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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores how traits of a mass casualty event and community institutionalization 
affect how a community demonstrates solidarity after a mass casualty event. A systematic 
examination of mass casualty events along these lines has not been conducted before. 
Theoretically, individual helping behaviors like altruism help explain individual involvement in 
demonstrations of solidarity while solidarity and resilience help in explaining group behaviors. A 
typology is proposed that breaks up mass casualty events into four different types: terrorism, 
criminal, weather and accidents. These types of events make up the majority of non-war mass 
casualty events. Experimentally a sample of students is used to assess how individuals are likely 
to respond to mass casualty events by gauging how they would respond using five different types 
of demonstrations of solidarity. Findings suggest that victim type positively influences 
demonstrations of solidarity while casualty number and event type are only selectively 
influential. Two cases (Orlando, FL 2016 and San Bernardino, CA 2015) are used to test three 
hypotheses that are related to how a community demonstrates solidarity after a mass casualty 
event. Results indicate that victim type positively influences demonstrations of solidarity, 
particularly through the specific institutions within vulnerable communities that increased access 
to demonstrations. Additionally, increased institutionalization within the victim community also 
positively influences demonstrations of solidarity. Furthermore, results suggest that event 
specific traits do influence demonstrations of solidarity under certain circumstances. However, 
more empirical research is needed to examine how individuals respond and the exact processes 
available to communities that would aid in their recovery from such an event. 
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I wish to dedicate this project to the victims of mass casualty events and the first responders who 
deal with the aftermath of such events firsthand. While these events are traumatic and life 
changing, a new sense of normalcy is achievable where the victims are honored, causes of such 
events are confronted, and the institutional support is plenty.  
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSES TO MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 
 
Natural and man-made disasters are likely to increase as the 21st century progresses 
(Rogge 2004). Over the past two decades, the number of events that result in multiple deaths 
have increased in the United States (Schenk et al. 2014). These events are often referred to as 
mass casualty events and these incidents can take the form of terrorist or criminal acts, acts of 
nature or accidents. Though there are some disagreements in the literature, this paper follows the 
common definition of a mass casualty event as causing at least five deaths (Arnold, Halpern, 
Tsai & Smithline 2004; Park, Shin, Song, Hong & Kim 2016). Between 2000 and 2016 there 
were 140 mass casualty events in the United States.1 Violent criminal acts, such as the 2012 
Newton Connecticut shooting that killed 28 people, accounted for 42 events. Terrorist acts, such 
as the 2012 Boston Bombing that killed 6 people, accounted for only 13 events. Accidents, like 
the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in 2001 that caused 265 deaths, account for 49 events. 
Acts of nature, like Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that killed approximately 1,800 people, account 
for 36 events.   
Mass casualty events not only take lives but also are traumatic for the communities in 
which they occur. The community is strained following a mass casualty event and people are 
often dealing with sudden loss. Therefore, victims of these events need help following such a 
traumatic event to return to normalcy. Some communities respond resiliently with high numbers 
of demonstrations of solidarity and return to normal quickly. Other communities do not respond 
resiliently; demonstrations of solidarity are few and the return to normalcy for the victim 
 
1 Based on an original database created using news sources of mass casualty events. See Appendix A for complete 
database. 
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community takes longer. Why do some communities respond resiliently while others do not? 
What determines the scale of community response to a mass casualty event? Demonstrations of 
solidarity are common when a mass casualty event occurs, however, there is little empirical 
research on what influences the scale of the demonstrations. Understanding what influences 
demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event can assist in building more resilient 
communities facing the trauma caused by these events.  
Most of the research involving mass casualty incidents is from emergency management 
and focuses on the initial response to the event. However, theories and findings on collective 
action and solidarity are becoming more important when analyzing community behaviors 
following a mass casualty event. This growing body of research is important because it helps 
explain how communities react following a trauma, including which communities demonstrate 
solidarity. Understanding of what influences demonstrations of solidarity following an event is 
important as it can affect post event behaviors and policy. For example, communities that are 
unable to make robust demonstrations of solidarity may need to receive additional financial and 
institutional support.  
Demonstrations of solidarity begin at the individual level and are driven by individuals 
with a strong desire to participate in helping behaviors. Community institutions play a pivotal 
role because they transform those individual desires into action by organizing demonstrations 
and providing an outlet for those altruistic individuals.  
This dissertation has five chapters. Chapter 2 is a literature review focused on social 
solidarity, community resilience and charitable giving. Existing literature on social solidarity and 
community resilience does not include actual demonstrations of solidarity in their findings. 
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Literature on altruism and charitable giving is common, however, neither have substantial 
empirical findings that examine how mass casualty events affect these behaviors. Chapter 3 
proposes a theory of individual and community response, and generates four hypotheses:  
• Hypothesis 1: Higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
• Hypothesis 2: Violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than 
nonviolent events. 
o Hypothesis 2a: Terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of 
solidarity than other event types.  
• Hypothesis 3: Events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will 
generate more demonstrations of solidarity.  
• Hypothesis 4:  Victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization 
will have more demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event. 
o Hypothesis 4a: A strong response from government institution leaders will 
lead to more demonstrations of solidarity. 
o Hypothesis 4b: A strong specific institutional response will lead to more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
This chapter introduces a figure that explains the processes behind demonstrating solidarity after 
a mass casualty event. It also discusses the intervening role the media has in relaying the facts of 
an event to the general public. Social capital is also discussed as an unobserved intervening 
variable. Social capital and institutional trust allow individuals to demonstrate solidarity with the 
help of institutions.  
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Chapter 4 tests hypotheses 1-3 using a survey experiment. The sample of UCF students 
participated in an experiment with vignettes that varied casualty numbers, event type and victim 
type. After each vignette those surveyed had the option to respond to each event through five 
different demonstrations of solidarity; social media response, volunteering time, donating blood, 
donating money or participating in a vigil. Results indicate that demonstrations of solidarity are 
only selectively influenced by casualty number and weather events influenced demonstrations of 
solidarity more than other event types. However, results do suggest that a vulnerable victim type 
will motivate individuals to demonstrate solidarity more than when a nonvulnerable group is 
targeted. 
Chapter 5 tests the first, third and fourth hypotheses using a case study design based on 
the cases of the Pulse night club terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida in the Summer of 2016 and 
the San Bernardino, California terrorist attack in the Winter of 2015. Case selection does not 
meet most similar criteria; each variable is analyzed independently within each case to show 
variable influence. In addition to primary and secondary source material, interviews were 
conducted with local community leaders to better articulate and understand the demonstrations of 
solidarity that followed each mass casualty event. Findings suggest that when vulnerable victim 
groups are targeted in a mass casualty event, higher demonstrations of solidarity do indeed 
follow. Findings also suggest that greater institutionalization within the victim group increases 
demonstrations of solidarity.  
Chapter 6 presents the findings and provides suggestions for future empirical research. 
Overall, results suggest that multiple community and event related factors can influence 
demonstrations of solidarity. Understanding what influences demonstrations of solidarity is an 
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important step in understanding resiliency to mass casualty events. Future experimental research 
would benefit from adding more variation in casualty numbers when testing their effects upon 
demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, future experimental research would also benefit from 
including other event specific factors (like familiarization) when testing event type effects upon 
demonstrations of solidarity. Future qualitative research would benefit from increasing the 
number of cases and from implementing a most similar design so the inferences made would be 
stronger. Additionally, it is suggested that future research examine general community behaviors 
like crime rates (not just demonstrations of solidarity) following a mass casualty event and the 
use of quantitative methods.  
Mass Casualty Events, Community & Government Response & Demonstrations of Solidarity  
 
In order to understand the research questions, it is important to introduce several 
important concepts and factors that will aid in putting this dissertation and its results into proper 
context. Mass casualty events are often defined in emergency response literature as “any event in 
which emergency medical services and resources are overwhelmed by the number and severity 
of casualties” (Mistovich 2013). Many jurisdictions define a mass casualty event based on a 
relatively small numerical threshold (5 in New York City, 6 in South Korea etc.) (Arnold, 
Halpern, Tsai & Smithline 2004; Park, Shin, Song, Hong & Kim 2016). For the purpose of this 
dissertation, events that resulted in five or more deaths from a single cause were considered to be 
mass casualty events. Five deaths from a single source often cause an overwhelming of medical 
services seen in other definitions as opposed to simply relying on a high count. Additionally, five 
deaths from a single source are also likely to receive increased media coverage. This coverage 
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then informs the rest of the community the facts of the event and thus enables individuals to 
demonstrate solidarity with the victims. 
Mass casualty events are often a collective trauma in that they can impact an entire 
community not only those immediately affected. They elicit an emotional response amongst 
people who are not directly involved with the killings. Collective trauma refers to the 
psychological reactions to a major event that can affect an entire society (Hirschberger 2018). It 
will be a collective trauma because it is believed that these sudden deaths will cause a 
community to react with a surge of behaviors to help the victims and the community. 
Community is often defined as groups of individuals who share an origin, culture, 
history, laws, values, and geographic proximity, however, there may be considerable diversity 
amongst a community (Pfefferbaum et al. 2007). Though proximity to a traumatic event has been 
shown to increase solidarity, community is not bound strictly in geographic terms (Brenner et al. 
2015). Communities reflect beliefs, perceptions and attitudes that potentially influence behavior. 
Interaction between members is crucial because without it, values and norms cannot be shared, 
which gives a community its identity. People are not bound to a single community and 
communities often exist within one another. Communities nest within each other and coexist side 
by side. However, certain sections of a community are often aligned alongside different identity 
traits such as ethnicity or religion. These nested communities may respond more strongly to 
certain stimuli, such as the sudden death of many of their members and that specific nested 
community may demonstrate solidarity strongly. That proximity, and sense of community allows 
for a collective effervescence like response to occur following a mass casualty event, resulting in 
demonstrations of solidarity (Durkheim 1912). 
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A strong local government response allows for a community that had just been subjected 
to a mass casualty event to stabilize and demonstrations of solidarity to begin. It is the primary 
responsibility of the local government to respond and prepare to all phases of emergency 
management for these events, regardless of specific type. Local governments are also tasked by 
the community to organize and participate in demonstrations of solidarity. If additional resources 
are needed, then the local government will go through five steps: (1) declare a local state of 
emergency, (2) activate mutual aid with other agencies, activate emergency operations center 
and/or emergency operations plans, (3) coordinate response with public and private organizations 
and (4) notify state emergency management (NAEMT 2017).2 Following that declaration, the 
state government can then declare a state of emergency and request federal aid via the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Governor of a state can then make a request to 
the President and an emergency declaration can be made if it is needed to save lives, protect 
property, safeguard public health or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe (NAEMT 2017). 
The most serious of disasters can be declared Major Disasters and the response and recovery 
efforts to such events can provide more federal assistance. Subsequent involvement of other 
government institutions, either through mutual aid or through an emergency declaration, can 
affect demonstrations of solidarity greatly. The addition of these other institutions can take some 
of the burden off the local government institutions allowing demonstrations to occur, or they 
may bring in their own apparatuses to demonstrate solidarity. Relief provided by additional 
government institutions allows for local institutions to prioritize demonstrations of solidarity. 
 
2 The National Incident Management System (NIMS) drives disaster response in the U.S. and other areas and it has 
been empirically suggested that these principles aid in alleviating many issues that arise when local institutions 
respond to large scale events (El Sayed 2013; Dal Ponte et al. 2015). 
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Demonstrations of solidarity are acts or behaviors that individuals and communities 
engage in. They take place following traumatic events or other scenarios such as the death of a 
public figure or polarizing events, etc. Some demonstrations are actual, meaningful behaviors, 
while others are symbolic with little or no actual impact. For example, demonstrations like 
donating money, blood or volunteering time occur at the cost of the donor. Other demonstrations, 
like social media responses, do not occur at the cost of the donor and are more symbolic in 
nature. These behaviors often take place following a mass casualty event and are the dependent 
variable in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2: DURKHEIM, RESILIENCE, SOLIDARITY & INDIVIDUAL GIVING 
BEHAVIORS 
 
In AD 79, Roman Emperor Titus used the imperial treasury to aid the victims of the 
Mount Vesuvius eruption in what could be one of the first official demonstrations of solidarity 
(Higgins 2009). Informal methods of collectively demonstrating solidarity with the victims of a 
traumatic event likely go back to when communities first formed and humans began helping one 
another when in need. The French Sociologist Emile Durkheim defined solidarity as a “bond of 
unity between individuals, united around a common goal or against a common enemy” 
(Durkheim 1893). Durkheim further described solidarity as the “totality of bonds that bind us to 
one another and to society, which shape the mass of individuals into a cohesive aggregate” 
(Durkheim 1984).  
Understanding how communities respond to mass casualty events is the first step in 
understanding which communities participate in demonstrations of solidarity and which 
communities do not. My analysis of the literature highlights important findings regarding 
demonstrations of solidarity and is split into two sections. The first section is focused primarily 
on the ideas and work of Emile Durkheim, which include community effervescence and 
resilience, social solidarity and group behaviors. The second section is focused on individual 
behaviors and covers generally charitable giving behaviors, altruism and social capital. 
There are two major limitations in the existing literature. First, while individual giving 
behavior has been systematically examined, only very rarely has it been examined as a 
demonstration of solidarity to a mass casualty event. A traumatic event, such as a mass casualty 
event, is likely to affect existing giving behaviors at the individual level but the effect of such 
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events has not been empirically researched. Prior findings regarding charitable giving would be 
applicable to understanding demonstrations of solidarity as the same individual processes would 
motivate people to give. Second, community level demonstrations of solidarity following a mass 
casualty event have not been examined. Existing literature regarding group behaviors following a 
mass casualty event is limited and does not explain how event specific traits could influence 
community response.  
Group Behaviors, Community Effervescence & Social Solidarity 
 
In 1912, Emile Durkheim described how a community may come together to 
communicate the same thought and participate in the same action (Durkheim 1912). This became 
known as collective effervescence and it can be easily applied to describe how a community may 
come together following a mass casualty event in order to demonstrate solidarity. Collective 
action is driven by an individual emotional response which drives people to participate in similar 
actions. Collective emotions after a disaster are associated with higher solidarity (Garcia and 
Rime 2019). Participating in demonstrations of solidarity reinforces both positive social beliefs 
or shared positive beliefs regarding the group (Rime 2005). These demonstrations act as 
motivators of commitment with values and beliefs. Participation in these demonstrations helps to 
emphasize the positive aspects of collective experience following a trauma. Additionally, 
participation in these community wide events has been shown to enhance social identity (Neville 
and Reicher 2011), ethnic identification (Gasparre, Bosco and Bellelli 2010) and identity fusion3 
(Swann et al. 2012). Participation in collective emotional gatherings has also been shown to 
 
3 Identity fusion is a “sense of oneness with a group and its individual members that motivates personally, costly, 
pro-group behaviors” (Swann and Buhrmester 2012). 
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increase social cohesion and social integration (Weiss and Richards 1997) and perceived social 
support (Paez et al. 2007). Collective effervescence is visible in communities following a mass 
casualty event in the group demonstrations (vigils, gatherings, funds gathered etc.) that often 
follow, often to express solidarity with the victims. 
Durkheim (1893) noted that “heinous crimes shock our collective conscience and elicit a 
communal response because of the collective nature of the sentiments the crimes cause” while 
also noting that “crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them.” Conflict, 
natural disasters, terrorism and school shootings have been found to produce solidarity, however, 
how conflict is produced is elusive (Simmell 1955; Coser 1957; Barton 1969; Collins 2004; 
Drabek 1986; Fritz 1961; Hawdon, Ryan and Agnich 2010; Hawdon and Ryan 2011; Turkel 
2002). Vuori et al. (2013) tested Durkheim’s notion of crime leading to collective indignation 
and examined how particularly heinous crimes can lead to a decline in social order or a 
promotion of social cohesion. Their results indicated that both models may be applicable. Factors 
like how an event is framed, the size and experiences of the community limit the generalizability 
of both models.  
Capriano (2006) described solidarity as the degree of trust, sense of familiarity, and 
bonding relations between individuals and the collectivity. Social solidarity is an aspect of 
human association that emphasizes the cohesive social bond that holds a group together (Gilson 
2003). Individuals have different motives for participating in demonstrations of solidarity. 
Motives for participating in social solidarity include rational choice, self-interest, shared norms 
and beliefs. Using a sample of Virginia Tech students, Hawdon, Ryan and Agnich (2009) found 
that feelings of solidarity increased for six months following the 2007 on campus shooting that 
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cost 30 lives before decreasing back to normal levels. Collins (2004), looking primarily at 
terrorism, further specified that group solidarity following a conflict exists in four phases: (1) an 
initial few days of shock and idiosyncratic individual reaction to attack; (2) one to two weeks of 
establishing standardized displays of solidarity symbols; (3) two to three months of high 
solidarity plateau; and (4) gradual decline toward normalcy in six to nine months. Brenner et al. 
(2015) found that proximity to a traumatic event increased likelihood of participation in 
demonstrations of solidarity. Sweet (1998) found that solidarity also increased following a 
natural disaster, however, within a month it returned to pre-disaster levels. Hawdon and Ryan 
(2011) elaborated on their initial study by using longitudinal data and found that event-specific 
parochial and public activities generate solidarity but general parochial activities (such as 
attending local meetings and businesses) are needed to sustain solidarity. Rasanen (2014) found 
that social solidarity can assist in reducing the worry associated with potential risks and provide 
a sense of security, however, benefits are limited.  
Social solidarity and collective action are often enhanced by individual trust, reciprocity 
and altruism (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Social altruism deals with community wide helping 
behaviors where individual altruism deals with individual desires to participate in helping 
behaviors. Social altruism has been defined as “the community’s commitment to provide 
essential resources in order to help and protect their members” (Chamlin and Cochran 1997). 
Like community effervescence, social solidarity describes group behavior, in this case the 
community in which a mass casualty event occurred. However, the main difference is that social 
solidarity describes general solidarity feelings whereas collective effervescence describes a 
specific collective action.  
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Community Resilience & Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
Solidarity is part of being resilient because it helps a community address and overcome a 
trauma. Community resilience describes the collective ability of a geographically defined area to 
deal with stressors and efficiently return to normalization of daily life following a shock (Aldrich 
2012). Community resilience is founded in the ability of community members to take 
meaningful, deliberate, collective action to remedy the effect of a problem, including the ability 
to interpret the environment, intervene, and move on (Pfefferbaum et al. 2007). Resilient 
communities demonstrate solidarity following a traumatic event like a mass casualty event. 
Mass casualty events are traumatic events that strain a community’s sense of wellbeing 
due to the shock and sudden loss of life. Resilience itself is the ability to execute efficient and 
effective adjustment processes to alleviate stress and restore balance in the face of trauma, 
tragedy or threat (Steinberg and Ritzmann 1990). For a community to be effectively resilient, 
members need to cope individually and assist other members of the community to cope with the 
situation. Community resilience fortifies a community against a variety of social concerns and 
prepares individuals for future hardship (Brown and Kulig, 1996-1997; Kulig 2000). Many 
disciplines, such as emergency management, sociology and psychology are slowly 
acknowledging the concept of community resilience as a preparedness strategy for mass casualty 
events and as a mechanism to prevent damaging psychological, psychosomatic, and social 
consequences associated with terrorism and other disasters (Friedman 2005).  
Community resilience has grown into a central concept within crisis management 
policymaking and its effects are evident within national governments (COAG 2009; CCS 2011; 
USDHS 2011), humanitarian organizations (UNISDR 2007; USAID 2012), and across cross-
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institutional crisis management forums (Bach et al. 2010). However, solid empirical findings 
supporting the concepts behind community resilience are lacking. Community resilience theories 
were empirically tested in Queensland, Australia following a series of floods in 2010-2011 
(George and Stark 2016; McCrea, Walton and Leonard 2016; Madsen and O’Mullan 2016). 
These publications found that a general well-being of the community (prior to the events) 
contributed greatly to overall resiliency (McCrea, Walton and Leonard 2016), that a strong 
community was formed due to the crisis (George and Stark 2016) and social capital, 
connectedness, and optimism are all important features of a resilient community (Madsen and 
O’Mullan 2016).  
Resilient communities demonstrate solidarity following a mass casualty event. 
Communities can become resilient in two ways. First is through prior exposure to traumatic 
events. The communities that learn from and persevere through earlier traumatic events become 
more resilient as they continue on. As other traumatic events occur, these resilient communities 
are prepared for them and respond with meaningful demonstrations of solidarity. However, 
communities where disasters or traumatic events have become commonplace may not respond 
with high demonstrations of solidarity as the community will have become more accustomed to 
them occurring. Return to normalization would be quick for them and they may not appear to 
respond resiliently as demonstrations of solidarity would not be as high. However, return to 
normalization is the ultimate goal for a community following a mass casualty event and a quick 
return to normalization would be a sign of a resilient community. Second, is through training and 
preparation for traumatic events. Communities can prematurely increase their resilience by 
preparing for different traumatic events that may afflict them. Resilience training includes 
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educating people as to the role their institutions play and the methods of demonstrating solidarity 
available after traumatic events. Non-resilient communities will have lesser demonstrations of 
solidarity and return to normalization would take longer.  
When Demonstrations Do Not Occur 
 
Actual demonstrations of solidarity that follow a mass casualty event occur at varying 
levels. In some communities, demonstrations occur at minimal levels while other communities 
demonstrate strongly. Prominent mass casualty events, like 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina, 
commonly raise millions of dollars, receive consistent media coverage and people consistently 
demonstrate solidarity for these events well after normalcy has returned. Other mass casualty 
events have very little or no demonstrations of solidarity at all. The majority of the 140 events 
that occurred in the U.S. from 2000-2016 have no or minimal demonstrations recorded.4 When 
demonstrations of solidarity are lacking or nonexistent it is often for three reasons. First, 
individual interest in an event is lacking. Lack of interest may occur for a variety of reasons 
including a low victim count, unknown victim group, blame for the victims, lack of awareness, 
etc. Second, traumatic events may become too common during a timeframe. Trauma fatigue 
involves a “numbness” to traumatic events, and if trauma becomes too common then individuals 
would not respond to an event at all. Third, institutional support may be lacking around certain 
mass casualty events. Without effective institutions to channel those interested in demonstrating 
into actual, meaningful behaviors, then demonstrations would be low.  
 
4 Based on an original database created using news sources of mass casualty events. See Appendix A for complete 
database. 
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 In 1965, Mancur Olson suggested that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests” (Olson 1965 P.2). This phenomenon became known as 
the free rider problem and it is applied to many analyses of collective action. Existing literature 
suggests that free riding is common following a disaster (Walsh and Warland 1983; Collins 
2004). In the context of this dissertation, free riding would occur when individuals do not 
demonstrate or only demonstrate minimally but still reap the social benefits. As Olson suggested, 
self-interest has been found to be the biggest driver of free riding following a disaster (Walsh and 
Warland 1983). However, communication failures by groups that organize demonstrations of 
solidarity also significantly increased free riding (Walsh and Warland 1983). Individuals with 
little motivation or who may desire to participate in demonstrations of solidarity but may only 
have limited means may respond “slacktively” (Phan 2001).   
Slacktivist demonstrations include simple forms of showing solidarity with a cause that 
require minimal effort, have minimal effects, and require minimal coordination with others. The 
internet and social media play an important part in aiding the slacktivist mentality. For example, 
the most often used example of slacktivism is posting a message or picture on social media 
showing solidarity with the victims. These messages are simple demonstrations of solidarity but 
do not benefit the victims or community in a concrete way.  
A multitude of factors can influence a community into responding with low levels of 
demonstrations of solidarity. For example, a lack of altruistic individuals would increase levels 
of free riding. A lack of community institutions that enable actual demonstrations to occur would 
increase slacktivist responses. Communities that do not respond with high levels of 
demonstrations of solidarity are less-resilient. Additionally, communities that demonstrate 
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solidarity strongly or return to normalization quickly while meeting all community needs would 
be considered resilient. 
Demonstrations of Solidarity & Individual Giving Behaviors 
 
In 2017, Americans donated just over $410 billion to charity (Giving USA 2018). Many 
recipients of these charitable acts are influenced by world events. For example, $2.4 billion were 
donated to the victims of the September 11th terrorist attack and $3.3 billion were raised for 
Hurricane Katrina disaster relief (Brown and Minty 2008). Demonstrations of solidarity like 
these are one of the dependent variables throughout this dissertation.5  
Understanding who participates in charitable behavior has been thoroughly examined. 
However, why people demonstrate solidarity and what motives people into demonstrating 
solidarity has not been examined. Two factors that influence charitable giving are altruism and 
social capital. Altruism is defined as the belief in or practiced disinterested and selfless concern 
for the well-being of others (Taylor 2010). Social capital is an idea that is closely related to 
solidarity (Bell 2010). Trust and existing social networks are two key components of social 
capital. Access to social networks directly increases volunteering and charitable giving indirectly 
(Musick and Wilson 2008; Burr et al. 2005; Lee and Brudney 2012; Schervish and Havens 
1997). Coleman (1988) proposed that the more dense and diverse social networks are along with 
how trusting a person is are likely to influence how involved someone is in solidarity action.  
 
5This kind of charitable giving is viewed as different from philanthropy by scholars. Charity in general is associated 
with a strong, short and emotional response whereas philanthropy is seen as involving a long-term effort (Ruesga 
2006) Though philanthropy and charity have a considerable overlap the main difference is that charity aims to 
relieve the pain of a specific problem and is often motivated by specific events whereas philanthropy seeks to 
solve a root issue (Ruesga 2006; Dietlin 2011). 
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Who Demonstrates Solidarity? 
 
Scholars have identified several individual factors that explain who demonstrates 
solidarity. Demographically, older people are much less likely to physically volunteer than 
younger people (O’Brien and Mileti 1992; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Haines, Hurlbert, and 
Beggs 1996; Bjaklebring et al. 2016). Economically, higher status and more income facilitates 
demonstrations of solidarity, particularly financial demonstrations (Nelson 1973; Nelson and 
Dynes 1976; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Bracha and Vesterlund 2013). Previous findings indicate 
that women were more likely to participate in demonstrations of solidarity (Helms and 
McKenzie 2013; Mesch et al. 2006; Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). Religiously affiliated 
individuals give more than non-religious individuals, particularly when the cause is religious in 
nature (Wang and Graddy 2008; Sibley and Bulbulia 2014; Hagood 2016). Higher income status 
has also been found to directly affect giving behaviors, both amount and frequency (Bracha and 
Vesterlund 2013). Many findings do not consider how traumatic events may impact donation 
behavior. An emotional element is necessary for donating to charity and demonstrating solidarity 
following a mass casualty event. However, why people demonstrate and how mass casualty 
events affect demonstrations has not. 
Individual Motivations to Demonstrate 
 
Charitable giving is driven by eight mechanisms; awareness of need, solicitation, costs 
and benefits of giving, altruism, reputation, psychological benefits, values and efficacy (Bekkers 
and Wiepking 2011). Of those eight mechanisms awareness of need and altruism are the most 
important to this dissertation. Following a mass casualty event, the needs of the victim 
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community would be paramount and awareness of those needs, along with individual altruism 
would drive demonstrations of solidarity. Sympathy and empathy, guilt, happiness and identity 
have all been found to influence individuals into giving (Rick, Cryder and Loewenstein 2007; 
Cialdini, Baumann and Kenrick 1981; Liu and Aaker 2008). These feelings can all influence 
demonstrations of solidarity after a mass casualty event. For example, an individual who feels 
pity (sympathy) or understands the feelings (empathy) of the direct victims of a mass casualty 
event could feel compelled to demonstrate solidarity.  
Public donations, such as donating blood and volunteering time, to relief operations can 
be considered a pro-social behavior (Penner et al. 2005). Relatively, Lee and Chang (2007) 
found that intrinsic factors like individual altruism led people to donate while specific factors 
like educational attainment and income were correlated with higher monetary donation amounts. 
Donating previously to a relief campaign had been found to be a predictor of future donation to a 
relief campaign (Cheung and Chan 2000). In a comparison of donation types, Lee, Piliavin and 
Call (1999) found that personal norms and role identity affect the giving of time, money and 
blood. Lee, Piliavin and Call (1999) further established that charitable donations and formal 
volunteering are closely related but were unable to establish a relationship between these types of 
giving and donating blood. 
Altruism 
 
Individual altruism deals with individual helping behaviors while social altruism is 
focused on community wide helping behaviors. Disasters positively influence altruism by 
increasing donations of material aid and decreasing antisocial behaviors (Mileti et al. 1975; 
Drabek 1986; Siegel et al. 1999). People have been found to engage in altruistic helping 
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behaviors, putting themselves at risk to save the lives of others (Tierney et al. 2001). An 
endogenous relationship appears to exist between acts of altruism and positive feelings. For 
example, happy people have been empirically shown to participate in charitable behavior more 
than their unhappy counterparts (Isen and Levin 1972; Aderman 1972). However, altruistic acts, 
such as gift giving and charitable donations, have also been shown to promote happiness (Anik et 
al. 2009). Feelings of competence have been shown to increase helping and volunteering 
behaviors (Harris and Huang 1973; Kazdin and Bryan 1971).  
Barton (1969) proposed that altruistic feelings within a community afflicted by a 
traumatic event may carry on for months after the event. However, other empirical work has 
found that a therapeutic, helping community is not enduring (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977). High 
altruistic behavior was associated with blood donation frequency, though convenience, 
community safety and personal benefit were also found to be correlated with blood donations 
(Steele et al. 2008). People who desire to participate in demonstrations but have limited abilities 
to do so would likely be directed towards symbolic acts that have little importance. Prior 
empirical work examining who is altruistic and participates in donations can be applied to this 
dissertation. The same individuals who have donated before or possess altruistic traits would 
likely be the ones who demonstrate solidarity after a mass casualty event.   
Social Capital, Social Networks and Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
Social capital has been defined as “social networks and the associated norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness” (Putnam 2007).  Individual level social capital in producing 
demonstrations of solidarity has already been well established (Bekkers 2012; Brooks 2005; 
Brown & Ferris 2007; Forbes & Zampelli 2014; Jones 2006; Wang & Graddy 2008; Wilson & 
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Musick 1997). Social capital is an important part of understanding the inner workings of a 
community as it related to inter-community relationships. Without the trust and inter-personal 
networks that comes with high social capital, a community would be disjointed and less likely to 
respond to a mass casualty event effectively.  
Patulny, Siminski and Mendolia (2015) suggested that the emotional and shared 
experience of participating in symbolic interaction rituals (such as those following a mass 
casualty event) may affect social capital in that it may bond participants to one another. In a 
distressed community social capital sustains problem solving abilities while also linking 
individuals to the broader society and other problem-solving efforts (Bendik 1993). Musick and 
Wilson (2008) found that individuals who have access to larger social networks volunteer more. 
Larger social networks are likely to increase informal volunteering (Haines et al. 1996; Kaniasty 
and Norris 1995; Burr et al. 2005; Lee and Brudney 2012) while also drawing people into 
charitable giving through information and requests (Schervish and Havens 1997).   
As social media usage has increased, social networks have transformed and utilize 
cyberspace in order to operate. Social media can provide information to a large number of people 
very quickly, which is beneficial during an emergency situation when traditional communication 
methods may be overwhelmed. Institutions and organizations are now using the online platform 
to reach citizens and to aid in collective action and guide people away from these symbolic 
demonstrations into more actual ones (Obar, Zube and Lampe 2012). The ease of access many 
people now have to the internet and social media has also aided in collective actions (such as 
demonstrations of solidarity) as it has increased networking amongst people while 
simultaneously keeping people in touch with organizations and institutions within their 
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communities (Obar, Zube and Lampe 2012). The creation of online donation relief funds after a 
mass casualty event have become commonplace. These online fundraising efforts make it easy 
and convenient for individuals to demonstrate solidarity with the victims. While social media 
responses may have minimal effects, they are still demonstrations of solidarity because they are 
acts that show personal solidarity with the victims of an event. 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, demonstrations of solidarity and there causes need to be examined at both 
the individual and group level. Prior findings on group behaviors indicate that solidarity and 
resilience selectively occur following a traumatic event. Demonstrations of solidarity are 
indicative of a resilient community; however, resilient communities do not always demonstrate 
solidarity. Prior findings on individual giving behaviors indicate that people donate for a variety 
of reasons. Additionally, altruism, social capital and access to social networks are strong 
predictors of individual giving behaviors. These individual measures of giving behavior are 
likely to indicate participation in demonstrations of solidarity.  
Demonstrations of solidarity are made up primarily of individual giving behaviors that 
occur following an event that show support with the victims. Individual giving behaviors have 
been examined as a demonstration of solidarity. However, how do event specific traits affect 
individuals and their giving behaviors. For example, does the number of people killed during an 
event influence individual donation behavior? If specific groups are targeted, how does the 
perception of the victims affect demonstrations of solidarity? The empirical research within this 
dissertation attempts to answer each of these questions. 
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Understanding solidarity and resilience and the conditions in which they occur helps 
explain how a mass casualty event could affect a community. However, prior work does not 
effectively analyze demonstrations of solidarity as a sign of resilience. Additionally, the trauma 
of a mass casualty event upon a community has not been examined, particularly along event trait 
lines. Do certain types of the mass casualty events affect communities differently than others?  
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CHAPTER 3: ELEMENTS OF SOLIDARITY 
 
The facts of an event are what motivates people and institutions to participate in 
demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event. This theory is rooted in the notion 
that event specific traits (such as casualty number, event type, victim type) will motivate people 
to demonstrate solidarity. All altruistic people will not demonstrate solidarity following a mass 
casualty event. Additionally, some people with minimal altruistic traits will be motivated to 
demonstrate solidarity. However, individuals with altruistic traits are more likely to demonstrate 
solidarity, either individually or through a community level organization following a mass 
casualty event. Without institutions and willingness of the community to participate in actual 
helping behaviors, demonstrations of solidarity would likely be lessened. Figure 1 provides a 
visual representation of how a mass casualty event can influence demonstrations of solidarity.  
 
Figure 1: Solidarity Model 
Event specific traits such as casualty amount, type of event, and victim type will 
influence people into participating in demonstrations of solidarity. Media coverage acts as an 
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intervening variable as the facts of the event can only be influential on individuals and 
institutions to respond if those facts are relayed to the community.6 Reporting by the media also 
covers demonstrations of solidarity which informs community members of their occurrence and 
sparks individual interest to participate in demonstrations. The facts of the event also influence 
institutions into responding and providing opportunities for people to demonstrate solidarity. 
Community institutions allow for interested people to have methods to demonstrate solidarity. 
These institutions often organize and solicit demonstrations of solidarity for the community. 
Social capital acts as an intervening variable between individuals and institutions due to the 
trustworthiness and social networking associated with it. Without those networks and 
trustworthiness in post mass casualty event processes, demonstrations of solidarity would likely 
be hampered.  
The coverage of an event acts as an intervening variable between the facts surrounding an 
event and the response by the community. The media is naturally drawn to covering ongoing or 
potential conflicts, particularly shocking, or sensational events (Tuman 2010). Studies of United 
States media has found that sensationalism is a strong driving force behind what is covered 
(Slattery and Hakanen 1994; Adams 1978; Slattery, Doremus and Marcus 2001). Disasters, 
violence, crimes, sex, fires and riots are often typified as sensational (Adams 1978; Grabe et al. 
2001; Hendriks Vettehen et al. 2005; Newhagen and Reeves 1992; Ryu 1982). A systematic 
examination of cause of death and media coverage revealed that media coverage significantly 
covered homicide and terrorism, even though they only account for a small fraction of overall 
 
6 Media sources are only utilized for the qualitative portion of this dissertation. They are not utilized for the 
experiment because respondents receive necessary information through the vignette that they would normally 
receive through media sources. 
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causes of death (Shen et al. 2018). Media coverage accomplishes two things; first it informs the 
public as to what had occurred, often profiling victims and identifying issues surrounding 
response and needs within the community going forward (Harris 2018). Emotionally charged 
images, such as those from coverage of a mass casualty event, have been found to have a 
significant impact on donation behavior (Small and Verrochi 2009). Second, media coverage 
pressures existing institutions to act. Coverage can impact public policy and even sway policy 
decisions (Gilboa 2005). Previous findings indicate that media coverage and individual exposure 
to that coverage is a strong predictor of donation to relief agencies (Eisensee and Stromberg 
2007; Brown and Minty 2008; Oosterhof, Heuvelman and Peters 2009).  
The interest in sensational news is based on the assumption that people are evolutionarily 
predisposed to survey their environment and react to anything that may be perceived as 
threatening (Vettehen and Kleemans 2017). Additionally, this predisposition is used to explain 
why people automatically respond to salient or negative news features (Davis and McLeod 2003; 
Lang 2000; Shoemaker 1996). Laboratory studies have shown that sensationalist framing of 
negative content had a positive effect on physiological indicators like short term attention and 
arousal responses (Grabe et al. 2000, 2003; Lang et al. 1996; Soroka and McAdams 2015).  
Social capital acts as an intervening variable between individuals and institutions within 
the community. Though social capital has had differing definitions, for the purpose of this 
dissertation it is defined as “social networks and associated norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness” (Putnam 2007). Individuals who desire to demonstrate solidarity may still do so 
without institutions. However, institutions organize and advertise their demonstrations, making it 
easier for individuals to participate in them and magnifying the effects of their efforts. If social 
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capital is low, then people may not trust the institutions and organizations who were coordinating 
demonstrations of solidarity and would not participate in them. Social capital is high when 
community members communicate well, trust their institutions and organize for a variety of 
different issues. When social capital is high, community members trust the institutional 
capabilities within their community and seek them out in order to demonstrate solidarity after a 
mass casualty event. Individual group membership is accounted for in the experiment based on 
the notion that if an individual is personally involved with groups, they trust them and are a part 
of those social networks and will thus have more access to demonstrations of solidarity.7  
Casualties 
 
Of the facts of an event, the number of casualties would likely impact people the most. 
Previous empirical findings suggest that the number of fatalities of natural disaster events 
positively influence the amount of money donated to recovery efforts (Evangelidis and Van den 
Bergh 2013). The statistical victim count of an event has also been shown to have a positive 
effect on donation behaviors (Lesner and Rasmussen 2014).  
Casualty Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
There are two reasons at the individual level and one at the community level that could 
explain why higher casualty numbers affect demonstrations of solidarity. At the individual level, 
as more people are killed due to an event, then more people are likely to have been directly 
affected by the tragedy through familial and association-based relationships. This leads to more 
 
7 Due to the difficulty in measuring social capital, it is not something operationally accounted for within the 
qualitative portion of this dissertation. 
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people participating in demonstrations of solidarity (St. John and Fuchs 2002). Death of a loved 
one generates a powerful emotional response that often mobilizes into individual or collective 
actions (Jasper 1997). Second, costlier events will be more sensational and thus draw more of a 
media coverage as found by Kearns, Betus and Lemieux (2019). This increased coverage of the 
event signals to people that there is more of a need due to the increased trauma a higher casualty 
count event will have. This increased signaling motivates more people to demonstrate solidarity. 
At the community level, a costlier event will require more institutional resources to stabilize the 
community. These institutions will then continue to be active within the community after the 
event has ended and they will organize and participate in demonstrations of solidarity. These 
factors suggest that: 
• Hypothesis 1: Higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of 
solidarity.  
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1CasualtyNumbers+βx+u 
 
Event Type 
 
Mass casualty events originate from different sources but for the purpose of this 
dissertation they fall into one of the following categories: terrorism, crime, acts of nature and 
accidents. Some events are the direct result of intentional human action; some are accidents; and 
some are natural in origin. When human caused, the intention of such events creates a difference 
that is perceived by the community.8 
 
8 Acts of war can cause mass casualty events and cause demonstrations of solidarity (Collins 2004). However, the 
acts of war the United States has faced since World War II are rare so they are not included in this dissertation. 
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Terrorism and crime are both violent, human-caused events. Terrorism involves a 
political goal that is meant to reach a larger audience (Kydd & Walter 2006; FBI 2019; GTD 
2019).9 Examples of terrorism include 9/11 and the Boston Bombing. Violent events that do not 
meet these criteria are treated as criminal events. The difference between crime and terrorism is 
in part a matter of perception. Violent criminal events primarily cover purposefully malicious 
acts like murder that do not include a political motive. Violent criminal events with five or more 
casualties are not uncommon but prominent examples include the 2007 Virginia Tech Shooting 
and the 2013 Washington D.C. Naval Shipyard shooting.  
Accidents are either unintentionally human caused events or occur due to a mechanical or 
technological failure. The people who cause them do not have a malicious intent to kill others 
like in criminal acts. Accidental mass casualty events are often transportation related. Well 
known examples of accidental mass casualty events include the Philadelphia train crash in 2015 
that killed 8 and the Minneapolis bridge collapse in 2007 that killed 13. 
Nature can also cause mass casualty events. Natural events include floods, mudslides, 
earthquakes, wildfires and weather events. Unlike some mass casualty events, natural events can 
sometimes be predicted and people can either evacuate or better prepare for them. For example, 
tracking and projection of hurricanes is common and earthquake fault lines are well known and 
building codes reflect the risks of the events. Natural events have the capability to create the 
most destruction when they occur and people often fear natural disasters more than other types of 
mass casualty events (Healthcare Ready 2018). Weather events include hurricanes, tornadoes 
 
9 Huff and Kertzer (2016) specifically noted how the severity and extremity of violence can influence how likely an 
individual is to believe an event is terrorism or not. 
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and other types of storms. People are also most exposed to weather events, making victims more 
sympathetic as response to them is more relatable.  
Table 1: Event Type Examples 
 
Violent Event Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
Violent events where numerous people are purposefully killed have a different effect 
upon a community than when people die by accident or act of nature. There are three reasons that 
explain why a violent event would cause more demonstrations of solidarity than a non-violent 
one. First, violent attacks cause a trauma not seen from other event types which causes a stronger 
emotional reaction from the community in which they occur. A violent event type shocks people 
within a community to feel as if they are under attack which motivates people into demonstrating 
solidarity. The lives of survivors of traumatic events become altered, often in revelatory and 
uncompromising ways (Herman 1992; Caruth 1996; Humphrey 2002; Edkins 2003). After a 
traumatic event, survivors are more likely work through their grief and trauma with a community 
that recognizes and identifies with them and a community familiar to them (Fierke 2004). 
Commemoration and remembrance following a traumatic event have been found to ease those 
Year Location Method Victims # Dead Year Location Method Victims # Dead
2016 Dallas, TX Firearms Law Enforcement 6 2016 Burlington, WA Firearms Mall Shoppers 5
2016 Orlando, FL Firearms Gay Nightclub 49 2015 Roseburg, OR Firearms College Students 9
2015 San Bernardino, CA Firearms Workplace 14 2014 Isla Vista, CA Firearms Women 6
2015 Chattanooga, TN Firearms Military Personnel 6 2013 Washington D.C. Firearms Naval Base 13
2015 Charleston, SC Firearms Black Church 9 2012 Newton, CT Firearms School Children 28
Year Location Method Victims # Dead Year Location Method Victims # Dead
2016 Lockhart, TX Airballoon Crash Passengers 16 2014 Snohomish, WA Mudslide Residents 49
2015 Philadelphia, PA Train Crash Passengers 8 2013 Yarnell, AZ Fire Firefighters 19
2011 Bronx, NY Bus Crash Passengers 11 2011 Joplin, MO Tornado Residents 158
2006 Lexington, KY Plane Crash Local Passengers 49 2011 Tuscaloosa, AL Tornado Residents 44
2003 West Warwick, RI Fire Concert Goers 100 2005 New Orleans, LAHurricane Poor/Black Residents 1464
Non-Violent
Terrorism Crime
Accidents Nature
Violent
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traumatic feelings (Edkins 2003). Each violent event will impact each community differently. 
However, a violent mass casualty event does represent a significant trauma upon a community 
that is not seen from other event types. That trauma then causes a strong emotional reaction 
within the community that leads to demonstrations of solidarity.  
Second, a violent event will draw more media coverage than a nonviolent one. Crime and 
terrorism are both sensational in nature and draw significant, consistent coverage whenever they 
occur. Shen et al. (2018) examined media coverage and found that homicide and terrorism were 
significantly covered more than other causes of death. Violent events also often carry legal and 
policy narratives, which keep the event in the news cycle for a longer period of time. The 
activism that occurs around these narratives draws media attention and the increased media 
coverage increases the chances of people learning of or being reminded of an event, which 
motivates interested people to demonstrate solidarity.  
Third, violent event types are directly caused by people, therefore, survivors and 
community members are likely to feel as if the event was avoidable and seek to put blame on 
others. These negative feelings are often directed against government leaders and will lead to 
more demonstrations. However, instead of those demonstrations being solely with the victims 
they are also against whoever is seen as being at fault. For example, the suspect in the 2018 
Parkland, Florida shooting had been reported to federal and local law enforcement for suspicious 
behaviors. However, nothing was done to act on any of the information reported to law 
enforcement and many of the demonstrations that occurred following the shooting were in 
solidarity with the victims and against the government (Wamsley 2018). These factors suggest 
that: 
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• Hypothesis 2: Violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent 
events.  
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1ViolentEvents+βx+u 
 
Terrorism is often seen as an attack upon a community, thus causing a stronger reaction 
amongst the victim community. Criminal events typically originate within the community and 
target based on individual interests. Terrorism often targets a specific group of people which can 
activate existing institutions within those nested communities into participating in 
demonstrations of solidarity. Knowledge that a specific group was targeted, for whatever reason, 
would also add onto the emotional reaction as it would cause similar people to feel under attack. 
Prior findings indicate that war and terrorism disrupt communities and cause strong emotional 
reactions to the violence (Hutchinson and Bleiker 2008). Additionally, major attacks, like Pearl 
Harbor and 9/11, have been found to inspire higher levels of community solidarity (Collins 
2004). Increases in altruism, kindness and solidarity were evident following the 9/11 attacks 
(Abrams, Albright & Panofsky 2004; Etzioni 2002; Steinert 2003). Terrorist events have led to 
large amounts of donations to the victims in their aftermaths (Glynn et al. 2003). Therefore: 
o Hypothesis 2a: Terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of solidarity than 
other event types.  
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1TerroristEvents+βx+u 
Victim Type 
 
The last event specific trait that could influence demonstrations of solidarity is the type of 
victim. Vulnerable groups often become victim by chance, such as when a school bus crashed in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee in 2016 that killed 6. Other mass casualty events strike at random 
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victims or groups that may not be perceived as vulnerable or sympathetic. For example, 10 
people from the Hendricks Motorsports organization were killed in a private plane crash in 2004. 
This victim group represented a specific group; however, they were not perceived to be a 
vulnerable group. Demonstrations in these cases are likely stronger within those certain groups, 
but without a vulnerable perception, demonstrations would not be higher across a community or 
population. In other cases, people who plan mass casualty events intentionally target specific, 
vulnerable victim groups such as school children in Newton, Connecticut or the LGBT 
community in Orlando, Florida.  
There are two types of victim vulnerability that could affect demonstrations of solidarity. 
The first are traditionally vulnerable groups (Wisner and Adams 2002). Traditionally vulnerable 
people are vulnerable due to age, illness, etc. Examples of traditionally vulnerable people include 
children, the elderly or disabled groups of people. Traditionally vulnerable victims are 
sympathetic to many people as they are relatable to the general population as these 
vulnerabilities do not discriminate across social class, ethnic or religious lines. Traditionally 
vulnerable people are common and often have a physical component in explaining their 
vulnerabilities. For example, children and the elderly often have physical limitations that prevent 
them from being resilient to trauma. Therefore, sympathetic people respond with more 
demonstrations of solidarity to compensate for those inabilities traditionally vulnerable groups 
have.  
The second are socially vulnerable groups. Socially vulnerable groups include those who 
have a documented history of marginalization and victimization. Examples of victims of this 
type of vulnerability include the LGBT community, religious, gender and racial groups. 
Additionally, people who are victimized perceive themselves and people similar to be more 
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vulnerable than nonvictims (Perloff and Fetzer 1986). People who are sympathetic with socially 
vulnerable groups may respond with more intense demonstrations as a response to the 
victimization the group had experienced. People who are not a part of the victim identity group 
must be aware of past treatment of the victim identity group and sympathize with them for that 
group to be perceived as vulnerable. Socially vulnerable groups often have limitations that 
prevent them from being resilient to trauma. These limitations exist due to victimization and 
marginalization that is common within a socially vulnerable group. While most people will trust 
traditionally vulnerable groups, some members of the public may not perceive socially 
vulnerable groups as vulnerable or sympathetic.  Perception of the vulnerability of these groups 
is dependent on the population knowing and being concerned about past victimization and 
marginalization of these groups. All people will not respond the same to traditionally and 
socially vulnerable groups.10  
Victim Type Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
There are two reasons that explain why a vulnerable victim type would motivate a 
community to demonstrate solidarity following a mass casualty event. First, the identifiability11 
of victims of disasters has been suggested to be influential in determining donation behavior 
(Cryder, Loewenstein and Scheines 2013). Rosenfeld et al. (2005) proposed that people who 
identify with, or see themselves as similar to the victims, are in closer social proximity to the 
victims and will be more sympathetic and respond stronger. Media coverage of an event that is 
 
10 A traditionally vulnerable group is used as an independent variable in the experiment while a socially vulnerable 
group is used as an independent variable in the qualitative section. 
11 Identifiability occurs when more information is relayed to the public, such as pictures of victims, individual 
backgrounds and specific information. 
35 
 
inclusive of victim characteristics allows for that traumatic event to transform from an event 
whose effects are limited to those immediately affected, to a collective trauma amongst those 
that identify with the victims. Characterization of victims as vulnerable is important as it elicits 
an emotional response. Perception of vulnerability is dependent on the individual, however, the 
media or community leadership may frame certain groups as vulnerable. However, once those 
victims are perceived to be vulnerable then demonstrations of solidarity will be higher. After 
some mass casualty events the media may consistently cover a small portion of the victim 
population that may be vulnerable. Media consumers will then perceive the victim group to be 
vulnerable based on these messages, even though the majority of the victims may not be 
vulnerable. For example, after the 2011 tornadoes in Joplin, Missouri, media coverage focused 
on destruction of the schools in the area, however, of the 158 victims, only seven were students 
from area schools (NPR 2011). 
Second, once the victims are identified and perceived to be vulnerable by the general 
public then people within the community will attempt to help by demonstrating solidarity with 
them. The perception of victims as vulnerable causes a strong emotional reaction amongst people 
similar or sympathetic to the victims. Empathy12 and compassion with victims may help to 
generate social activities conducive to attempted healing of trauma, what is referred to as 
demonstrations of solidarity in this dissertation (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002; Halpern and 
Weinsten 2004; Schaap 2006). Once the characterization of the victims takes place, then the 
event becomes more of a collective trauma as non-involved individuals begin sympathizing with 
the victims. Individuals may sympathize with the group or know someone within that vulnerable 
 
12 Empathy generally involves the ability to identify with the situations or experiences of others (Hutchinson & 
Bleiker 2008). 
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victim group, which may compel them to demonstrate solidarity with the victims. These factors 
suggest that: 
• Hypothesis 3: Events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will generate more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1VictimType+βx+u 
 
Institutionalization of Community 
Beyond the facts of an event, institutions play a key role in generating demonstrations of 
solidarity. Institutional response to a mass casualty event could be perceived as a demonstration 
of solidarity itself. However, for the purpose of this dissertation the response is an independent 
variable (x), and what they actually do is the dependent variable (y). The roles institutions play in 
organizing and coordinating demonstrations of solidarity can lead to more demonstrations of 
solidarity as more individuals become involved. Prior research has identified institutions like 
local governments, private businesses, and nonprofit organizations as crucial partners in all 
phases of emergency management; this includes building capacity, social capital and more 
resilient communities (Edwards 2013; Kapucu 2006; Waugh 2003). Institutions play an 
important role in building community resilience to disasters and resilient communities are the 
ones able to demonstrate solidarity to their potential (Langeland et al. 2016; Chandra et al. 2011). 
This dissertation classifies institutions in four ways: (1) government, (2) business/economic, (3) 
non-profit, and (4) specific institutions.  
Government institutions include elected leaders, their offices and agencies. Government 
institutions often have considerable resources to devote to the first response and short-term 
responses to traumatic events that occur within their community. Governments have a convening 
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authority and a responsibility to respond to mass casualty events. Specifically, local government 
institutions have been found to have higher levels of public trust than federal and state level 
institutions (McCarthy 2018). Therefore, when local government institutions become involved in 
demonstrations, community members trust them. Elements of government institutions like 
emergency managers and emergency services are often the most prepared to provide initial 
responses to traumatic events within a community as they are often part of emergency response 
and preparedness plans. These individuals then often coordinate with other institutions as 
demonstrations of solidarity commence.  
Business/economic institutions are locally located establishments that are a part of the 
area’s economic makeup. Some of which have a vested interest in the wellbeing of their 
community. Businesses are likely to support demonstrations of solidarity but rarely conduct them 
on their own. Findings show that areas with locally active companies received help quicker and 
recovered faster from disasters than communities without strong local businesses or who relied 
on traditional relief (Ballesteros, Useem and Wry 2017). Additionally, businesses have been 
found to play an important role in long term disaster recovery (Chikoto, Sadiq and Fordyce 
2013).  For example, the casinos and entertainment businesses were active in demonstrations 
following the Las Vegas shooting in October of 2017 (Raz 2017).  
Non-profit institutions are organizations that are not directly affiliated with governments 
or oriented to profit. These organizations often provide community services and routinely 
respond to community trauma. Some of these organizations are nation or worldwide but have 
local chapters or affiliations. Many of these institutions serve the general community and often 
respond to events regardless of event type or victim type. These institutions often take leading 
roles in organizing demonstrations that help local residents respond to and recover from disasters 
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(Gazley 2013; Kapucu, Yuldashev and Feldheim 2011).  Examples of these institutions that 
respond to mass casualty events include the United Way, Red Cross, or blood donation 
organizations.  
Specific institutions are defined as non-governmental institutions that were founded by 
and primarily serve a specific community nested within a larger community.13 These groups are 
often considered a sub-section of non-profit institutions (Cammett and MacLean 2014; Sledge 
and Thomas 2019). Some specific institutions exist to represent, organize or serve socially 
vulnerable groups based on ethnicity or race, sexual orientation, gender, religious beliefs etc. 
Examples of such institutions include the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, The Center (LGBT), and various religious groups. Some specific institutions respond to 
community trauma as part of their core mission, regardless of the victim involvement with their 
institutions. These institutions would still be considered specific institutions because they were 
founded to or mostly serve a specific population. For example, the Salvation Army is a 
Protestant-Christian denomination, however, disaster response, aid and charity are core values 
the group holds and they respond to disasters regardless of victim type. In some cases, specific 
institutions may also not respond because they are not representative of the victim group and 
they are not sympathetic to the victims. When a specific group is afflicted by such an event, new 
institutions may form in order to fill a void that becomes apparent after a traumatic event 
happens. Essentially, the creation of these new institutions in response to such an event become a 
demonstration of solidarity themselves. 
 
13 For the purpose of this dissertation no government institutions are considered specific institutions. I recognize 
that they exist (ex. Indian Reservations), however they are rare in the U.S.  
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 A strong response from any one of these categories of institutions may lead to higher 
demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, strong institutional responses in other categories 
would increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of solidarity. Though the institutions and 
their structures are the main method in which demonstrations of solidarity could be increased, it 
is important to recognize that individual representatives of institutions can also influence 
demonstrations.  
There is an individual leadership aspect to institutionalization. For example, leaders of 
institutions are often wealthy, prominent members of a community. They often receive media 
coverage and are most often known for their involvement with one form of institution previously 
mentioned. The best example of institutional leadership would be the mayor of a community. 
The mayor would be looked to for leadership following a mass casualty event. If the mayor 
responded with strong leadership by frequently speaking to the media, soliciting for 
demonstrations, and working with other groups, etc. then demonstrations of solidarity would be 
positively affected. Eldridge (2005) found that availability of information on how to donate, as 
communicated by local leaders in this case, is paramount in predicting donation behavior. If 
these individuals have a particular investment in a community then they would be likely to 
positively influence demonstrations of solidarity either through solicitation of demonstrations or 
through a personal contribution. Other individuals, like business leaders, may be personally 
invested in an area and donate as a demonstration of solidarity, but due to their personal success 
they are able to make a significant contribution. For example, in 2017 Houston native and tech 
billionaire Michael Dell pledged $36 million for Hurricane Harvey relief after it devastated the 
Gulf Coast of the U.S. (Yurieff 2017). While this is only a single demonstration, it is an intense 
demonstration that the majority of other Houston residents would not have been able to conduct.  
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Institutional Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
Institutions have a direct impact upon demonstrations of solidarity for five reasons. First, 
institutional collaboration in humanitarian relief operations are important for effective disaster 
relief (Telford and Cosgrave 2007). These partnerships facilitate disaster response by providing a 
method to exchange knowledge and skills by participating institutions (Kapucu 2006). Second, a 
strong non-profit institutional response can bring experience in organizing effective 
demonstrations. Non-profit institutions bring considerable resources and name recognition when 
responding to disasters. Sledge and Thomas (2019) found that these institutions critically shaped 
disaster response and recovery because they “quickly provide services that may not be provided 
by governments, their flexibility, and their unique capacity to reach marginalized populations.” If 
community members see the response of one of these groups it could legitimize the 
demonstrations of solidarity that are occurring and motivate people to help. 
Third, business institutions can bring a considerable amount of resources to 
demonstrations of solidarity. If an afflicted area is economically well off, then there is likely to 
be strong business involvement in demonstrations of solidarity. These businesses not only 
directly provide aid to the area but they can also solicit funds for disaster relief themselves. 
Economically weak areas will have limited business involvement in demonstrations, and people 
in economically weaker areas would be more financially strained and would be less able to 
demonstrate solidarity even if they wanted to. Fourth, communities that are institutionally dense 
are likely to have high profile representatives of those institutions that are active members of the 
community. These individuals are able to provide essential leadership following a mass casualty 
event and they can solicit demonstrations of solidarity or make a significant demonstration 
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themselves through their increased institutional capability. Fifth, institutions can act as social 
networks and larger social networks have been found to increase demonstrations of solidarity 
(Haines et al. 1996; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Schervish and Havens 1997; Burr et al. 2005; 
Music and Wilson 2008; Lee and Brudney 2012). 
The individuals in a community may be intent on responding resiliently and 
demonstrating solidarity strongly following a mass casualty event, however, without strong 
institutions that response can be impeded until people within the community can organize 
themselves or they lose interest. Areas with low institutionalization include rural areas where 
government reach is minimal and poor areas with low business/economic involvement. Specific 
institutions are likely to respond whenever the groups they represent are victimized. Non-profit 
institutions are also likely to respond whenever a major event happens. However, in the case of 
both specific and non-profit institutions, these groups are likely to respond stronger in more 
densely populated areas where they may have an existing influence. Institutions allow for a quick 
and organized response and without that existing infrastructure demonstrations would at least be 
delayed until the community can organize themselves. The longer organization of 
demonstrations take, the quicker people would become no longer interested in participating in 
meaningful demonstrations. Without the availability of institutions, community members who 
desire to demonstrate solidarity but have no means to do so would respond selectively and in less 
meaningful ways, such as a social media response. These factors suggest that: 
• Hypothesis 4:  Victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization will have 
more demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event.  
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1Institutionalization+βx+u 
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Outside of the traditional first response that is expected from local government agencies, 
strong government institutions and their leaders play an important part in how a community 
responds to a mass casualty event. A strong governmental response can not only contain a 
disaster and limit the damage but also government leadership can actively solicit funds. People 
within a community look first to their government when a community trauma occurs. Involved 
political leaders are a demonstration in itself, however, there involvement attracts interested 
individuals into demonstrating. In some communities elected officials are more involved than in 
others. Leaders of government institutions have up to date knowledge of an area and are able to 
identify the resources that a community possesses and gaps in community needs (Edwards 2013). 
Strong leaders are consistently in the media and they are popular within the areas they govern. 
Other elected officials are rarely seen outside of official government businesses and they remain 
mostly unknown even within the areas they govern. Government involvement or the 
endorsement of political leaders in demonstrations legitimizes the demonstrating process. 
Additionally, strong government institution leaders commonly collaborate and work with other 
institutions in order to facilitate demonstrations. The agreements government institutions have in 
place with other institutions to respond when a disaster strikes makes government institutions 
more powerful. Government institutions, the leadership they provide and the relationships they 
often have with other institutions make a strong government institutional leadership response 
crucial if strong demonstrations of solidarity are to happen. Therefore:  
o Hypothesis 4a: A strong response from government institution leaders will lead to 
more demonstrations of solidarity. 
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1GovernmentInstitutionalLeadership+βx+u 
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When a specific group is the victim of a mass casualty event, that group may have a 
higher level of institutionalization than other groups of people. Vulnerable communities often 
have existing institutions within their communities that were founded with the purpose of serving 
members of that vulnerable population (Cammett and MacLean 2014). The best examples of 
specific institutions providing support is for socially vulnerable groups. For example, numerous 
LGBT groups participated in demonstrations of solidarity following the Pulse shooting in 2016. 
However, traditionally vulnerable groups also receive institutional support. For example, schools 
across the nation participated in demonstrations of solidarity following the 2012 Newton 
Connecticut shooting that targeted elementary school students. Whenever trauma, such as a mass 
casualty event, affects the community in which these specific institutions are active, they are 
likely to mobilize, coordinate and participate in demonstrations of solidarity. The coordination 
they provide allows for interested individuals to participate in demonstrations of solidarity 
through those specific institutions they usually would not have been involved in. These 
institutions often have existing members, donors and structures that makes it easier for them to 
quickly organize demonstrations.  A strong specific institutional response is important due to 
increased media coverage, ability to quickly organize and their closeness to specific victim types. 
However, a strong specific institutional response is not likely to happen unless a specific victim 
group is the victim of a mass casualty event. Therefore: 
o Hypothesis 4b: A strong specific institutional response will lead to more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1SpecificInstitutionalization+βx+u 
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Theoretical Conclusions 
This theory attempts to explain how event specific traits and existing institutions can 
influence demonstrations of solidarity to occur following a mass casualty event. Examining 
demonstrations of solidarity following mass casualty events in these ways reveals limitations. 
For example, other event specific traits like extent of property damage and number of injuries are 
closely related to some of the independent variables and could logically influence individual 
desires to help and thus demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, community specific traits 
could also influence demonstrations of solidarity. For example, the familiarity a community has 
with trauma could influence demonstrations of solidarity in two contradictory ways. First, if a 
community has experienced prior mass casualty events then they may be more resilient and have 
existing institutions to demonstrate solidarity. Gal (2013) found that communities who 
experience repeated traumas collectively exhibited signs of resilience through a quick return to 
normalization. Alternatively, a community may also feel trauma fatigue if traumatic events strike 
their community often. Trauma fatigue and the associated lack of emotional response to motivate 
people to participate would lead to less demonstrations of solidarity.   
Because of the wide array of variables likely to influence demonstrations of solidarity it 
is logical to utilize an experimental approach to test these ideas. However, an experimental 
method removes the emotional element that is important in warranting a response to such a 
traumatic event. Living in a community where a mass casualty event happened, seeing the event 
be covered through media sources and knowing people affected by such an event are two 
influential factors that could not be effectively relayed through an experimental approach. 
Nonetheless, experiments are an important step in measuring demonstrations of solidarity based 
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on event specific traits. The wide array of variables that could influence demonstrations of 
solidarity makes a qualitative approach a logical step. A comparative case study approach would 
allow for a thorough and more invasive evaluation of communities following a mass casualty 
event. However, effectively drawing causal inferences and attributing them to the independent 
variables of interest would be challenging as having cases that are similar along all variables of 
interest except one would be difficult.   
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH  
 
This section seeks to answer questions regarding an individual and community’s reaction 
to a mass casualty event through the use of survey experiments. A survey experiment is a 
purposeful manipulation of key variables within a survey instrument for the purpose of inferring 
how the respondent is affected by those variables (McDermott 2002). Random assignment of 
respondents into control and treatment groups will allow for causal inferences to be made based 
on the comparisons of the decisions made by the individuals in each group (Druckman et al. 
2006).  
Experimental methods are rarely used to measure the effects of a mass casualty event due 
to the unpredictable nature of such events and the traumatic effects they can have on people. 
Rasanen et al. (2014) utilized two sets of surveys mailed out in 2008 (before and after a school 
shooting) to see if the recurrence of a potential mass casualty event changes the relationship 
between solidarity and the perception of different types of risk. They found that once tragedies 
became more common the protective functions of social solidarity that help communities reduce 
their worry associated with risks (in this case the shooting) tended to diminish.  
Measuring a community’s response to a mass casualty event begins at the individual 
level, so the use of a survey experiment is a natural fit. However, the use of a survey experiment 
to measure demonstrations of solidarity after a mass casualty event has never been undertaken 
before so any empirical results will be a first step in better understanding this phenomenon. 
Three hypotheses are tested across three experiments. The hypotheses tested are: 
1. higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of solidarity 
 CasualtyNumbers(X ) DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )
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2. violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent events  
 
a. terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of solidarity than other event 
types.  
 
3. events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will generate more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
 
Results are mixed and appear to support a null hypothesis regarding hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2. However, when testing hypothesis 3, results are very supportive. As results are 
further analyzed a discussion is provided regarding what constitutes a mass casualty event in 
terms of casualty number and the differences between event types.  
This chapter consists of five sections. The first begins with an introduction to the 
experiments and includes the text each respondent received. The second section connects the 
experiments to their appropriate hypotheses and discusses the independent variables. The third 
section examines the dependent variables measured across the experiments and the control 
variables. The fourth section begins with some descriptive statistics regarding the variables 
before the results for each experiment are examined more closely. The fifth and sixth sections 
further analyze the findings of the survey experiment and interpret the results. 
ViolentEvent(X ) DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )
TerroristEvent(X ) DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )
VictimType(X ) DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )
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Experiment Introduction 
The nature of a survey experiment such as this makes the unit of analysis at the individual 
level. Therefore, a convenience sample was utilized and this survey was disseminated to UCF 
undergraduate students (n=225).14 Each respondent first answered nine demographic, descriptor 
and psychometric questions meant to measure basic attributes about each respondent. They then 
received their first vignette which tested hypothesis 1, followed by five questions meant to 
measure their responses to that event. They then faced a short distractor asking them to rank 
presidents in either ascending or descending order. They then faced their second vignette meant 
to test hypothesis 2 and five questions meant to test their responses to that event. They then faced 
a short distractor asking them to complete a numerical sequence (All distractor tasks available in 
Appendix). Respondents then faced their final vignette meant to measure hypothesis 3, followed 
by final five questions meant to measure their responses to that event. In order to provide 
additional variation across vignettes, hypothesis 2 (violent events will result in more 
demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent events), is tested across all three experiments as 
respondents answered either a violent or nonviolent event type in their vignettes in experiment 1 
and experiment 3.  
Experiment 1 
 
 The first experiment manipulated the number of casualties and event type. Respondents 
received either a weather or terrorism related event: 
Imagine that: 
 
14 IRB Explanation of Research and Approval Letter are provided in the Appendix B 
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• your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather 
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 
[2/6/23] dead and many other injured 
 
OR 
• a large car bomb went off in your community killing [2/6/23] people and leaving many 
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is 
currently being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of terrorism 
 
The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief 
efforts are underway. 
 
Experiment 1 tests hypothesis 1; higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more 
demonstrations of solidarity and hypothesis 2/2a that violent event types (terrorist in this case) 
will result in more demonstrations of solidarity. The independent variable values were selected 
because the first option (2) is below the five threshold that is often referred to as the minimum 
for a mass casualty event. The second option (6) is near that threshold while the third option (23) 
is significantly higher. Each respondent received either of the event types and victim counts at 
random. 
Experiment 2 
 The second experiment only manipulates the type of event and respondents randomly 
received either a weather, terrorism, accident or criminal event.  
Imagine that: 
• your community was struck by a powerful tornado. According to the National Weather 
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area. 
• a large car bomb went off in your community. The responsible party was apprehended 
leaving the area and the incident is being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of 
terrorism 
• a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed within 
your community 
• a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several people 
during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible 
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individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the 
attempted robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused. 
 
The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the 
number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist 
and relief efforts are underway 
 
• The second experiment tests hypothesis 2; violent events will result in more demonstrations 
of solidarity than nonviolent events and hypothesis 2a; terrorist events will cause more 
demonstrations of solidarity than other event types.   
Each vignette is framed in a way that does not specify the number or type of casualties 
and they are only referred to as a mass casualty event in order to attribute any responses to the 
variation provided (event type).  
Experiment 3 
 
 The third experiment manipulates the type of victims for each event along with event 
type. Respondents received either a crime or accident related event.  
Imagine that: 
• a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several people 
during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible 
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the 
attempted robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused.  
• a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed within 
your community 
 
Victims are mainly: 
 
• school age children who were on several different school buses 
• seemingly random commuters 
 
The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the 
number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist 
and relief efforts are underway. 
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Experiment 3 tests hypothesis 3; events that harm victims who are perceived as 
vulnerable will generate more demonstrations of solidarity and hypothesis 2; violent events will 
result in more demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent events. The first value for the 
independent variable (school age children) was selected because children are a traditionally 
vulnerable victim group that spans across cultures. According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), children, elderly, malnourished and ill people are the most vulnerable when a disaster 
strikes (Wisner and Adams 2002). The second value (random commuters) is included to account 
for events where random or non-vulnerable groups make up the majority of victims. Respondents 
received at random either event type and either victim type. 
Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables measured across all the experiments is the propensity of 
respondents to participate (or not) in a variety of different types of demonstrations of solidarity 
following a mass casualty incident. The demonstrations of solidarity measured are social media 
response, volunteering of time, donation of blood, monetary donation and event participation. A 
factor analysis is then conducted with the demonstrations of solidarity for each experiment. 
Those factors that are created are then used as a dependent variable. These demonstrations of 
solidarity were chosen because they cover the spectrum of possible demonstrations (including 
symbolic and actual demonstrations) available to members of a community after a mass casualty 
event.  
 The first response available to respondents is how they will respond via social media and 
is measured dichotomously based on whether or not their social media activity would reflect the 
event that occurred. Though social media is used more by younger generations, it is often the 
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first line of access individuals have to respond to an event that happens within the community. 
For example, many community organizations utilize social media to organize and coordinate 
events. The logic behind the inclusion of this variable is based on the notion that social media is 
incredibly widespread, so when a mass casualty event happens, people will look to their profiles 
for information regarding the event. Social media is also a means of communication with other 
community members to check on their wellbeing and to notify other individuals of their 
wellbeing, often through a marking of “safe” or a changing of their profile pictures. Individuals 
who only possess minimal desires to demonstrate or who may not have the means to respond in 
other ways may respond “slacktively” through social media. This variable is represented in the 
following results tables as SocialMediaResponse and respondents received the following 
question: 
• Question 1: In the week following the mass casualty event, would any of your social 
media activity (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram etc.) be in response to the event? (ex. 
Posts/hashtags related to event, marking yourself as “safe,” changing pictures etc.)  
Answer 1: Option 1- Yes. Option 2- No. Option 3- Not involved with social media 
 
 The second demonstration of solidarity measured is how much free time (out of 2 
hours/120 minutes) a respondent would devote to relief efforts. The inclusion of this variable is 
based on the notion that the individuals will respond to the mass casualty events that occurred 
within their community by volunteering their time to relief efforts. Relief efforts often take the 
form of physical cleanup (such as after a weather incident), providing voluntary victim services 
or other time-consuming acts done in response to an event. This variable is represented in the 
following results tables as VolunteerTime and respondents received the following question:  
• Question 2: Out of two hours of free time in the week following a mass casualty event, 
how much of that time would you devote to relief efforts?  
Answer 2: Out of 120 minutes 
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 The third demonstration of solidarity measure is dichotomous and asks whether or not an 
individual would donate blood following a mass casualty. The inclusion of this variable is based 
on the notion that individuals will often look to donate blood as a means to assist their fellow 
community members who may have been injured during a mass casualty incident. Violent events 
more often cause an increase in blood donations as community members find this is their best 
way to help. While recent empirical findings confirm that an increase does occur, very rarely do 
those blood donations provide actual assistance (Lozada et al. 2019). This variable is represented 
in the following results tables as BloodDonations and respondents received the following 
question:  
• Question 3: Would you donate blood in the week following the mass casualty event? 
Answer 3: Option 1- Yes. Option 2- No  
 
 The fourth demonstration of solidarity is how much money (out of $100) would a 
respondent donate towards relief efforts. The inclusion of this variable is based on the notion that 
individuals will be more likely to donate money to victim’s relief funds, charities etc. that are 
working in the affected areas. These donations are often useful in restoring and reconstructing 
after a disaster and are much better suited than the donations of goods (Heimburger 2018). This 
variable is represented in the following results tables as MoneyDonations and respondents 
received the following question:  
• Question 4: If you had $100 in the week following an event that you were not using for 
anything else, how much (if any) would you donate to a charitable or relief effort related 
to the event? 
Answer 4: Out of $100 
 
The fifth and final demonstration of solidarity is whether or not an individual would 
participate in an incident specific event (ex. vigils) following the mass casualty incident and is 
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measured dichotomously. Events often take place to show solidarity with an affected community 
and first happen at the local level, though they can often spread worldwide for major mass 
casualty incidents. Post et al. (2003) explains “In a general therapeutic context rituals are 
recommended as an element in the process of handling grief and other emotions following a 
disaster.” The candlelight vigil serves as a reaction and response because it gathers a community 
together to stand as one when conditions are difficult. The inclusion of this variable is based on 
the notion that individuals will participate in a community event to show solidarity with the 
affected communities following an incident. The final question respondents received was 
regarding participation in events following a mass casualty event and is represented in the 
following results tables as EventParticipation; it is as follows: 
• Question 5: Would you attend a large group event immediately following the mass 
casualty event meant to show solidarity with the victims and community? (Ex. 
candlelight vigil)  
Answer 5: Option 1- Yes. Option 2- No 
 
A factor analysis creates a matrix of intercorrelations amongst a set of variables (in this 
case our experiment specific demonstrations of solidarity) in order to determine to what extent 
those variables are related.15 If the data analyzed has little to no variation, only one factor can be 
derived from the data, if there is more variation more factors will be derived (Rummel 1970). 
The dependent variables from the first experiment contain a significant amount of variation so 
two factors were created. The dependent variables for the second and third experiments contain 
little variation so only a single factor was created for each. Based on those matrices it is apparent 
that the variance within the dependent variables of Experiment 1 is much more dispersed. Factor 
1 only accounts for 33% of the variance within the variables whereas Factor 1 accounts for 43% 
 
15 See Appendix B.4 for Factor Analysis Matrices 
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and 46% of the variance in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, respectively. Within Experiment 1, 
Factor 1 is mostly defined by the variables Money, Blood, and Time, whereas Factor 2 is mostly 
defined by variables Social Media and Event. Within Experiment 1, the first Factor Analysis 
variable is represented in results tables as X1F1 while the second one is represented as X1F2. 
The factors created within both Experiment 2 and 3 are also mostly defined by Money, Blood, 
and Time, however, the variance does not reach the levels to where another factor would be 
created. Within Experiment 2 the Factor Analysis variable is represented in results tables as X2F 
while the Experiment 3 Factor Analysis variable is represented as X3F. Each factor generated is 
analyzed using OLS against each of their respective experiment’s independent variables in the 
same manner the other demonstrations of solidarity were analyzed. 
Control Variables 
 
Other variables of interest to this study include mainly demographic and descriptive 
questions along with a single psychometric question designed to provide a better insight into the 
characteristics and behaviors of who is participating in this study. Focused on demographics, 
there are six characteristics considered. First is the age of the respondent and is included based 
on previous findings that indicate an age-based positivity bias exists in regards to charitable 
giving (Bjalkebring et al. 2016). The age question respondents received is as follows: 
• Question 1:  How old are you? 
Answer 1: blank space allowing respondents to input in their year of birth. 
 
Second is the inclusion of a gender variable based on previous findings that indicate that 
women tend to provide more charity due to higher empathetic concerns (Mesch et al. 2011). 
Individuals who indicated that they did not have a sex where removed from the final analysis 
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which allowed a true dichotomous gender variable. The gender question respondents received is 
as follows: 
• Question 2: What is your sex? 
Answer 2: Option 1- male Option 2-female Option 3-no sex 
 
Third is an eight-point scale asking the highest education an individual has completed. 
The inclusion of this variable is based on numerous prior findings that indicate that people who 
have higher education will be more altruistic and donate more (Yen 2002; Andreoni et al. 2003; 
Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). The question respondents received regarding their education level 
is as follows: 
• Question 3: What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree 
you have received? 
Answer 3: Option 1-less than high school. Option 2- High school graduate or equivalent 
(ex. GED). Option 3-Some college but no degree. Option 4- Associates Degree (2 year). 
Option 5-Bachelor’s Degree (4 year). Option 6- Master’s Degree. Option 7- Doctoral 
Degree. Option 8- Professional Degree (MD, JD etc.) 
 
 
The fourth variable of interest is the income level of respondents and it is measured on a 
seven-point scale (1 = less than $30,000, 7 = $80,000 or more). Higher income status has been 
found to directly affect giving behaviors, both amount and frequency (Bracha and Vesterlund 
2013). The income level question respondents received is as follows: 
• Question 4: Describe your income (before taxes): 
Answer 4: Option 1-less than $30,000. Option 2- $30,000-$39,999. Option 3- $40,000-
$49,999. Option 4- $50,000-$59,000. Option 5- $60,000-$69,999. Option 6- $70,000-
$79,999. Option 7- More than $80,000 
 
Fifth is a seven-point scale for political ideology (1 = far left, 7 = far right). The inclusion 
of this variable is based on the notion that political ideology affects the types of giving. Previous 
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findings indicate that politically conservative individuals reported higher levels of giving 
(Paarlberg et al. 2018). The politic question respondents received is as follows: 
• Question 5: On the scale below indicate your political leanings: (0-10) 
Answer 5: 0: Far Left. 5: Independent. 10: Far Right 
 
The sixth general demographic question is regarding religiosity and measures 
respondents’ levels of religious activity based on a four-point scale (1= not religious, 4= very 
religious.) More religious people have been found to have higher life satisfaction and thus, give 
more to charity (Sibley and Bulbulia 2014). The religious question respondents received is as 
follows: 
• Question 6: How often do you attend religious services per week (4-point scale). 
Answer 6: Option 1- None. Option 2- 1. Option 3- 2-3. Option 4- More than 3.  
 
The final three control variables are believed to directly affect how an individual would 
react following a mass casualty event and falls in line with the aforementioned theory. The first 
is a four-point measure of group membership and asks respondents how many social, civic or 
organizational groups they are personally a member of (1 = none, 4 = more than 3). Individuals 
who are members of groups theoretically have more accessibility to demonstrations. It is as 
follows: 
• Question 7: How many social, civic or organizational groups are you a member of? (ex. 
Alumni associations, charitable/neighborhood groups, fraternities/sororities etc.) 
Answer 7: Option 1- None. Option 2-1. Option 3-2-3. Option 4- More than 3 
 
The next is a five-point psychometric measure of altruism and asks respondents how 
often they would go out of their way to do something nice for a stranger (1 = never, 5 = very 
often). The altruistic measure respondents received is as follows: 
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• Question 8: Would you go out of your way to do something nice for a stranger? 
Answer 8: Option 1- Very often. Option 2- Often. Option 3- Occasionally. Option 4- Not 
Often. Option 5- Never.  
 
The final control variable is four-point scale meant to measure an individual experience 
with a mass casualty event (1 = no experience, 4 = experienced firsthand). This variable is based 
on the idea that individuals who have experienced a mass casualty event before and survived will 
be more likely to participate in demonstrations of solidarity because they have a greater 
understanding of mass casualty events and how they affect the community. 
• Question 9: Have you ever experienced an event where a large number of people were 
killed in a single incident? (including military service) 
Answer 9: Option 1- No. Option 2- Knew someone who was a victim of an event and 
survived. Option 3- Knew someone who was killed during an event. Option 4- 
Experienced firsthand 
  
Sample Characteristics 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for all control variables across the sample. The 
standard deviations in the table represent a selection based on the ranges provided through the 
questioning. The minimums and maximums listed also represent selections based on the 
questioning range, with the exception of age, which represents a true value. A sample restricted 
to college students is fairly limiting as only about a third of Americans have any sort of college 
degree (Census 2017). However, scholars argue that results from a survey using a convenience 
sample of college students is valid and reliable and results are generalizable to other populations 
when the survey is reliant on basic psychological processes as opposed to general demographics 
Kardes (1996) and Lucas (2003).  
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As expected with such a sample, the majority of respondents were young (See Figure 3), 
and not very religious (See Figure 6). In addition to age and religiosity, the limitations of the 
sample are also evident in that the majority of respondents had an Associates Degree (See Figure 
4) and little income (See Figure 5).  
Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
While the sample limitations are evident, it is important to note that the population is still 
very heterogeneic. For example, the slightly female dominant gender distribution is positive in 
that recent U.S. census data has indicated that there are more females than males within the 
country (See Figure 2). The political breakdown of the sample is also a good sign mainly 
because no one group represents more than half of the sample. 40% of respondents were 
moderates (those who indicated 4-6 on the question) followed by 35% liberal (0-3) and 25% 
conservative (7-10) (See Figure 7). 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Age 24.03 8.31 18 79 225
Sex 0.55 (Slightly More Female) 0.49 0 1 225
Education 3.75 (Just Below Some College) 0.89 1 7 225
Income 1.76 (Just Below $30,000-$39,999) 1.7 1 7 225
Politics 4.62 (Slightly More Liberal Than Independent) 2.37 0 10 225
Religion 1.34 (Slightly Above None) 0.70 1 4 225
Group Membership 2.03 (Slightly More than One) 0.94 1 4 225
Altruism 2.41 (Between Often and Occassionally) 0.83 1 5 225
MCE Familiarity 1.48 (No Experience) 0.93 1 4 225
60 
 
 
Figure 2: Sample Sex Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 3: Sample Age Characteristics 
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Figure 4: Sample Education Characteristics 
 
Figure 5: Sample Income Characteristics 
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Figure 6: Sample Religion Characteristics 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sample Political Characteristics 
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Figure 8: Sample Group Membership Characteristics 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Sample Altruism Characteristics 
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Figure 10: Sample Prior MCE Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 11: Altruism & Group Membership 
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Theoretically, the measures of group membership, altruism, and prior mass casualty 
experience are all important measures and distributions of these traits amongst the general public 
are not well established. The majority of respondents were involved in groups and behaved 
altruistically, even at minimum levels (See Figure 8 & 9). As expected, the more altruistic 
someone is the more it appears they are involved with groups (See Figure 11).  More than 75% 
of respondents had no experience with mass casualty events (See Figure 10). While the 
occurrence of such events is on the rise, most of those responses are likely military service. In 
conclusion, while the sample is not, ideal the results will be valid and reliable because of the 
size, heterogeneic (albeit limited) nature of the sample and the context of the surveys. 
Analytical Methods 
 
The first (social media), third (blood donation) and fifth (event participation) variables 
have binary outcomes, therefore logistic modeling (logit) was utilized. The second (volunteer 
time) and fourth (monetary donation) and sixth (factor analysis) variables have an integer range, 
therefore they were run as linear regression (OLS). All tests are two tailed and robust standard 
errors were used for all modelling. As with any regression based empirical study, it is important 
to test for collinearity before any models are run. A Pearson’s correlation table of descriptive 
variables revealed that none are collinear enough to warrant an exclusion from the models (See 
Appendix B.3). 
Casualty Number & Demonstrations of Solidarity Results 
 
Based on hypothesis one, respondents who are exposed to higher numbers of fatalities 
will be more likely to respond with higher levels of demonstrations of solidarity. 
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Table 3: Casualty Numbers & Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age -0.122(0.053)** -0.122(0.053)** -0.123(0.053)** 0.784(0.583) 0.787(0.583) 0.785(0.583)
Sex -0.273(0.393) -0.273(0.394) -0.273(0.393) -14.268(6.457)** -14.210(6.463)** -14.240(6.458)**
Education 0.358(0.279) 0.359(0.279) 0.360(0.280) 3.521(4.396) 3.501(4.295) 3.509(4.396)
Income 0.071(0.125) 0.071(0.125) 0.070(0.125) -1.002(2.380) -0.968(2.380) -0.985(2.380)
Politics 0.225(0.071)*** 0.225(0.071)*** 0.225(0.071)*** 0.094(1.355) 0.090(1.355) 0.090(1.355)
Religion 0.012(0.333) 0.012(0.334) 0.011(0.333) -5.599(4.606) -5.558(4.608) -5.580(4.605)
Social Capital -0.422(0.230)* -0.423(0.230)* -0.423(0.231)* 9.757(3.393)*** 9.757(3.392)*** 9.754(3.392)***
Altruism -0.427(0.254)* -0.428(0.254)* -0.429(0.254)* 11.823(3.827)*** 11.828(3.825)*** 11.820(3.825)***
Prior MCE 0.038(0.253) 0.038(0.253) 0.039(0.253) -0.328(3.434) -0.366(3.437) -0.339(3.430)
Weather -0.119(0.391) -0.120(0.391) -0.122(0.390) 10.320(6.228) 10.270(6.226) 10.235(6.226)
Casualty 2: -0.646(0.455) -0.300(0.501) 3.116(7.375) -3.308(7.659)
Casualty 6: 0.345(0.485) 0.640(0.458) -6.618(7.654) -3.354(7.458)
Casualty 23: -0.352(0.482) 0.288(0.500) 6.354(7.543) 3.170(7.633)
Cons 2.018(1.667) 1.680(1.674) 1.397(1.739) -14.526(24.631) -8.198(25.010) -11.333(25.307)
Pseudo R
2 0.13 0.13 0.13
Log PseudoLikelihood -86.11 -86.12 -86.13
ꭓ2 0.006 0.006 0.006
R
2
0.12 0.12 0.12
F 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
N 186 186 186 222 222 222
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age 0.875(0.449)* 0.880(0.448)* 0.879(0.449)* 0.875(0.449)* 0.880(0.448)* 0.879(0.449)*
Sex -6.170(4.946) -6.196(4.953) -6.147(4.954) -6.170(4.946) -6.196(4.953) -6.147(4.954)
Education -1.137(3.877) -1.160(3.880) -1.144(3.879) -1.137(3.877) -1.160(3.880) -1.144(3.879)
Income 0.666(2.061) 0.697(2.053) 0.692(2.060) 0.666(2.061) 0.697(2.053) 0.692(2.060)
Politics 0.270(1.008) 0.270(1.008) 0.275(1.008) 0.270(1.008) 0.270(1.008) 0.275(1.008)
Religion -4.043(3.703) -4.026(3.707) -4.011(3.707) -4.043(3.703) -4.026(3.707) -4.011(3.707)
Social Capital -2.788(2.640) -2.776(2.641) -2.773(2.640) -2.788(2.640) -2.776(2.641) -2.773(2.640)
Altruism 11.247(3.250)*** 11.288(3.249)*** 11.283(3.250)*** 11.247(3.250)*** 11.288(3.249)*** 11.283(3.250)***
Prior MCE 2.489(2.812) 2.481(2.819) 2.438(2.805) 2.489(2.812) 2.481(2.819) 2.438(2.805)
Weather -5.343(4.909) -5.264(4.908) -5.280(4.903) -5.343(4.909) -5.264(4.908) -5.280(4.903)
Casualty 2: 5.273(5.828) -1.013(5.841) 5.273(5.828) -1.013(5.841)
Casualty 6: -6.133(6.044) -4.803(5.924) -6.133(6.044) -4.803(5.924)
Casualty 23: 6.611(5.920) 1.660(5.817) 6.611(5.920) 1.660(5.817)
Cons -0.685(18.579) 5.410(19.513) 4.023(19.382) -0.685(18.579) 5.410(19.513) 4.023(19.382)
Pseudo R
2 0.05 0.05 0.05
Log PseudoLikelihood -132.53 -132.55 -132.51
ꭓ2 0.32 0.33 0.32
R
2 0.13 0.13 0.13
F 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
N 222 222 222 222 222 222
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
BloodDonation (Logit) MoneyDonations (OLS)
SocialMediaResponse (Logit) VolunteerTime (OLS)
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While these results do not support the hypothesis there are some observations to take 
away. The only instance of a casualty number being significant is in Model 3 of X1F1 where 
individuals who received a mass casualty event where 23 people were killed responded with 
higher demonstrations of solidarity than those who received an event where 6 people were killed. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age 0.028(0.026) 0.028(0.026) 0.028(0.026) 0.028(0.014)** 0.028(0.014)** 0.028(0.014)**
Sex -0.442(0.325) -0.442(0.325) -0.444(0.325) -0.252(0.148)* -0.251(0.149)* -0.253(0.149)*
Education 0.243(0.215) 0.245(0.215) 0.245(0.215) -0.070(0.100) -0.071(0.100) -0.070(0.100)
Income -0.224(0.114)** -0.227(0.114)** -0.227(0.114)** 0.006(0.054) 0.008(0.054) 0.006(0.054)
Politics 0.059(0.061) 0.059(0.061) 0.059(0.061) 0.017(0.031) 0.017(0.031) 0.017(0.031)
Religion 0.303(0.222) 0.301(0.222) 0.300(0.222) -0.068(0.115) -0.067(0.115) -0.068(0.115)
Social Capital -0.499(0.165)*** -0.499(0.165)*** -0.500(0.165)*** 0.004(0.077) 0.005(0.077) 0.005(0.077)
Altruism -0.454(0.188)** -0.456(0.188)** -0.456(0.188)** 0.380(0.092)*** 0.382(0.092)*** 0.381(0.091)***
Prior MCE -0.022(0.170) -0.022(0.170) -0.019(0.170) -0.046(0.081) -0.048(0.081) -0.046(0.080)
Weather 0.330(0.305) 0.325(0.304) 0.325(0.304) 0.044(0.142) 0.048(0.142) 0.044(0.142)
Casualty 2: -0.514(0.365) 0.078(0.384) -0.019(0.168) -0.282(0.176)
Casualty 6: 0.588(0.390) 0.491(0.369) -0.262(0.181) 0.027(0.170)
Casualty 23: -0.610(0.383) -0.115(0.381) 0.270(0.177) 0.293(0.174)*
Cons 1.145(1.198) 0.563(1.242) 0.662(1.228) -1.401(0.601)** -1.151(0.614)* -1.427(0.624)**
Pseudo R
2 0.11 0.11 0.11
Log PseudoLikelihood -130.74 -130.86 -130.84
ꭓ2 0.0036 0.0037 0.0038
R
2 0.15 0.15 0.15
F 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
N 222 222 222 186 186 186
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age -0.013(0.014) -0.013(0.014) -0.013(0.014)
Sex -0.043(0.149) -0.044(0.150) -0.045(0.149)
Education 0.106(0.101) 0.107(0.101) 0.107(0.101)
Income -0.015(0.055) -0.017(0.055) -0.017(0.055)
Politics 0.090(0.031)*** 0.090(0.031)*** 0.090(0.031)***
Religion -0.002(0.116) -0.002(0.116)
Social Capital -0.212(0.078)*** -0.213(0.078)*** -0.212(0.078)***
Altruism -0.185(0.092)** -0.186(0.092)** -0.186(0.092)**
Prior MCE 0.059(0.081) 0.060(0.081) 0.061(0.081)
Weather -0.021(0.143) -0.024(0.143) -0.025(0.143)
Casualty 2: -0.266(0.169) -0.013(0.177)
Casualty 6: 0.255(0.182) 0.263(0.171)
Casualty 23: -0.257(0.178) 0.002(0.175)
Cons 0.787(0.604) 0.545(0.617) 0.540(0.628)
Pseudo R
2
Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2
R
2 0.16 0.16 0.16
F 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 186 186 186
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
EventParticipation (Logit) X1F1 (OLS)
X1F2 (OLS)
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Model 1 and Model 2 within the X1F1 modeling indicates that those who received an event 
where 23 people were killed responded with higher demonstrations of solidarity, however, it is 
not at a significant level. The relationships between casualty numbers and dependent variables 
are insignificant across all other demonstrations of solidarity, however some of the results are in 
a positive and theoretically supported direction, but not at the 90% confidence interval level. For 
example, the relationship between high casualty count and volunteer time, blood donation and 
money donation are in a positive direction, however, not at the minimum 90% confidence 
interval level needed to claim a significant relationship. The relationship between casualty 23 
and volunteer time, blood donation, money donations and X1F1 is more positive than the 
relationship between those dependent variables and lesser casualty counts, however, it does not 
reach the minimum levels for significance. As stated, the directionality of the relationship is not 
incorrect, however, without a significant relationship of at least at the 90% confidence interval, 
we are forced to accept the null hypothesis that casualty number does not affect the 
demonstrations of solidarity that follow a mass casualty event. 
Results indicate that younger people are more likely to use social media to respond to a 
mass casualty event as well as more politically conservative individuals. Older individuals were 
found to be more likely to donate blood and money. Male respondents were more likely to 
respond by volunteering their time. The relationships between the dependent variables and social 
capital and altruism are significant across multiple demonstrations of solidarity.  
The relationship between group membership and social media, time donations, event 
participation and X1F2 variables is significant. That significant relationship is in a negative 
direction across social media, event participation and X1F2 and positive with time. Group 
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membership relationship with social media is something that has not been explored but the 
nature of group membership is civic participation so the negative relationship with event 
participation is puzzling. The positive significant relationship with time is confirmatory with the 
aforementioned theory as individuals who are involved in more groups will be more likely to 
participate in demonstrations of solidarity, in this case by volunteering time.  
The relationship between altruism is significant across all seven of the dependent 
variables; in a positive direction with time, blood, money and X1F1 and in a negative direction 
with social media, event participation and X1F2. The rationale of altruistic individuals not 
responding via social media and through event participation is understandable because our 
altruistic measure (and survey based altruistic measures in general) gets at more actual helping 
behaviors and not symbolic ones as in these variables. The positive and significant relationship 
between altruism and volunteering time, blood and money donation are in line with the 
aforementioned theory stating that altruistic individuals would be more likely to participate in 
demonstrations of solidarity.  
Event Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity Results 
 
According to hypothesis two, respondents who are exposed to nonviolent events are more 
likely to respond in lower levels of solidarity while respondents to violent events are more likely 
to answer with higher levels of solidarity. Additionally, hypothesis 2a suggests that demonstrations 
of solidarity will be stronger following terrorist events than any other event type.  
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Table 4: Event Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
Again results are not strongly supported, however, different event types are drawing 
different reactions. The relationship between terrorism and blood donations and the X2F 
variables is positive and significant. The relationship between criminal events and social media 
responses is also positive and significant, however, accidents have a stronger significance. The 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age -0.034(0.040) -0.034(0.040) 0.522(0.604) 0.522(0.604) 0.073(0.036)** 0.073(0.036)**
Sex -0.383(0.365) -0.383(0.365) -9.543(6.177) -9.543(6.177) 0.062(0.315) 0.062(0.315)
Education 0.026(0.256) 0.026(0.256) 0.242(3.910) 0.242(3.910) -0.541(0.228)** -0.541(0.228)**
Income -0.078(0.143) -0.078(0.143) -1.745(2.749) -1.745(2.749) 0.083(0.123) 0.083(0.123)
Politics 0.127(0.077)* 0.127(0.077)* -0.543(1.327) -0.543(1.327) 0.061(0.067) 0.061(0.067)
Religion 0.001(0.269) 0.001(0.269) -6.336(3.688)* -6.336(3.688)* -0.304(0.220) -0.304(0.220)
Social Capital -0.199(0.193) -0.199(0.193) 9.781(3.306)*** 9.781(3.306)*** -0.203(0.165) -0.203(0.165)
Altruism -0.257(0.224) -0.257(0.224) 7.807(3.467)** 7.807(3.467)** 0.476(0.192)** 0.476(0.192)**
Prior MCE -0.037(0.203) -0.037(0.203) 4.879(3.053) 4.879(3.053) -0.060(0.171) -0.060(0.171)
Weather -0.978(0.519)* 27.928(8.517)*** 1.049(0.425)**
Terrorism -0.459(0.486) 0.520(0.532) 13.623(8.960) -14.305(8.766) 1.295(0.432)*** 0.246(0.434)
Accident 0.978(0.519)* -27.928(8.517)*** -1.049(0.425)**
Crime -0.047(0.461) 0.932(0.516)* -6.696(8.179) -34.625(7.975)*** 0.682(0.418) -0.367(0.424)
Cons 1.516(1.599) 0.538(1.602) 0.700(24.128) 28.628(25.042) -1.223(1.291) -0.174(1.299)
Pseudo R
2 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.10
Log PseudoLikelihood -101.05 -101.05 -131.08 -131.08
ꭓ2 0.13 0.13 0.002 0.002
R
2 0.12 0.12
F 0.000 0.000
N 187 187 222 222 222 222
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age 0.493(0.452) 0.493(0.452) 0.033(0.029) 0.033(0.029) 0.014(0.013) 0.014(0.013)
Sex -9.903(4.983)** -9.903(4.983)** -0.425(0.314) -0.425(0.314) -0.099(0.146) -0.099(0.146)
Education 1.368(3.877) 1.368(3.877) 0.094(0.215) 0.094(0.215) -0.066(0.099) -0.066(0.099)
Income 1.554(2.040) 1.554(2.040) -0.091(0.122) -0.091(0.122) 0.025(0.051) 0.025(0.051)
Politics -0.748(1.015) -0.748(1.015) 0.127(0.068)* 0.127(0.068)* -0.061(0.030)** -0.061(0.030)**
Religion -6.180(3.187)* -6.180(3.187)* 0.171(0.217) 0.171(0.217) -0.069(0.109) -0.069(0.109)
Social Capital -1.479(2.634) -1.479(2.634) -0.476(0.171)*** -0.476(0.171)*** 0.106(0.075) 0.106(0.075)
Altruism 9.343(3.102)*** 9.343(3.102)*** -0.540(0.192)*** -0.540(0.192)*** 0.293(0.088)*** 0.293(0.088)***
Prior MCE 5.044(2.671)* 5.044(2.671)* -0.077(0.171) -0.077(0.171) 0.048(0.077) 0.048(0.077)
Weather 6.109(6.855) -0.410(0.426) 0.526(0.193)***
Terrorism 3.620(6.972) -2.489(6.675) -0.743(0.434)* -0.332(0.435) 0.459(0.197)** -0.067(0.194)
Accident -6.109(6.855) 0.410(0.426) -0.526(0.193)***
Crime -6.592(6.767) -12.701(6.579)* -0.151(0.420) 0.259(0.422) 0.059(0.194) -0.467(0.192)**
Cons 8.788(19.118) 14.897(19.321) 1.669(1.233) 1.258(1.241) -1.209(0.612)** -0.683(0.607)
Pseudo R
2 0.11 0.11
Log PseudoLikelihood -130.73 -130.73
ꭓ2 0.0004 0.0004
R
2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
F 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.0001
N 222 222 222 222 189 189
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
SocialMediaResponse (Logit) VolunteerTime (OLS) BloodDonations (Logit)
MoneyDonations (OLS) EventParticipation (Logit) X2F (OLS)
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relationship between terrorism and monetary and time donations is positive, but the relationship 
between these variables is more significant with weather events. The relationship between crime 
is also positive but at an insignificant level.  
An important observation from this experiment is that weather events tend to draw the 
strongest reaction from respondents and their tendencies to participate in demonstrations. A 
reason behind that may be that weather events are the most common and are the most 
unavoidable. For example, Americans have been found to fear natural disasters significantly 
more than other types of disasters (YouGov 2019). In parallel, terrorist events also drew a strong 
reaction from the community. This may be due to the rarity of such events, along with the 
shocking nature and publicity that surrounds terrorist events when they do occur. The 
perceptions and facts regarding crime in the United States is often very different. For example, in 
a late 2016 survey, 57% of respondents claimed that crime had gotten worse since 2008, though 
data shows that both violent and property crimes have decreased significantly since the mid-
1990s (Gramlich 2016). Crime (or at least its perceptions) are also often relegated to certain 
lower socio-economic areas and people. Additionally, many people do not believe that crime will 
happen to them, let alone a violent criminal event. Another observation is that each type of mass 
casualty event draws a different response from the community in which they occur and 
generalizing and classifying events (such as violent and nonviolent events) could lead to 
confusing and misinterpreted results. It would be more empirically beneficial to study each event 
type within in its own context in order to better understand the processes that occur within a 
community after such an event occurs.  
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Politically conservative respondents were found to be more likely to use social media to 
respond to a mass casualty event as well as participate in events related to a mass casualty event. 
Less religious respondents were also found to be more likely to donate both money and time. 
Older people were again more likely to donate blood, as well as the less educated. Altruism and 
social capital are again significant with many of the variables.  
The relationship between group membership and time donations is significant in a 
positive direction and insignificant in regards to event participation (same as the Experiment 1 
results).  The relationship between altruism is again positive and significant in terms of 
volunteering time, donating blood, donating money and with the factor analysis while negatively 
significant with the event participation variable (synonymous with the Experiment 1 results).  
Victim Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity Results 
 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that when vulnerable groups are the victims of mass casualty 
events, then more demonstrations of solidarity will happen.  
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Table 5: Victim Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity  
 
Results from Experiment 3 are supported in three of the demonstrations of solidarity as 
the presence of a vulnerable victim population has a positive and significant relationship with 
time and money donations and with the X3F variables. That relationship between vulnerable 
victim populations and time donations is at the 90% confidence interval, 99% confidence interval 
with the money variable and at the 95% confidence interval for the factor analysis variable. 
However, the presence of a vulnerable victim group has no effect on other demonstrations of 
solidarity measured and is negatively associated in terms of social media response as well as 
event participation.  
Politically conservative respondents are again more likely to respond to a mass casualty 
event using social media and by participating in events related to the mass casualty incident. Less 
Social MediaResponse 
(Logit)
VolunteerTime (OLS)
BloodDonations 
(Logit)
MoneyDonations 
(OLS)
EventParticipation 
(Logit)
X3F (OLS)
Age -0.055(0.037) 0.372(0.613) 0.089(0.036)** 0.799(0.512) 0.036(0.029) 0.018(0.013)
Sex 0.021(0.339) -12.734(6.512)* -0.119(0.315) -7.475(5.157) -0.051(0.310) -0.203(0.147)
Education 0.075(0.237) 0.302(4.225) -0.547(0.233)** 1.640(3.957) -0.041(0.213) -0.068(0.100)
Income 0.021(0.126) -0.361(3.055) -0.040(0.122) 1.258(2.311) 0.001(0.117) -0.001(0.052)
Politics 0.155(0.072)** 0.945(1.402) 0.054(0.067) -0.009(1.102) 0.144(0.067)** -0.056(0.030)*
Religion 0.075(0.253) -6.919(4.150)* -0.270(0.232) -9.935(3.395)*** 0.019(0.223) -0.086(0.111)
Social Capital -0.076(0.179) 4.622(3.475) -0.358(0.168)** -2.697(2.885) -0.476(0.169)*** 0.027(0.076)
Altruism -0.430(0.209)** 9.868(3.932)** 0.704(0.200)*** 9.300(3.258)*** -0.590(0.191)*** 0.330(0.089)***
Prior MCE 0.032(0.187) 1.716(3.539) -0.158(0.169) 4.603(2.991) -0.032(0.169) -0.018(0.078)
Crime -0.112(0.327) -10.943(6.338)* -0.252(0.309) -9.270(5.081)** 0.446(0.302) -0.220(0.141)
Vulnerable -0.459(0.335) 10.824(6.067)* 0.347(0.309) 14.077(5.014)*** -0.216(0.305) 0.345(0.143)**
Cons 1.411(1.423) 11.858(26.244) -0.679(1.273) 2.389(19.208) 1.261(1.180) -0.756(0.598)
Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.10 0.11
Log PseudoLikelihood -114.56 -130.34 -132.97
ꭓ2 0.13 0.002 0.0003
R
2 0.09 0.17 0.16
F 0.0022 0.000 0.000
N 189 222 222 222 222 189
*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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religious people are again more likely to demonstrate solidarity by volunteering their time or 
money. Older people are again more likely to donate blood, as well as the less educated.  
The relationships between group membership and altruism and the dependent variable are 
again significant. The relationship between social capital and blood donations and event 
participation is negative and significant, synonymous with results from the previous experiments 
conducted. Altruism is again negatively associated with social media response and event 
participation while it has a positive and significant relationship with both the time, money and 
Factor Analysis variables.  
Analysis 
 
While none of these results unanimously support the hypotheses proposed, there are some 
important conclusions that can be made. The first conclusion is that the consistency of the results 
regarding the first nine variables, that are common amongst all three experiments, adds to the 
validity and reliability of the results. Results table 5 shows the significance of some of the 
consistent findings across the different experiments, all at the minimum 90% confidence interval 
level or higher.  
Table 6: Cross Experiment Consistency Test 
 
X1 X2 X3 X1 X2 X3 X1 X2 X3 X1 X2 X3 X1 X2 X3
Age - + + + +
Sex - - -
Education - - -
Income -
Politics + + + + +
Religion - - - -
Group Membership - + + - - - -
Altruism - - + + + + + + + + - - -
Prior MCE +
EventParticipationSocialMediaResponse VolunteerTime BloodDonations MoneyDonations
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The significance and direction of some of these relationships also adds to the discussion. 
For example, the finding that older people are more likely to give blood makes logical sense as 
older individuals often are physically unable to participate in other demonstrations of solidarity. 
Older people are also less involved in social media (which is consistent with H1 results) and 
often have the means to contribute financially to different charitable causes (consistent with H1 
results). Gender related findings are contrary to previous findings that found that women were 
more likely to participate in voluntary charity (Helms and McKenzie 2013; Mesch et al. 2006; 
Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). Though previous empirical findings have found that politically 
conservative people report higher levels of charitable giving, politically conservative indicators 
were only significant in social media and event participation. This a considerably different 
method of demonstrating solidarity than traditional giving like volunteering or donating money 
(Paarlberg et al. 2018). Findings regarding religion are in line with previous findings that 
religiously affiliated individuals gave more (both time and money) than nonreligious individuals 
(Hagood 2016), but only when those causes were religious in nature (Wang and Graddy 2008). 
The response to a mass casualty event is not likely to satisfy that need for a religious person, 
unless, the victim group is religious in nature (which is in line with Hypothesis 3).  
The rationale for group membership and altruistic behavior positively affecting 
demonstrations of solidarity has already been discussed within this paper. The clearest results in 
support of those previous findings is the positive and significant relationship between volunteer 
time, group membership and altruism. The positive and significant relationship between 
volunteer time and group membership makes logical sense as individuals who have institutional 
involvement will have more of an opportunity to volunteer their time. These findings are in line 
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with previous findings that demonstrate a relationship between formal volunteering and informal 
helping through social networks (Gallagher 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997). Volunteering time 
is perhaps the most altruistic of all the demonstrations of solidarity measured so it is to no 
surprise that a positive and significant relationship exists between altruism and volunteering 
time. Altruism is a strong positive indicator in blood donations, consistent with previous findings 
(Steele et al. 2008). Monetary donation is also significant while group membership has an 
insignificant relationship with these variables. Volunteering and monetary donations garnered 
similar responses, akin to previous findings (Lee, Piliavin, Call 1999). 
The negative but significant relationship between altruism, group membership and social 
media usage is a relatively unexplored topic, but rationale for a negative relationship exists. A 
negative relationship exists between social media response and group participation across all 
experiments (though only significant in Experiment 1). These findings are supportive of the 
“slacktivist” concept in that social media usage does not require group participation (though 
many civic groups exist on social media). Altruistic behavior deals more with actual helping 
behaviors and not necessarily symbolic ones, like a social media response would be. The 
significant negative relationship between group membership, altruism and event participation is 
contrary to logic, but can be explained. For example, those involved in groups would logically 
participate in events, however, the event participation variable does not consider who is 
organizing the event. If that event organization was controlled for (and the respondent’s 
affiliations were organizing) then the negative relationship currently showing for group 
membership would likely flip to a positive one. Again, altruistic behavior deals mostly with 
actual helping behaviors captured by the significant positive relationships captured for time, 
77 
 
blood and money. Though demonstrating solidarity through event participation requires more 
effort than a social media response, these demonstrations are still largely symbolic. 
Event Type Examination 
 
The only hypothesis tested across all the experiments was regarding violent event types 
vs. nonviolent ones and tested specifically through Experiment 2. Event type is completely 
insignificant in Experiment 1 where respondents received either a weather or terrorism event. 
Event type is significant in Experiment 3 where accidents had a stronger relationship with 
demonstrations of solidarity than criminal events. As mentioned before, the mixed results from 
the testing of this hypothesis suggests that violent events do garner strong demonstrations of 
solidarity, but under certain circumstances. Those circumstances remain unknown though 
variables such as blame, frequency of each event type (ala Rasanen et al. 2014 results) and media 
coverage of other events are likely to impact individuals within a community where a mass 
casualty event had just occurred. Theoretically terrorist and criminal events were assumed to be 
similar, but results suggest that they are very different. For example, previous experimental 
results found that extremity and severity of violence was important, along with the motivation 
for the incident and social categorization of the actor (Huff and Kertzer 2016). Importantly, they 
specifically highlighted the language used to described violent incidents as an important factor in 
how the public classifies an event as terrorism or not. However, such inconsistent results forces 
acceptance of the null hypothesis regarding hypothesis 2/2a must be accepted. Further empirical 
research into each event type and how they affect individuals at both the individual and 
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community levels is something that is needed before any logical claim regarding event type 
could be made.   
Conclusion 
 
An important lesson taken from these results is the mostly unexplored differences 
between different types of demonstrations of solidarity. Previous research suggests that blood 
and money donors receive greater anonymity, while time donors participate in person with those 
in need and requires more initiative (Lee, Piliavin and Call 1999). Additionally, which 
demonstrations are related? For example, social gatherings to commemorate victims reinforces 
compassion and sympathy for victims and the gravity of an event and positively affects 
volunteering to relief efforts (Jasper 1997, 1998; Wuthnow 1991). More empirical research is 
needed to examine how a mass casualty event affects psychological factors behind giving 
behaviors as a demonstration of solidarity. A larger and more representative sample would be 
able to better explore the relationships between demographics and demonstrations of solidarity as 
the limited college student sample is unable to elaborate on these relationships. Though younger 
people make up an important part of a community, college students often have limited life 
experiences. However these results are intriguing and empirically promising.  
 Results from Experiment 1 (testing Hypothesis 1) support the null hypothesis as casualty 
count does not seem to affect the demonstrations of solidarity that follow. However, the results 
using the X1F1 variable suggest that a higher casualty count has a somewhat positive and 
significant relationship with volunteering time and blood and monetary donations (though not 
individually). As the definition of a mass casualty event is usually vague and abstract in nature 
(as previously discussed), perhaps these results can be interpreted to suggest that psychologically 
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a mass casualty event requires a much higher number of casualties to signal a need within the 
community, which would draw a response (in the form of demonstrations of solidarity). 
Violent events (specifically terrorism) is a significant indicator of whether an individual 
will donate blood or not, however, the mixed responses across all the dependent variables 
suggest that each event type is truly unique regardless of violence or not. Therefore, a further 
examination into how different event types are perceived by individuals is needed along with 
how they impact a community. However, this is support for hypothesis 2a that terrorist events 
will lead to more demonstrations of solidarity.  
Results from Experiment 3 (testing Hypothesis 3) suggest that the presence of 
traditionally vulnerable victim groups was a significant and positive indicator of both time and 
money donations along with the X3F variables. These results suggest that the presence of a 
vulnerable victim group will indeed cause more demonstrations of solidarity. However, it is 
important to recognize that psychologically deciding whether a victim is vulnerable or not occurs 
at the individual level, though traditionally vulnerable groups (children, elderly etc.) are 
interpreted by the majority of people as being vulnerable. Other, socially vulnerable groups may 
be interpreted as vulnerable by individuals who share common traits with that group (or who are 
merely sympathetic) and thus more demonstrations of solidarity will occur. For example, the 
2016 terrorist attack at the gay nightclub Pulse likely caused more demonstrations of solidarity 
by LGBT individuals and those sympathetic to the LGBT community. In contrast, individuals 
who are not sympathetic would behave normally in their post-event demonstrations while 
individuals who carried an anti-LGBT mindset likely did not demonstrate or participated in 
victim blaming. For example, Kogut (2011) found that if an individual is believed to be 
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responsible for their plight then people are less likely to offer help. These results regarding 
vulnerable victim groups is intriguing and suggests that framing mass casualty event victims to 
be more sympathetically appealing (more so than simply being a victim) could lead to stronger 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
 
This section seeks to examine how casualty numbers, the presence of a vulnerable victim 
group and institutional presence affects the demonstrations of solidarity that follow a mass 
casualty event. Three hypotheses are tested across two case studies. The hypotheses tested are: 
1.  higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of solidarity 
3.  events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will generate more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
4.  victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization will have more 
demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event. 
a. A strong response from government institution leaders will lead to more 
demonstrations of solidarity.  
b. A strong specific institutional response will lead to more demonstrations of 
solidarity. 
Case study methods like those used here are useful because they can be exceptionally 
detailed on variables of interest and allow process tracing. The use of case studies is essential for 
description and is fundamental to social science (King, Keohane and Verba 1993). The use of 
qualitative methods is common in previous studies involving the reactions to mass casualty 
events. Gal (2014) used a single case study of Israel during the Second Intifada (September 2000 
to early 2004) to show that Israeli reaction became normative in the sense that the public reacted 
immediately to the event (terrorist in this instance), took measures to protect itself, and then 
returned quickly to its normal routines. Carroll et al. (2005) used case studies on three separate 
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towns in Arizona affected by fires in 2002 to show that cohesion and conflict was evident based 
on the individual perceptions of those that did not evacuate. 
This chapter consists of seven different sections. The first section discusses case selection 
and data. The second section primarily discusses the independent and control variables of 
interest. These variables are measured through the use of primary source material regarding the 
casualty number for each event, the victim group and community institutionalization. The fourth 
section operationalizes the demonstrations of solidarity examined within the case studies. The 
fifth and six sections are the case studies; the Pulse terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida in the 
Summer of 2016 and the San Bernardino terrorist attack in the Winter of 2015. The seventh 
section is an analysis of the findings from both case studies. Within this final section is also an 
application of the findings and a discussion of other unaccounted for variables that could play an 
impact.  
Case Selection 
 
Ideally, a most similar case method where variation only existed on the variable of 
interest would be used. However, since the unit of analysis is the community in which the event 
occurred, a true most similar method would be difficult to execute because of the wide range of 
independent variable values and the limited number of cases to choose from. Therefore, there is 
variation on the number of casualties (to test Hypothesis 1), victim type (to test Hypothesis 3) 
and institutionalization of the victim community (to test Hypothesis 4/4a/4b).  
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Table 7: Case Comparisons 
 
These cases are similar in that they were acts of terrorism carried out by radicalized 
extremists who were apparently sympathetic to the Islamic State. Each incident qualifies as a 
mass casualty event based on the total number of dead; 49 in Orlando and 14 in San Bernardino. 
Each incident was the largest terrorism-based mass casualty event since the September 11th 
terrorist attacks when they occurred. Each incident lasted a short amount of time and individuals 
associated with the suspects in both cases were later prosecuted. In both cases, the perpetrators 
were killed on site by local law enforcement and the FBI became involved later to investigate 
these acts of terrorism.  
Every community and every mass casualty event are unique and though event types or 
casualty numbers may be similar there are likely other factors that exist within a community that 
impact the response to such a traumatic event. The three main differences between these cases 
are in line with the aforementioned hypotheses. First, the casualty numbers differ; Orlando had 
Similarities Differences
Community Traits Ethnic Makeup Economic Makeup
Poverty
Unemployment
Median Household Income
GDP/Capita 
Crime Levels
Facts of the Event Mass Casualty Events Number of Dead (49/14)*
Terrorism Type of Victims (LGBT/Govt.)*
Attackers Pledged Allegiance to ISIS Institutionalization of Victim Community*
Use of Firearms Number of Shooters
Most Casualties since 9/11 at time
Events Lasted about 3 Hours
Suspects Killed by Local Law Enforcement
Post Event Response Few Related Prosecutions Amount of Money Raised**
Consulted Kenneth Feinberg Gatherings/Vigils**
Federal Response for Terrorism Investigation Donations**
*Denotes Independent Variables
**Denotes Dependent Variables
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49 fatalities while San Bernardino had 14. Second, is the extent to which the victims were 
perceived as vulnerable. The victims in the Orlando case are generally associated with the LGBT 
community, a group many people see as vulnerable. The victims in the San Bernardino case were 
local government workers, a group not generally seen as vulnerable. Third, is the level of 
institutionalization within those victim groups. Institutionalization includes governmental 
support of demonstrations, the involvement of non-profit groups and local businesses and 
specific institutions (related to the victim group) in demonstrations of solidarity.  
There are strong differences between Orlando and San Bernardino and both areas have 
different histories and economies. Orlando’s economy is reliant on tourism and hospitality in 
addition to a growing technology sector, and as a result the area is economically better off than 
San Bernardino. Economically, poverty and unemployment are lower and median household 
income and gross domestic product per capita are higher in Orlando than San Bernardino (US 
Census Bureau 2019). Crime is higher in San Bernardino than Orlando (FBI UCR 2019). While 
both events had an initially strong media response, the victim type inclusion was most prominent 
in the narrative in the Orlando case. The added variation makes it more complicated to draw 
inferences in examining these two cases. The two communities responded differently to the mass 
casualty events that occurred. The Orlando community responded strongly with large and 
frequent demonstrations of solidarity with the victims, whereas the San Bernardino community 
response was limited.   
Methodology 
 
Hypothesis 2 is not tested because both events where violent, terrorist events. One key 
source of information used in both cases are after action reports from the Community Oriented 
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Policing office within the National Institute of Justice.16 Media sources, preferably local news 
sources were used because they were much more thorough and consistent in their reporting. 
Though national news sources were used, local news sources were able to cover smaller 
demonstrations that are often overlooked by after action reports and national media sources, such 
as material (non-monetary) donations. 
Case Structure 
 
Each case is broken down into six sections. First, the cases begin with the facts of each 
event, drawn mainly from after action reports. Second, the area in which the event occurred is 
described using publicly available information describing the economy and other aspects of each 
community. The third section discusses the independent variables for each case; casualty 
number, victim vulnerability (using primarily historical, legal and survey data) and community 
institutionalization. The fourth section discusses the media’s role in each event is described, 
including how the victim group and casualty number is included or not in coverage. The fifth 
section covers the demonstrations of solidarity (dependent variable) that occurred following each 
event, supported by the interviews. The sixth and final section is concluding thoughts regarding 
each case, including which hypotheses there is supportive evidence for.  
Author Bias 
I have lived in the Central Florida area for more than twenty years. Within that time, I 
earned both Bachelor’s and Masters’ degrees in Criminal Justice from the University of Central 
Florida. I have been trained in qualitative methods, including the use of interviews in providing 
 
16 NIJ/COPS after action reports include hundreds of hours of interviews with numerous individuals involved with 
each case, including first responders and community leaders. 
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empirical evidence. Additionally, I have been a sworn Deputy Sheriff with the Orange County 
Sheriff’s Office for more than five years. In that position, I regularly interview people from a 
variety of different diverse backgrounds. The fact that I am a law enforcement officer was not 
provided to anybody that I interviewed prior to interview. I acknowledge any subliminal bias I 
may have as a white male approaching these topics from an academic background, but no bias 
was intentional. 
As a law enforcement officer, I responded to the Pulse shooting on the morning of June 
12th and observed the aftermath of such a traumatic event upon the community. That event, in 
many ways, inspired this project. This project and the interviews I conducted added into a greater 
understanding of how individual communities respond to mass casualty events. Results have 
suggested that the motivations to demonstrate solidarity depend on the individual and the types 
of demonstrations available. Communities respond differently based on a variety of different 
factors, most importantly the institutional response they receive.  
A triangulation method was used on the data in order to eliminate potential biases. Data 
came from many different sources including interviews, primary sources including local and 
national media, and secondary sources including academic and government data. While I was 
familiar with the general community response to Pulse, I did not have any substantial 
interactions with any of the organizations whose members I interviewed. Therefore, I relied 
heavily on media sources in guiding who was contacted for an interview for both cases. 
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Interviews 
 
A total of 28 individuals who were active in either the Orlando or San Bernardino 
communities following the mass casualty events were contacted via email for an interview.17 I 
contacted 19 different individuals related to the San Bernardino case. I was only able to 
interview 6 people related to that case as the response rate was low. I contacted 9 individuals 
related to the Orlando case and was able to interview 7 people. I also interviewed a 
representative from the law offices of Ken Feinberg, a victim fund expert. Mr. Feinberg is a 
well-known compensation attorney who provided similar services to affected communities 
following the Boston bombing, Virginia Tech shooting, Aurora theater shooting and the BP oil 
spill in addition to the September 11th attacks (Barkan 2016). Every person interviewed was with 
their respective organization when the mass casualty event occurred.  
Of those contacted, 14 total interviews were completed for a response rate of 50%. 
Contact information for interviewees was readily available through internet-based sources. 
Interviews were conducted either face to face or over the phone between April 23 and June 24 
2019. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes and was semi-structured with open ended 
questioning. Initial questioning followed the “grand tour” model to understand the organizations 
typical role within the community (Spradley 1979). Immediately after, a follow up question was 
posed along the “specific” grand tour model in order to focus specifically on the event (Spradley 
1979). The interview questions focused upon the role the organization has within the community, 
the impact the event had upon the community, and the role the organization had following the 
 
17  See Appendix C.1 and C.2 for Qualitative IRB documents 
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event.18 Additional questions were focused on inter-institutional collaborations, the participants 
personal experiences and perceptions following the event. Semi-structured interviews allow 
participants to speak freely and for the interviewer to modify questioning based on the direction 
the interview is going.  
Detailed notes were taken for each interview. Those interviews were crucial in providing 
an “on the ground” perspective as all the interviewees played important roles in the community 
following the mass casualty events. Additionally, participants were able to provide information 
on demonstrations of solidarity that occurred. They provided contextual information on the roles 
the victim type, community institutions, and casualty numbers played along with other control 
variables that they believe influenced the community response.  
Data Analysis 
As a theory was already in place to describe community behavior following a mass 
casualty event, the method used was more akin to an inductive/scientific method. Once cases 
were selected, data points began to be gathered and verified through different sources. Due to the 
expected limited interview response, contact was attempted with as many different people 
involved in the community response as possible. Analysis of the interviews focused on phrases 
and ideas being conveyed that refer to organizational response specific to the individual being 
interviewed. Additionally, the perceptions of other institutional and community involvement in 
demonstrations of solidarity, perceptions of how facts of an event motivated community 
response, and how response to the event could have been improved were all topics covered 
throughout the interviews. Analysis of demonstrations of solidarity, both from interviews and 
 
18 See Appendix C.3 for Interview Questions. 
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other sources, were coded in context of the community in which the event occurred.19 When 
possible, claims made during interviews were corroborated through neutral media sources. Any 
claims made during the interviews that were contradictory with media sources were confronted 
during the interviews.   
Independent Variable: Casualties 
In order to test hypothesis 1, the casualty number for each case was compared across an 
original database covering all mass casualty events that occurred in the United States from 2000-
2016 (See Appendix A). In order to code each event, the average was taken of all violent events 
prior to the event being examined. If the average is lower than the casualty number for the event 
being examined, then the event is coded as high and if the average is higher than the event being 
examined then the event is coded as low. Additionally, the casualty number was specifically 
focused upon in media reports and when conducting interviews with those involved with 
demonstrations within each community. Everyone who was interviewed was asked if they 
believed the number of fatalities affected the community’s response. Though both cases qualify 
as mass casualty events, there is a significant difference in the 49 deaths in the Orlando case to 
the 14 deaths in the San Bernardino case.  
Independent Variable: Victim Type 
 
In order to test hypothesis 3, that vulnerable victims elicit more support than victims who 
are not perceived as vulnerable, primary sources were used to gather information about the 
nature of the victim class. While traditionally vulnerable victims were used in the experiment, 
 
19 Inductive and deductive approaches were used to code interview responses. Both open and axial coding was 
used (Corbin and Strauss 1990). 
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this instance of testing hypothesis 3 is focused on socially vulnerable victims. In order for a 
group to be considered socially vulnerable they must have a history of marginalization and be 
perceived by others as vulnerable. These groups must be common and identifiable enough of a 
victim type to be sympathetic to rest of the community. Identity group factors such as general 
legal protections, anti-discrimination policies and the targeting of each group in crimes provide 
insight into whether a group may be perceived as vulnerable or not. Non-vulnerable victim 
groups may not have legal protections in place because there is not a need and these groups often 
do not have a history of marginalization. They are not sympathetic enough to warrant an increase 
in concern if they are targeted and there are no societal protections in place to protect groups that 
are not seen as vulnerable. Non-vulnerable groups may have a weak institutional structure and 
rely on other institutions for support. In addition to primary source material, leaders within the 
LGBT community in Orlando and the representatives of the workers in San Bernardino were 
interviewed in order to ascertain how the roles each sub-community played in demonstrations of 
solidarity. 
Independent Variable: Institutionalization 
 
In order to test hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b, each case is analyzed regarding government 
leadership and institutional involvement in demonstrations of solidarity. This information comes 
from primary sources and from community leaders who were interviewed. Representatives from 
government, non-profit, business/economic and specific institutions within the communities 
were interviewed in order to ascertain the effects of institutional involvement in demonstrations 
of solidarity. Government institutions are coded as such if they are a part of the government. 
Strong government institutional leadership is coded as such if members of the local or state 
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government appear frequently in media related to the event. These appearances are most often 
because government leadership is involved with demonstrations of solidarity either directly (ex. 
speaking to a crowd during a memorialization) or indirectly (speaking to the media regarding 
community needs). Non-profit institutions are coded as such if they are a non-government 
institution that does not make money from its actions. Examples of non-profit institutions that 
were interviewed are blood donation organizations. Specific institutions are coded as such if they 
were founded to serve a specific community. Examples of specific institutions interviewed 
include LGBT organizations in Orlando and the workers union in San Bernardino. High 
institutionalization of a victim community is characterized by multiple institutions being active 
within the victim community. Additionally, high institutionalization is characterized by 
numerous and effective collaborations between institutional types. These active institutions must 
be able to organize demonstrations of solidarity for the general community not just the specific 
community that was struck. Low institutionalization is characterized by either primarily 
individual involvement with organization of demonstrations or an institutional response by a few 
groups. Institutions that are unwilling (or unable) to organize demonstrations of solidarity, or 
who are unwilling to work with the general community, would also lessen the effectiveness of 
institutions in affecting demonstrations.  
Controls 
 
Other than the primary independent variables of interest, other community specific 
factors, like the economy in an area, can influence demonstrations of solidarity. Information on 
the economies of each area was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. This economic data is supported through publications that discuss economic growth 
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within each area. Additionally, data on the ethnicity of each area is provided in order to clarify 
the ethnic makeup of an area. 
Dependent Variable: Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
 Though the articulation of the dependent variable will appear similar to how it was 
measured through the experiment (social media activity, volunteering, blood donations, 
monetary donations, event participation) it will not be restricted to those five things. For 
example, collaboration between groups and creation of groups are two unique types of 
demonstrations of solidarity that were able to be measured qualitatively. The dependent variable 
is measured through examination of primary source material that provided information on any 
kind of demonstration of solidarity. Primary sources captured many different demonstrations of 
solidarity, like the size and frequency of vigils and other gatherings along with how much money 
was donated to official relief funds. Data on demonstrations was also gathered through the 
interviews. Questioning was framed to gather information on post event demonstrations and the 
effects of the independent variables.  
Orlando, Florida 
 
 Just before 2:00AM Omar Mateen parked a rental vehicle north of the LGBT oriented 
Pulse nightclub and entered with a Sig Sauer MCX semiautomatic .223 rifle and a 9mm Glock 
17 handgun. Almost immediately after entering he shot a patron, while Orlando Police 
Department Detective Adam Gruler sent out the initial emergency call for assistance. Detective 
Gruler shot at Mateen several times as he targeted clubgoers through the club. Around 2:03AM 
other OPD units arrived and began assisting. They formed a contact team and moved through the 
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club, shooting at Mateen several times. Around 2:10AM it became apparent that Mateen had 
barricaded himself inside the north restroom inside the club, which changed the situation from an 
active shooter to a barricaded gunman. Mateen had several conversations with crisis negotiators 
before the OPD SWAT team made entry into the bathroom where he had hostages. At 5:14 while 
the entry point was being widened Mateen opened fire on the SWAT team members, striking one 
in his ballistic helmet. At 5:15AM OPD reported that Mateen had been killed after exchanging 
gunfire with the SWAT team members. Surviving hostages were extricated from the area and 
directed to medical treatment. At 11:15AM a joint statement from responding agencies 
announced that Pulse and the surrounding area was safe.  
Forty-nine club patrons were dead and 53 more were wounded. At the time, the Pulse 
nightclub attack was the highest single casualty terrorist attack in the United States since 
September 11. The Pulse nightclub was a well-known LGBT establishment and the majority of 
the victims were Hispanic in descent and under the age of 40. Many of the victims were active in 
the LGBT community in that they were publicly known as gay, lesbian, bisexual or 
transgendered. Additionally, victims were students, parents, soldiers, and involved in a diverse 
range of professions (Bloch et al. 2016).  
Area Descriptors 
 
 The Pulse nightclub is in the southeastern portion of the city of Orlando in Orange 
County, Florida. In 2016, Orlando had approximately 271,000 people and unincorporated 
Orange County had an additional 1.28 million people (. Orlando is best known as a tourism 
mecca and for its world class attractions such as Walt Disney World and Universal Studios.  
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More than 150 international companies representing 20 nations have facilities in Orlando 
(Orlando Economic Partnership 2018). In addition to tourism and hospitality, the Orlando area is 
a hub of defense contract driven technology as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop 
Grumman and others all have large offices in the area. Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral 
Air Force Station and the Kennedy Space Center are all within 60 miles. Hospitality and tourism 
remain the main backbone of Orlando/Orange County as nearly 20% of the population works in 
leisure or hospitality and 68 million people visited Orlando in 2016 (Stratton 2014; Russon 
2018). Those tourists contribute greatly to the economy of Orange County, and visitors pay more 
than 5 billion dollars a year in state and local taxes (Orlando Economic Partnership 2018). In 
2018, the Milken Institute ranked the Metro Orlando area 7th as a best performing city 
economically. Between 2014 and 2018 the Central Florida region was ranked the top region for 
job growth (Shanklin 2018). Between 2015 and 2018, the City of Orlando was ranked #1 in the 
U.S. for job growth (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). GDP per capita is significantly higher in 
Orange County than the rest of Florida and United States (SSTI 2018; Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2016). Poverty rates were slightly higher than the rest of the state and national average 
while the median household income was higher than the rest of the state, but not the nation (U.S. 
Census Bureau).  
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Table 8: Case #1 Descriptors 
 
 
Casualties 
 
The majority of violent mass casualty events result in a lesser amount dead than 49.20 At 
the time, 49 dead as a result of a violent mass casualty event was the highest since the September 
11th attacks. The average number of casualties for a violent mass casualty event between 2000 
and this event is 11.23. Therefore, this event’s casualty number is coded as high because it is 
much higher than the average.  
LGBT Community as a Vulnerable Group 
 
The Pulse nightclub was a well-known, primarily LGBT establishment (Tunstall & 
Tunstall 2012; Cook 2011). Many of the victims identified with that community. Since the 
LGBT community may be considered a vulnerable group, demonstrations of solidarity may be 
higher following any trauma to that group. In objective terms, the LGBT community is a 
 
20 Of the 132 mass casualty events accounted for, the mean number of casualties is 51.35. Excluding the outliers of 
the 9/11 terrorist attack and Hurricane Katrina, the mean number of casualties drops to 19.94. There were 52 
violent events during this time with a mean number of 11.23 casualties for each event. 
2016 Orange County Florida U.S.
Population 1,314,267 20,612,439 323,127,515
White Only 64.7% 75.9% 73.3%
Poverty 16.6% 14.7% 14%
Unemployment 4.4% 4.9% 4.9%
Educational Attainment 31.9% 27.9% 30.3%
Gross Domestic Product per Capita $69,518 $38,398 $49,253
Median Household Income $51,335 $50,860 $57,617
Violent Crime (per 100,000) 635.2 430.0 386.3
Property Crime (per 100,000) 3,686.1 2,686 2,450.7
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vulnerable community and that vulnerability seems to be perceived by the rest of the nation. 
First, in some places there is still a strong social stigma that comes with being LGBT. This 
stigmatization is a driving factor into why LGBT people are seen as vulnerable because it can 
affect access to education, employment etc. This stigmatization causes LGBT people to become 
concerned about being victimized. Second, we are only several generations away from a time 
when LGBT individuals had virtually no rights or recognitions regarding their sexual orientation 
and violence was much more common against LGBT individuals. Third is the lack of uniform 
and consistent laws protecting LGBT people across the nation. Finally, LGBT people are 
perceived as vulnerable from those minimally or not involved with the LGBT community 
mostly. This is most evident through the high support for LGBT related legislation by non-
LGBT people. Though LGBT individuals are becoming much more a part of mainstream society, 
there is still much of the U.S. and world where LGBT individuals are treated as outcasts and 
punished for their behaviors. As the number of publicly out LGBT individuals increases, the 
perceptions of vulnerability are likely to decrease because the LGBT lifestyle will become more 
of a social norm.  
Treatment of LGBT People 
 
Homosexuality is still illegal in 76 countries and is punishable by death in six (UNAIDS 
2014).  Historically within the U.S. and many western nations, LGBT individuals were often 
treated as mental health patients. Throughout LGBT history, people have been often tormented 
by those with a religious fundamentalist ideology, which was found to be a strong predictor of 
negative implicit evaluations (Rowatt et al. 2006).  
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Many people recognize the discrimination that LGBT people face and support for LGBT 
people and policies is reasonably high. Nearly 70% of surveyed Americans are in favor of laws 
that specifically provided discrimination protections for LGBT people and 35% that strongly 
favor them (Vanermaas-Peeler et al. 2018). Media coverage of LGBT people and issues had been 
historically negative. However, since the 1990s LGBT people and culture began to receive more 
positive coverage. This more positive framing of the LGBT community through the mainstream 
media has served to not only increase acceptance and support for the LGBT community but also 
to highlight current injustices that still plague the community (Fejes and Petrich 1993). 
Discrimination and social exclusion against LGBT people can have serious consequences 
such as exclusion, harassment and marginalization that lead to relatively low education levels in 
LGBT teenagers (Williams and Ritch 1994; D’Augelli et al. 2002). Previous empirical findings 
suggest that stigmatization, discrimination, criminalization and harassment of LGBT people 
combined with low access to education, employment and health services illustrate systematic 
disadvantages LGBT people face which makes them a vulnerable population (Ekmekci 2017).  
Public opinion has become more supportive of LGBT rights. For example, public support 
for gay and lesbians has doubled in the last thirty years, significantly higher than any other 
marginalized groups (Flores 2014). The replacement of older less supportive generations with 
younger, more supportive people is important. However, Flores (2014) also noted that the 
increases in LGBT people being “out”, the growing numbers of LGBT characters in media and 
the active national discussion on LGBT rights as likely reasons for the increase in support. While 
evidence seems to indicate that the younger generations are bringing much more LGBT support 
with them, there is growing support across all age groups (Fetner 2016). The most positive 
indicator of having positive feelings towards the LGBT community is knowing someone who 
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identifies as a member of that community. As it becomes more common and easier to “come 
out”, the support for LGBT issues is likely to continue to rise as more people will know someone 
within the LGBT community (Fetner 2016).  
While acceptance of LGBT people has risen, it is important to recognize that a portion of 
the population is still unaccepting and unsympathetic to the LGBT lifestyle. For example, in 
2015, the year before Pulse, nearly 30% of respondents believed same sex relations between 
consenting adults should be illegal (Gallup 2019). As part of that same survey, Gallup (2019), 
found that nearly 40% of respondents believed that same sex marriages should not be recognized 
by law with the same rights as traditional marriage. Gallup (2019), also found that approximately 
35% of respondents believed that gay and lesbian relations was “morally wrong”.  
Targeting of LGBT People 
 
Whether sexual orientation belongs as a protected class under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 is something that is frequently contested in state and federal court. The U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that sexual orientation is a protected class, 
though that decision is only selectively binding (Wilson 2015). There are limited national 
protections for LGBT individuals and the majority of protections provided by the government for 
LGBT individuals falls at the state level.  
Sexual orientation consistently ranks as the third highest motivator for hate crimes, 
following race and religion (Marzullo and Libman 2009). In 2009 the definition of a hate crime 
expanded when President Barack Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act to include sexual orientation, gender identity, disability and gender in the 
definition and allowed the FBI to begin investigating those crimes.  
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Violent hate crimes perpetrated due to a victim’s sexual orientation were more severe 
than both racial and religious victims (Dunbar 2006). Further research has suggested that LGBT 
individuals are more likely to be targeted than any other minority for a hate crime (Park and 
Mykhyalshyn 2016).  Fear of being victimized is also high in the LGBT community and a Harris 
Interactive (2006) poll found that well over 50% of LGBT individuals surveyed were concerned 
over victimization due to their sexual orientation; a sharp contrast to only about 6-7% of non-
LGBT individuals who fear about being the victim of a violent crime (Gallup 2006; Gallup 
2007). In 2016, there were 1,076 hate crimes in the U.S. where someone was targeted due to 
their sexual orientation, including 32 in Florida and 2 in Orange County. In 2016, Orange County 
was not a particularly dangerous place for LGBT people. While these numbers seem to be low 
and according to Table 11 the numbers of LGBT hate crime incidents are decreasing. However, 
they do still exist, whereas non-LGBT individuals fear crime, but there is a lack of this 
enhancement that being a member of a protected group brings.  
Table 9: LGBT Incidents 
 
Many LGBT individuals also do not feel comfortable coming forward to law enforcement 
as a victim and many LGBT victims are reticent with law enforcement. Criminal justice 
curriculum often seems to be focused on race and gender more than sexual orientation and 
LGBT issues have not been taught prominently in criminal justice institutions even though 
LGBT Reported Incidents Orange County Florida U.S.
2016 2 32 1076
2015 1 14 1053
2014 4 12 1017
2013 5 20 1233
2012 6 42 1135
2011 6 25 1293
2010 4 29 1277
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crimes based on sexual orientation are still present and increasing in some situations (Cannon 
and Dirks-Linhorst 2006). Dunbar (2006) found that 28% of sexual orientation-based hate crimes 
were not reported to police after comparing hate crime statistics and statistics provided by a 
community level LGBT organization in California.  
In 2014, the ban on same sex marriage in Florida was ruled unconstitutional and same sex 
marriage was legal in every state by 2015 (Brenner v. Scott). At the state level Florida does not 
offer many protections for LGBT individuals. According to the Human Rights Campaign, the 
state of Florida has failed to act on 8 of the 10 most pressing issues affecting the LGBT 
community (HRC 2019). For example, Florida does not have laws prohibiting the discrimination 
of individuals based on their sexual orientation regarding housing, employment or public 
accommodations. Florida also does not have a law addressing school anti-bullying or education 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Florida does however, support marriage equality and 
other relationship recognition and supports a state level law that addresses hate and bias crimes 
based on sexual orientation, education, transgender healthcare, gender updates on identification 
documents and conversion therapy. Orange county prohibits discrimination in employment based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity in both the private and public sector (Equality Florida 
2010). The City of Orlando has had a non-discrimination ordinance since 1973, created a 
domestic partnership registry in 2011 and actively continues to support LGBT causes in the 
private and public domains (City of Orlando 2019).  
Institutions  
 
Government institutions in both Orlando and Orange County are strongly mayoral in 
nature. These mayors are prominent members of the community and exert a significant amount 
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of control over their respective areas and constituents. Mayor Dyer was a prominent member of 
the community following Pulse and he appeared often participating in demonstrations of 
solidarity and speaking with the media about the event. Additionally, Governor Scott came to 
Orlando following Pulse and was involved in demonstrations of solidarity. Economic institutions 
in Central Florida are driven primarily by the tourist/hospitality industry. Walt Disney World and 
Universal Orlando are very influential in both the political and public spheres. Nonprofit 
institutions are also active throughout Central Florida and many of them have existing 
partnerships with the local government or businesses to provide services. For example, 
OneBlood provides blood products to all hospitals throughout Central Florida. The Red Cross 
has a strong presence in Orlando and responded to Pulse.  
Institutionalism is strong within many sub-communities that exist along personal identity 
lines and the LGBT sub-community is no different. Many LGBT focused organizations were 
founded to provide safe spaces for LGBT people and, though acceptance has risen, those 
organizations are still around to provide support for LGBT people within the communities in 
which they serve. National LGBT specific institutions like GLAAD are active in the LGBT 
community today and other local specific institutions like Equality Florida serve smaller sub-
communities. There is likely going to always be a strong sub-community of LGBT individuals 
akin to certain races or ethnicities. The Center and The Zebra Coalition are two LGBT 
institutions that existed within the Orlando community prior to Pulse.  
The victims in this event were not only viewed as members of the LGBT community, but 
also as members of the larger Orlando community. As such, they benefited from the institutional 
response from government and non-government general institutions in addition to those specific 
LGBT institutions.  
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Media Coverage 
 
On June 16, 2016, during a visit to Orlando, President Obama described the incident as 
an “attack on the LGBT community” and vowed to “end discrimination and violence against our 
brothers and sisters who are in the LGBT community” (Obama 2016). President Obama’s 
comments regarding this attack were covered extensively by both local and national media. 
Other press coverage described the incident as an attack on the LGBT community. In a June 12th 
interview with CNN, Florida Senator Marco Rubio condemned the attack and stated that the 
shooter’s radical Islamic beliefs compelled him to specifically target the gay community 
(Bradner 2016). For example, on June 13th CNN’s developing coverage of the event noted Pulse 
as a “gay nightclub” (Ellis et al. 2016). A 2019 study examining online media sources and their 
publications following Pulse found that the victims were primarily identified as LGBT and the 
Hispanic nature of the victims was often neglected in coverage (Meyer 2019). 
The entire front page of the Monday, June 13th edition of the Orlando Sentinel was a 
memorial to the victims. In that memorial it was noted that Pulse was an LGBT themed 
nightclub and that the suspect was potentially driven by a hatred for homosexuals (Cutter 2019). 
Local television stations were quick to report and many sent reporters near the scene and they 
had a continued presence from the moment they became aware of the incident. Pulse related 
stories focused on the terrorism aspect, the high victim count and the identity group of the 
victims. For example, the New York Times coverage of the incident included the LGBT nature 
of the victims, terrorism and high casualty number (Alvarez and Perez-Pena 2016; Santora 
2016). New York Times coverage was very focused on the attack being at a gay establishment 
and extensively covered other LGBT violence in their Pulse stories. Washington Post coverage 
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was very focused on the terrorism aspect of the event and the high casualty number. However, 
their coverage did include that the victims were LGBT and even mentioned how ISIS executes 
LGBT people in areas they control (Tsukayama, Berman and Markon 2016; Goldman 2016). 
Many of the Pulse related stories focused on remembrance of the victims and Orlando stations 
WESH-Channel 2, WFTV-Channel 9 and News 13 each won Emmy awards for their coverage of 
the Pulse nightclub attack (Boedeker 2016). Throughout the Central Florida area many 
memorialization’s of the incident were focused on the 49 victims and wording like “Remember 
the 49” was common in headlines.  
Media coverage regarding Pulse continued well on several fronts. The first was regarding 
Mateen’s wife, Noor Salman, who was later charged with obstruction of justice and aiding and 
abetting her husband in providing financial and material support to a terrorist organization. In 
March of 2018 she was acquitted of those charges. Her role in the attack and subsequent trial 
kept the Pulse attack in the media spotlight and investigative information was released regarding 
the attack through her trial. Second was that Omar was a person of interest in a terrorism related 
investigation in 2013 and into 2014, though that investigation was later abandoned due to lack of 
evidence of wrongdoing. His father Seddique Matten had also been an FBI informant 
sporadically from the early 2000s up to 2016 and question even arose over Omar’s sexuality due 
to the LGBT club being targeted. These additional stories related to Pulse kept the event in the 
media well after it occurred.  
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Dependent Variable: Orlando Strong 
 
 The mission for the City of Orlando Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was to provide 
operational coordination and support for the command post and on-scene operations.21 The EOC 
began supporting victims and those immediately affected through the emergency information 
center and help line, the Family Reunification Center22 and Family Assistance Center.23 
Community support was also provided by assisting in dignitary visits, funerals, memorial 
services and vigils, the Orlando United Assistance Center and the OneOrlando Fund.  
 Once news of the event spread people were attempting to make donations through the 
EOC. The EOC worked closely with other government institutions (FBI, Department of Justice, 
City, County Staff and Medical Examiner’s Office) and non-government general institutions 
(Red Cross, Goodwill, Salvation Army) to provide relief services to those affected by the tragedy 
(Smith 2016). Donations made through EOC were directed to the appropriate organizations as 
the EOC is not intended to be a donations center.24  
 
21 Based on Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 
2019. The EOC was notified of the event around 3:30AM on the morning of June 12th. They recommended and 
received a full activation status (Level 1) by Mayor Dyer from June 12th to June 22nd.  
22 Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. The 
FRC was located at the Beardall Senior Center and ran from June 12th to June 14th with the purpose of notifying 
next of kin and victims’ identification and it was staffed with FBI Crisis Team, FEMORS and the FDLE. 
23 Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. The 
FAC was located at Camping World Stadium and ran from June 15th to June 22nd with the purpose of establishing 
support for the immediate needs of families, friends and victims. Services provided there included assistance with 
air travel/lodging, child and family services, consulate services, funeral services, legal aid etc. They served over 900 
individuals and 255 families in the time they were operational. 
24 Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. The 
EOC mentioned that donations were directed to the GoodWill or the RedCross,  
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In the morning hours of June 12th, Mayor Dyer 
began posting updates, such as the victim list, on what 
had occurred within his city.25 In one of these messages 
he notified the public that he had declared a state of 
emergency for the city of Orlando by Florida Governor 
Rick Scott, which allowed for further resources to be 
brought in (Dyer 2016). He also included a hotline for family members and a link to grief 
counselors through Aspire Health and the Zebra Coalition (Dyer 2016). Mayor Dyer also asked 
people to leave memorial items at the nearby Dr. Phillips center and to delay more vigils until 
public resources could be allocated to them. In the month that followed the City of Orlando 
tweeted 190 times and received 3.8 million impressions, 19,200 clicks and 7,877 new followers 
while Mayor Dyer’s account tweeted 145 times in that month and received 9,100 clicks and 
3,909 new followers (Taylor and DeVault 2017). Through Facebook, the City of Orlando posted 
159 times, received 2.6 million impressions, 23,919 clicks and 8,340 new followers while Mayor 
Dyer’s Facebook account posted 119 times, received 1.8 million impressions, 7,023 clicks and 
received 4,549 new followers (Taylor and DeVault 2017). The Twitter and Facebook activity 
from the City of Orlando in the month following Pulse are drastic increases from normal activity. 
On July 11, 2016 the Orlando United Assistance Center (OUAC) was founded to assist 
the individuals individuals directly impacted by the Pulse tragedy. The OUAC was a partnership 
between the City of Orlando, Orange County government and the Heart of Florida United Way 
 
25 Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. That 
official credits the strength of the Mayor’s Office and his strong leadership and commitment to public safety for 
much of the success of the post Pulse operations. 
“June 12, 2016, was the most horrific 
day in the history of the City of 
Orlando. In the days since the 
tragedy, the members of our 
community have stood up and stood 
together to show the world the best 
humanity has to offer. Together we 
will remain Orlando United.” – Mayor 
Buddy Dyer 
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and continued the work that had been done by the Family Assistance Center.26 The OUAC began 
with a mission to provide “long term healing through targeted mental health services, community 
building and awareness” and became a resilience center for anyone Pulse affected (OUAC 
2019).27 The OUAC provides a tailored approach to the LGBT and Hispanic communities 
through its use of case managers and the general approach is based upon the most effective 
healing processes from similar events. The OUAC primarily receives federal funding as they 
continue to actively assist individuals on a case by case basis with approximately 11 full time 
employees and approximately 300 active clients at any given time.28 
 The institutional response by the City of Orlando government included both direct and 
indirect approaches in order to assist survivors and the community. Mayor Dyer’s personal 
leadership and willingness to work with other institutions further enhances the governmental 
institution responses that occurred following Pulse. Indirectly, the government collaborated 
closely with non-governmental institutions to provide services to the victim and community. 
They also worked closely with businesses and specific LGBT and Hispanic institutions through 
the OneOrlando Fund.  
Fundraising Efforts 
 
Within several weeks of the shooting, Mayor Dyer’s general counsel reached out to Ken 
Feinberg for his guidance in how to respond to such an event.29 Mr. Feinberg suggested to 
 
26 Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019.  
27 Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019. 
28 Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019. The majority of those employees are case 
managers, though they do have 2 counselors on staff.  
29 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. The city came to an 
agreement with Mr. Feinberg so that he would provide administrative services, hold two townhall meetings, 
design plans and eligibility criteria for recipients of the funds raised. 
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consolidate all of the funds that had been set up to raise money for the victims and affected 
families.30 Mayor Dyer responded by announcing the OneOrlando Fund near the end of June 
2016. The OneOrlando Fund represents the diversity within Orlando, including those in the 
Hispanic and LGBT communities (OneOrlando 2016). Orlando Magic President Alex Martins 
was the chair of the board and the remaining members represent diverse groups including the 
Hispanic and LGBT communities (Dyer 2016; City of Orlando 2016; OneOrlando 2016). Table 
10 shows OneOrlando Fund board members (Broffman 2016). Equality Florida, the GLBT 
Community Center of Central Florida (The Center) and the National Compassion Fund 
announced a partnership with the OneOrlando Fund to better ensure that all collected funds were 
disseminated in a timely, unified and transparent manner (OneOrlando 2016). Economic 
powerhouses in the area contributed strongly to the fund. Prominent donors included Disney ($1 
million), Darden restaurants ($500,000) the DeVos family ($400,000), and $100,000 each from 
the Orlando Magic, Orlando City Soccer Club and JetBlue airlines (Santich, Jacobson and 
Arnold 2016). By December of 2016 the OneOrlando Fund had distributed $27,410,000 for 299 
claims of the 333 submitted, representing 98% of all eligible claims (Bednarz 2016). The fund 
closed on January 1, 2017 and any remaining funds were distributed accordingly.31  
 
 
 
 
 
30 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official further 
suggested that a publicly operated, custodial fund would be the most beneficial. 
31 Author’s interview with an official on the OneOrlando Fund Board on May 14, 2019. That official stated that 
donations came in from 127 different countries and characterized the fund as very much a short-term oriented 
entity while other groups were looked to provide support in the longer term. 
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Table 10: OneOrlando Fund Board 
 
Vigils and Gatherings of Solidarity 
 
 Smaller vigils occurred throughout Orlando on the night of June 12th, including at a 
downtown bar and a high school (Hayes et al. 2016). On June 13th Mayor Dyer and other 
community leaders spoke at a makeshift memorial at the Dr. Phillips center that thousands 
attended (Burch and Harris 2016). On June 14th, the nearby University of Central Florida hosted 
its own vigil to honor the victims, including a current student and alumnus who were killed 
(UCF Today 2016). On June 19th, “hundreds” attended a vigil that took place at Magic Kingdom 
after being organized by an online Walt Disney World related blog (Mauney 2016). A week after 
the attack a better organized vigil occurred at Lake Eola in downtown Orlando, which 
approximately 50,000 people attended to show solidarity with the afflicted LGBT and Hispanic 
communities (Bevil and Stennet 2016). Vigils and signs of solidarity were not restricted to the 
Central Florida area following the Pulse attack. Vigils to show solidarity with Pulse victims 
occurred in Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington D.C. 
Name Position Company
Rena Langley Senior V.P. Walt Disney World
Diane O'Dell V.P. of Community Relations Universal Orlando Resort
Stephanie Ghertner Director Darden Foundation & Community Affairs
Mark Meyer Industry Manager JP Morgan Chase
Paul F. Bryan Chief Executive Officer Grover Bryan, Inc.
Jennifer Foster Owner and Executive Producer Foster Productions
Diana Bolivar President Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of Metro Orlando
Carlos Carbonell Chief Executive Officer Echo Interaction Group
Ken Robinson President and Chief Executive Officer Dr. Phillips Inc. and The Dr. P. Phillips Foundation
Mark Shamley President and Chief Executive Officer Association of Corporate Contributions Professionals (ACCP)
Michael Farmer Statewide Deputy Director of Development Equality Florida
Tim Vargas Board President The Center
Chris McCullion Chief Financial Officer City of Orlando
Walter G. Hawkins Director of Urban Development City of Orlando Downtown Development Board
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(Taylor 2016; CBS 2016). International vigils of solidarity also occurred in London, Hong Kong, 
Mumbai, Sydney, Paris, Berlin and Seoul (Taylor 2016).32 Nearly 4% of the Orange County 
population attended the main vigil in downtown Orlando and numerous other vigils and 
gatherings occurred, both in the Central Florida area and out of the state and nation. 
Blood Supply Reaction 
 
 In the first 24 hours following the shooting, 372 pints of blood were used to help shooting 
victims (Brinkmann 2016). Blood and other blood products are one of the most important 
resources tapped following a violent mass casualty event as the number of dead can increase if 
medical resources are unprepared. The supplier of blood and blood products to Central Florida 
and the Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC), where a majority of the victims were taken, 
is OneBlood.33 Once victims began arriving at ORMC, lifesaving medical procedures were 
beginning and the blood at ORMC was being used. This caused the medical staff at ORMC to 
begin placing orders for more blood.34 Once it became apparent that a violent mass casualty 
event had occurred, OneBlood activated their Business Continuity Plan (BCP).35 Over the next 
two weeks, 109 pints of blood products were used for shooting victims and the hospital never 
had a shortage of any products. No victim experienced any delays according to OneBlood 
 
32 A prominent official within the LGBT community credits the worldwide diaspora of LGBT individuals and groups 
for the strong international reaction.  
33 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. OneBlood was created in 2012 after 3 
regional blood banks merged together to provide better services to the hospitals and medical facilities within the 
southeast.  
34 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. Hundreds of orders were placed throughout 
the night as blood began to be used.  
35 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. The BCP was created in 2015/2016 to 
formalize how to respond to such events. The BCP has been used numerous times and activated whenever an 
event occurs within their service area that more blood is likely to be needed. That official stated that is has been 
used for shootings, storms and bridge collapses in the past.  
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(Brinkmann 2016).36 The Orlando area was able to provide the majority of the blood, though O-
negative and O-positive was in high demand so several other cities within the region transferred 
blood products. What often goes unnoticed is the fact that blood donations require between 24 
and 48 hours to be processed before they can be disseminated to medical facilities for use. The 
blood previously donated is what saves lives in the immediate aftermath of a violent mass 
casualty event. The increases in blood donations that follows an event help in that blood products 
continue to be needed in the days and weeks following an event.  
OneBlood reported that 5,300 pints were donated on June 12th, three times what it usually 
receives per day (Brinkmann 2016).37 The week following the attack saw the biggest response 
since the September 11th terrorist attacks as OneBlood received 28,000 points of blood, well 
above the average weekly volume of 18,000 pints (Brinkmann 2016).38 By June 28th, 85 percent 
of the blood collected in the week after the shooting had been distributed within the OneBlood 
region of hospitals (Brinkmann 2016). The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), of 
which OneBlood is a part of, has a task force on domestic disasters and terrorism that helps 
affected regions tap into a larger array of resources in order to assist, but local blood banks 
stepped up quickly so the task force was not formally activated (Brinkmann 2016). Whenever an 
event where blood is likely going to be needed, OneBlood proactively reaches out to those 
affiliates to offer assistance and following Pulse, the Orlando area affiliates received dozens of 
 
36 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. 
37 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. During a press conference following Pulse a 
trauma doctor at ORMC asked people to donate blood and the official interviewed believes that provided an added 
motivation to donate. Many blood centers were taking donations until 4AM and OneBlood had no issue with filling 
the staffing requirements that such a huge surge brings, in either workers to take donations or technicians to 
prepare the blood for distribution.  
38 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. 80% of blood was donated through their 
mobile donation vehicles “Big Red Buses” and the remaining amount was taken in at designated blood donation 
facilities, of which there are 90 through their service area.  
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blood products from their service area.39 Following Pulse, OneBlood stressed that consistent 
blood donations are what saves lives. Approximately 30% of donors following Pulse were first 
time donors and 25% of donors had donated multiple times a year after Pulse occurred. 
OneBlood abides by Federal Drug Administration guidelines regarding blood donations which 
caused some minor strains following Pulse. Though some of the LGBT community were unable 
to donate due to FDA mandated guidelines, many of those individual still tried to help in the best 
ways they could, often through soliciting others to donate.40  
Established LGBT Groups Respond 
 
 Within the first 9 hours of the attack Equality Florida41, a statewide LGBT civil rights 
advocacy group, had raised $767,000 through a GoFundMe page dedicated to aid the victims and 
survivors (Shapiro 2016; WTVR 2016; Chillag and Wattles 2016). Some of the earliest large 
donors were Cricket Wireless ($25,000), Executive Pride ($30,000), singer songwriter Jeffree 
Star ($20,000) and even GoFundMe themselves who donated $100,000 and waived their 
transaction fees for any donations (Star 2016; Cricket Wirless 2016; Chillag and Wattles 2016). 
By June 16th, the goal of 5 million dollars had been met, breaking the previous record of 2 
million dollars (Pfeiffer 2016; Maxwell 2016; Kraft 2016; Chillag and Wattles 2016). Equality 
Florida partnered with the National Center for the Victims of Crimes (NCVC) to distribute the 
raised funds. NCVC is a non-profit that has helped distribute funds from other violent mass 
 
39 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019 
40 Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. That official noted that the guideline barring 
men who have had sex with another man from giving blood changed from a lifetime ban to only a one-year 
deferral soon before Pulse occurred. That official also cited guidelines barring or temporarily barring people with 
tattoos, piercings and certain travel and lifestyle restrictions from giving blood as a reason for why some were 
turned away. 
41 I attempted to interview a representative from Equality Florida but did not receive a response to my inquiry. 
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casualty events, most notably the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 and a shooting in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee in 2015 (Chillag and Wattles 2016). By September of 2016 the fund had raised 
$7,854,920 from 119,523 people (GoFundMe 2016). Equality Florida made two promises 
following Pulse; the first was to help victims and their families recover and the second was to 
ensure that Pulse never happened again (GoFundMe 2016; Evans 2016). Of the millions of 
dollars donated through the GoFundMe account set up, Equality Florida claimed that they kept 
none of it for administrative purposes and that all of it was appropriately disseminated 
(GoFundMe 2016). Since Pulse, Equality Florida has vowed to better protect LGBT individuals 
by passing legislation aimed at banning anti-LGBT discrimination and gun violence prevention 
policies (GoFundMe2016). Equality Florida also continues to accept money through a new 
GoFundMe page set up titled the “Honor Them with Action Fund” set up in memory of those 
killed during Pulse (GoFundMe 2016). 
 The Center opened in Orlando in 1978 and is one of the oldest organizations in the U.S. 
operating to promote the well-being of the Central Florida LGBT community while 
simultaneously serving non LGBT people of Central Florida. The Center advertises itself as a 
“sanctuary/safe space for all LGBTQ people in Central Florida” while also providing programs 
and services that empower, educate and entertain the LGBT community. They also are building 
strategic alliances for the purpose of increasing the influence and relationships between the 
LGBT community and the broader public. The Center in Orlando is the second oldest in the 
nation after the location in Southern California. That location was opened as a response to the 
Stonewall Riots in 1969 in order to provide safe gathering locations for LGBT individuals.42 The 
 
42 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. The official, who identified himself as a 
member of the LGBT community, stated that the LGBT community felt alienated and as if it lacked safe spaces 
following the Stonewall riots in 1969 where LGBT establishments were targeted by law enforcement. 
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morning following Pulse, The Center opened at 7am, operated for longer hours and immediately 
became a rallying point for the LGBT and greater Orlando community.43 Individuals would leave 
water and food donations with the organization and they would then disseminate those donations. 
The Center was so busy immediately following Pulse that they paused their STI testing in order 
to focus on mental health counseling.44 The Center received approximately 750 thousand dollars 
via donations within the month following Pulse, which they donated to the GoFundMe account 
set up by Equality Florida.45 The Center also donated approximately $31,000 in small business 
grants to the businesses in South Orlando that were affected by Pulse.46 The Center became a 
meeting point for many resiliency related activities following Pulse. For example, The Center 
received significant media coverage following the event. The Center corresponded with family 
members of victims that were out of state in order to bring them to Orlando and closer to their 
loved ones.47 As the oldest LGBT organization in the area, The Center worked closely with other 
LGBT organizations in order to better provide resources to those afflicted by the event.48   
 The increase in foot traffic to The Center following Pulse continued for a long while 
before diminishing.49 In 2015 The Center received $324,765 in total revenue (GLBT 2015). In 
2016 The Center had a 412% increase in total revenue as they received $1,664,613 (GLBT 
2016). The Pulse event put Orlando and the LGBT community in the spotlight and donations 
 
43 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official noted that the long hours for 
the workers of The Center came naturally as the believed they had a duty to their community to provide services. 
44 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official further explained that local 
counselors Adam Miller and Kristen Wieck provided mental health counseling on behalf of The Center. 
45 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. 
46 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official specifically noted several 
businesses near Pulse that were effectively shut down while the investigation was ongoing.  
47 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. 
48 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. The Center worked closely with Equality 
Florida and Zebra Coalition before working with the Orlando United Assistance Center.  
49 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official stated that while foot traffic had 
eventually decreased The Center was still busier than before Pulse occurred.  
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were not restricted to the immediate and afflicted area.50 In 2017, their total revenue decreased 
back down to $426,696 (GLBT 2017). The amount of total revenue in 2018 decreased even 
further down to around $200,000 which was attributed to trauma fatigue.51 The Center continues 
to provide mental health counseling and whenever another mass casualty event occurs that 
receives a significant amount of media attention, they see an increase in counseling needs.52  
 In an effort to provide the appropriate resources for the victimized community, Mayor 
Dyer directed people to the local mental health center Aspire and its sub-organization 
specifically targeted for the LGBT youth, the Zebra Coalition.53 The Zebra Coalition’s primary 
focus is on housing issues for LGBT youth (13-24 year olds) while they also deal with trauma 
reduction and gender issues.54 The Zebra Coalition is funded primarily through grants and after 
Pulse happened they received two new opportunities; one to expand into Osceola County and the 
other to offer more services for the 6 months after the attack happened.55 As with many of the 
other organizations within the area, they saw an influx of donations following Pulse. They 
carefully accepted monetary donations while distributing out material donations to those who 
 
50 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official could not provide official 
numbers but believed a significant portion of the donations they received that year were from out of state. 
51 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019.  
52 Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official believed that Pulse had such an 
effect on the community that many psychological issues in victims, witnesses and family members are still ongoing 
which causes an increase in the need for mental health counseling whenever another violent mass casualty event 
occurs. 
53 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. The Zebra Coalition was formed in 
2010 and bought a building in 2013 in which they currently operate out of directly across from The Center. The city 
of Orlando has always had a good working relationship with the Zebra Coalition and as of 2019, the treasurer of 
the city is on the Zebra Coalition board of directors. In 2019 the Zebra Coalition separated from Aspire, mainly for 
financial funding reasons and they continue to share many board members and overlap in many services offered. 
54 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. The Zebra Coalition has two mental 
health counselors and upwards of four interns at any given time that specialize in mental health counseling. 
55 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. The Zebra Coalition is primarily 
funded through a DFC grant from the federal government for $125,000 a year. After Pulse happened, they received 
a $50,000 grant from Humana to expand on their services and another grant through the Contigo Fund to expand 
into Osceola County in order to better serve the Hispanic residents there. 
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sought them out for help.56 For approximately two weeks following Pulse, the Zebra Coalition 
set up a help line to provide the appropriate resources for those that needed them and to make it 
easier for mental health practitioners to sign up and volunteer.57 Approximately 200 different 
mental health practitioners had volunteered their time and that same list is still in use.58 The 
Zebra Coalition believes that the community is now more accepting of LGBT people, though 
there is a bigger security concern now.59 As a member of CenterLink, the Zebra Coalition 
continues to share their experiences with other LGBT organizations across the country regarding 
how their organization and others responded to Pulse.60  
Demonstrations Continue and New Groups Form  
 
In the aftermath of the tragedy, numerous groups were formed in order to provide 
services to the community. One month after the attack, Pulse owner Barbara Poma founded the 
onePulse Foundation in order to memorialize the now closed club and honor the victims.61 The 
organization continues to fund community grants and offers 49 educational scholarships to honor 
 
56 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. That official emphasized that they 
only accepted monetary donations when the intent was specifically help out the organization. Donations such as 
hygiene products, gift cards and food and water are examples of some of the things donated to them following 
Pulse. 
57 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. That number was through 211 and 
the responsibilities went to the OUAC after that time. Mental health practitioners who wanted to help signed up 
on a document electronically shared across other organizations offering similar assistance. 
58 Author interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019.  
59 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. That official stated that issues with 
sexual orientation discrimination seemingly decreased in number following Pulse and believes that transgender 
issues have taken more focus.  
60 Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. CenterLink is an LGBT organization 
affiliation that spans the United States and Canada and is a means mainly for communication amongst these 
groups. That official stated that they routinely still receive questions and participate in discussions regarding Pulse 
and their organizational response to the incident. 
61 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. OnePulse was informally organized 
immediately after the incident occurred but slowly evolved and on May 4, 2017 the organization went public. 
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each of the victims.62 Immediately following the attack, onePulse directed most of the monetary 
donations to the OneOrlando Fund, which operated independently from onePulse.63 Donations to 
onePulse have slowed since the attack occurred, however, they continue to receive 
correspondence from across the nation and world.64 Since its inception, the foundation has 
accepted 32 donations of $10,000 or more, ranging from well-known international businesses to 
private individuals (onePulse 2019). The Orange County Government donated 10 million dollars 
of the tourism development tax revenue to onePulse. In June 2019 PVH Foundation joined 
Orlando Health as a 1-million-dollar donor to onePulse and Walt Disney World Parks and 
Resorts donated $250,000.  
 OnePulse currently has seven full time staff members, a 20-member board of trustees 
that includes businessmen and celebrities and an ambassador’s council that includes Mayor Dyer 
and representatives from across the nation including individuals from the 9/11 Memorial and 
Museum and the Oklahoma City Memorial and Museum.65 Barbara and several early board 
members of onePulse travelled to the 9/11 memorials in New York City and Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania along with the memorial of the Oklahoma City bombing and other memorials 
across the nation for similar events.66 OnePulse has always had a good working relationship with 
 
62 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that those scholarships are 
in the names of each of the victims, in topics the victims were involved or interested in. Each victim family 
maintains discretion over who receives the scholarships and each scholarship receives $10,000 a year. 
63 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that they did accept 
monetary donations for the organization when applicable.  
64 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official noted that simple demonstrations 
of solidarity often occurred near the club that nobody ever claimed and gave an example of a water cooler that 
would appear at the temporary club memorial. That official also stated that nontraditional donations include 
letters, poems, drawings and sculptures which they continue to receive.  
65 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that a well-rounded and 
professionally diverse board was intentional by the founders of OnePulse. Board members were initially appointed 
but now interested individuals reach out to OnePulse about board membership. 
66 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official emphasized that very early on 
Barbara sought out guidance in appropriately memorializing the events that happened at Pulse as similar events 
117 
 
the media and the organization believes that social media in particular has been their best method 
to reach people.67 OnePulse continues to organize and participate in events, such as 5ks and art 
shows, meant to raise awareness and donations and the organization is crucial in planning 
anniversary events on June 12th of every year. They also work with OUAC to coordinate with 
victims and affected families and they organize activities for those individuals twice a year. After 
the attack, Pulse was permanently shut down and the City of Orlando and Pulse owners grappled 
with how to memorialize the incident (Weiner & Tziperman 2016).68 OnePulse continues to 
strive for the construction of a permanent memorial and museum.69 
OnePulse partnered with the Orange County government to officially declare June 12th as 
“Orlando United Day-A Day of Love and Kindness” to annually honor the victims of the attack 
(Orange County Government 2016). The One Orlando Collection was later created by a 
partnership between the Orange County government, City of Orlando, the Orange County 
Regional History Museum and community partners to permanently and methodically preserve 
the event and the memories of the deceased (OneOrlando Collection 2019).70 More than 5,000 
artifacts were gathered from the Pulse nightclub, the Dr. Phillips Center and Lake Eola where 
vigils occurred and the Orlando Regional Medical Center where many victims were treated 
(OneOrlando Collection 2019).  
 
very rarely ever occurred within private businesses and she knew she would be strongly influencing how Pulse was 
remembered. OnePulse continues to work closely with the officials involved in memorials across the nation. 
67 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official credits the Rubenstein public 
relations firm out of New York for much of their consistent and positive relationship with the media and public 
alike. 
68 Based on the Author’s interview with both representatives from the City of Orlando and the Pulse nightclub 
owners, both stated that they have always had a good working relationship despite differences in how the event 
should be memorialized. 
69 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that they are seeking a 
permanent memorial at the nightclub and a museum in the vicinity. 
70 Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official noted that they loaned notable 
items from Pulse that included chandeliers, disco balls and other decorative items from inside the club.   
118 
 
On June 16, 2016, future founding members of The OneOrlando Alliance successfully 
contacted 18 other LGBT organizations asking for communication and collaboration between 
these likeminded groups.71 It began as a unified alliance of likeminded LGBT centered 
organizations before it grew to include nearly 30 different organizations, including Equality 
Florida, The Center, OnePulse Foundation, OUAC, QLatinX and the Zebra Coalition. The 
OneOrlando Alliance was formed to work in a “collaborative and transparent way to serve those 
affected-including victim’s families, survivors, Pulse employees, and the larger community also 
struggling with trauma, grief and fear” (OneOrlando Alliance 2019). As the OneOrlando 
Alliance was forming, the amplified communication they offered between member groups 
allowed for much easier assistance to be given to those in need following Pulse.72 In September 
of 2016 the newfound collaboration extended to the Orange County government after a meeting 
with Mayor Teresa Jacobs where she pledged support.73 The OneOrlando Alliance is funded 
completely by local grants and often raises money for the OUAC.74 The alliance and their 
coalition of member groups tackle important issues within the LGBT community. For example, 
the alliance organized a community forum on LGBT issues within the homeless population in 
Orlando and continues to work with different programs and services in Central Florida to ensure 
that they are LGBT inclusive (Santich 2019). The OneOrlando Alliance continues to raise money 
 
71 Several officials I spoke too stated that an alliance was attempted in 2012 between likeminded LGBT groups 
throughout Central Florida but it quickly became too difficult to organize. 
72 Author interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. That official stated that they 
initially set up a Facebook page where different groups could communicate their needs. Examples of some of the 
needs they assisted in include the need for hospital space, wheelchairs, food for family members, transportation, 
immigration attorneys and airline tickets. 
73 Author’s interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. That official stated that the 
government had been frequently involved from very early on but that Mayor Jacobs became emotional during the 
meeting they had and pledged much more support. 
74 Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019. That official stated that they receive about 
$155,000 in grants a year.  
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and awareness for LGBT issues through their Act.Love.Give campaign around the anniversary of 
the Pulse attack every year. Through that campaign they have seen directed over 10,000 
volunteer hours over the last two years.75 The OneOrlando Alliance was briefly consulted 
following the Las Vegas shooting in October of 2017 and other community leaders have reached 
out to them. 76 
QLatinX was a group formed by individuals directly connected to Pulse in July of 2016 
to account for the cultural challenges many Pulse survivors face.77 As previously noted, the 
majority of victims were Hispanic and many of the resilience programs and assistance measures 
provided to the victims and their families did not take these cultural differences into account.78 
QLatinX was founded to specifically provide services to the LGBT victims and their families 
where English was not the primary language of communication and where concerns over 
immigration inquiries were present. QLatinX was specifically formed to provide safe spaces to 
these individuals who did not feel comfortable relying on the other, more well-known attempts to 
help Pulse victims.79 Though QLatinX was founded to serve the communities of color within the 
 
75 Author’s interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. The majority of those 
volunteer hours go to non LGBT causes at locations such as food banks and environmental cleanup.  
76 Author’s interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. That official stated that no 
tangible work was done in cooperation with Las Vegas officials. 
77 Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. QLatinX was founded by 12 volunteers, all with 
connections to Pulse and is still predominantly volunteer led, though it does have a 200+ volunteer base.  
78 Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. That official cited a historical displacement of 
LGBT people of color and claimed that Pulse was very much a “tipping point” that forced many underlying issues to 
be brought to the forefront within the LGBT community. 
79 Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. That official believed that programs provided 
through programs such as Aspire and the Zebra coalition did not provide adequate considerations to the Hispanic 
communities primarily afflicted by Pulse.   
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LGBT community, they have been sought out by organizations across the nation to bridge the 
gap between the Hispanic community and the LGBT community.80 
Nontraditional demonstrations of solidarity are evident in institutional behaviors 
following the Pulse attack. For example, many new groups formed in order to memorialize the 
event and provide services to victims and their families. New collaboration between groups 
continues to the present day. This collaboration is not only between specific institutions but 
between government, and non-profit institutions and specific institutions. For example, the One 
Orlando Alliance advertises itself as an LGBT alliance, however, they partner with non-profit 
institutions like the United Way and both local governments. These new groups and 
collaborations between groups makes demonstrating solidarity easier and many demonstrations 
continue to this day. 
Analysis 
 
In conclusion the data collected through this case study is supportive of hypothesis 3 that 
when mass casualty events strike vulnerable victim groups, higher demonstrations of solidarity 
will result. Additionally, data collected is supportive of hypothesis 4, 4a, and 4b that strong 
institutional presence (particularly government leadership and specific institutions) led to higher 
demonstrations of solidarity. Results also indicated that the casualty number influenced 
demonstrations, but to a much lesser extent. Figure 12 represents how the facts of the event 
transferred through the media and onto the community. This figure shows how the perception of 
 
80 Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. QLatinX deals not only with LGBT issues within 
the Hispanic community, but also immigration and other cultural issues as part of other coalitions, such as the 
Trust Orlando Coalition.  
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the vulnerable victim group affected demonstrations of solidarity while simultaneously showing 
other variables that still affected the community response to the Pulse event.  
 
Figure 12: Case #1 Mechanism 
 
The Effect of the Casualty Number 
 
The number of victims and the type of event both seem to have had an effect upon 
demonstrations of solidarity through the media’s attraction to violent and high casualty events. 
At the time, the Pulse massacre was the highest loss of life in a terrorist attack in the U.S. since 
9/11, which brought increased media coverage on its own.81 Direct influence of the effects of 
casualty numbers is evident in increased media coverage which meticulously documented the 
event and its aftermath. Strong media coverage is a positive indicator of demonstrations of 
solidarity because without that consistent focus on the event, individuals tend to move on from 
the stressful event. Additional event related narratives, such as gun control, political response 
 
81 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official credits 
how violent an act is and the loss of life as the crucial factors when determining charitable giving following a mass 
casualty event. 
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and related prosecutions attracted the media and kept the Pulse event in the media cycle. This led 
to more people learning about the event themselves (and of the vulnerable victim group) which 
would increase demonstrations of solidarity. Whether or not casualty numbers influence people 
to demonstrate solidarity is more suited to be empirically studied at the individual level, such as 
through the experiment and not qualitatively. Casualty numbers were mentioned rarely 
throughout interviews with members of the community. As the number of injured and property 
damage was relatively low, it appears that neither of these factors affected demonstrations of 
solidarity and neither were mentioned prominently when looking through archival sources or 
through interviews with community organization leaders.  
The Effect of the Vulnerable Victim Group 
 
The high demonstrations of solidarity that occurred after Pulse seem to have been directly 
impacted by the presence of the vulnerable victim group and the effects that victim group had on 
demonstrations are undeniable. For example, following a 2017 shooting in Las Vegas which 
resulted in 58 deaths and 851 injuries just over 31 million dollars was raised, while the 
OneOrlando Fund raised just below 30 million dollars with 49 deaths and 53 injuries (Torres-
Cortez 2018; Blake 2018). Many of the same factors discussed impacted the response to the Las 
Vegas event. However, the victims were at a county music concert, a group of victims not likely 
to be considered especially traditionally or socially vulnerable. 
The presence of the vulnerable victim group increased demonstrations of solidarity 
mainly through the increased media coverage that followed the event (which informed people of 
the vulnerable nature of the victims) and through community level LGBT organizations (which 
facilitated demonstrations from the general public).  
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Figure 13 below shows Google search trends for Pulse, Orlando Nightclub Shooting 
Victims, LGBT and Best LGBT Charity from June 2015 to June 2019. Pulse and Orlando 
Nightclub Shooting Victims have obvious peaks when the event occurred and small increases 
over the next three years. LGBT has a consistent search pattern with a noticeable increase on the 
date of the attack. Best LGBT Charity is flat with moments of sharp peaks, one of these being 
around June 12, 2016 when the attack occurred. The purpose of this figure is to show how people 
searching for information regarding the incident identified the victim type and searched for 
related charitable causes. In Pulse and Orlando Nightclub Shooting Victims search records there 
is an increase when the Las Vegas mass shooting occurred on October 1, 2017. Searches of each 
of these topics increases again at the anniversary of the event, however, those increases are 
smaller as more time passes.   
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Figure 13: Case #1 Related Search Results 
Source: Google Trends 
https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US 
 
Though the attacker scouted other possible locations for his attack, his wife later stated 
that he showed the Pulse website to her several days before the attack and stated that “this is my 
target” (Ortiz 2018). Though it appears that Pulse was targeted for being an LGBT 
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establishment, without a media narrative that included the vulnerable nature of the victims the 
level of demonstrations of solidarity would likely not have been as high.82 However, other 
factors such as the terrorist nature of the event and casualty number would have brought media 
attention themselves. President Obama’s statement on Pulse and any other media that reflected 
the victims as being a part of the LGBT community was helpful as it reinforced the narrative that 
this was an attack on the LGBT community. The public then responded with increased 
demonstrations of solidarity due to the fact that LGBT people are perceived as a vulnerable 
group and that sympathy compelled people to demonstrate solidarity with the victims. A unique 
feature of the LGBT community is that LGBT individuals exist in every subsection of society 
regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or age which makes them easier to identify and sympathize 
with across not only Central Florida, but also the remaining U.S. and the world. Previous 
arguments have blamed the heteronormative nature of media coverage as a reason the LGBT 
victims weren’t featured more and claimed that the media was more fixated on gun control and 
the political response to the Pulse event (Hancock and Haldeman 2017). Though other narratives 
were covered, it is important to recognize that these narratives kept the event in the media cycle 
and the inclusion of the nature of the victims, even minimally, reached more people. 
Due to the vulnerable nature of the victims, community level organizations originating 
from that vulnerable community mobilized and played a major role in organizing and 
participating in demonstrations of solidarity. LGBT organizations continue to demonstrate 
solidarity with the victims and, without a specifically vulnerable victim group, the organizing 
and solicitation processes involved in demonstrating solidarity would have remained in 
 
82 An official I spoke with claimed that the original media narrative following Pulse was not accurate and did not 
specify that the majority of the victims were LGBT or Hispanic but the narrative was soon corrected. 
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traditional channels (government and non-profit groups). The LGBT organizations that existed 
prior to Pulse were heavily involved in the acts of solidarity that occurred following Pulse; the 
groups that formed due to Pulse continue to be involved in not only LGBT activities but general 
community activities. For example, as The Center was founded in response to the Stonewall riots 
in 1969 to provide a safe space for gay men, QLatinX was founded in response to Pulse in order 
to provide services for the LGBT individuals specifically within the Hispanic community. The 
formation of these new groups as a result of a perceived need is a phenomenon that occurs 
following a traumatic event within a community.  
The Effect of the Institutions 
 
The strong institutional response to this mass casualty event is supportive of hypothesis 4. 
Demonstrations of solidarity after this event benefited from strong institutions in three ways. 
First, the role government institutions undertook following the event and the leadership projected 
by the City of Orlando and Orange County. Government institutions effectively responded to the 
event and then collaborated with other institutions from very early on. For example, the FAC and 
FRC were both staffed with the assistance of numerous agencies including other local 
government institutions (Orange County Health Services, District Nine Medical Examiner’s 
Office, Victims Service Center of Central Florida etc.) and state government institutions (Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Department of Health). Non-profit institutions like the 
Red Cross also assisted at the FAC and FRC. Local government leadership relayed a strong and 
consistent message following the attack which set the stage for demonstrations of solidarity to 
occur untethered by bureaucratic red-tape. Elected officials in Central Florida consistently 
solicited funds which people within the community became aware of through media coverage. 
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That leadership was often front and center in the aftermath of Pulse and they expressed a 
willingness to work with community level institutions (non-profit & specific/LGBT) to show 
solidarity with the victims and their families. Florida Governor Rick Scott also seemed to 
respond strongly and promised stronger protections of LGBT people throughout Florida, though 
that promise was not acted on (Smith 2018). Governor Scott later declared June 12th as “Pulse 
Remembrance Day” (Wine 2018). The strong governmental institutional leadership response to 
this mass casualty event and resulting high levels of demonstrations of solidarity is supportive of 
hypothesis 4a.  
Second, non-profit institutions in the greater Central Florida area played a part as well. 
OneBlood accepted blood product donations with the purpose of providing the best services 
possible, regardless of the victim type or not. Numerous other organizations such as the 
RedCross, GoodWill and other general community level institutions responded and provided 
opportunities for the general public to demonstrate solidarity if they chose to do so. Many of the 
victims were treated at ORMC and Florida Hospital and neither hospital chose to charge the 
victims for the services they provided (Domonske 2016). Business institutions in the Orlando 
area responded strongly and contributed to the recovery process. Both Disney and Sea World 
released statements condemning the attack and supporting the victims (Farber 2016). Prominent 
business institutions donated strongly to the OneOrlando fund. Individual institutional 
representatives demonstrated solidarity with victims on their own. For example, Walt Disney 
World President George Kalogridis individually donated $25,000 and continues to serve on the 
onePulse Foundation Executive Council (onePulse 2019). Other prominent individuals in Central 
Florida also serve on the onePulse Foundation. Victim type did not impact the response of any of 
these groups. Many of these organizations collaborated with the LGBT groups and greatly 
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assisted in demonstrations of solidarity that followed (Geary 2017). Other institutions praised the 
attack due to the LGBT nature of the victims and did not demonstrate (CBS News 2016; Stack 
2019).  
Third, the Orlando area had existing LGBT oriented groups that were able to immediately 
respond to the event. These existing specific institutions became the focal point for many within 
the community and they allowed for people to demonstrate solidarity easier as they were willing 
to work with non-LGBT individuals. These specific institutions were already well known within 
the community and they organized and participated in numerous demonstrations following the 
event. Fourth, new institutions that were created following the attack are in their own way a 
demonstration of solidarity. These new groups were formed for a specific purpose and they 
continue to memorialize the event, accept donations, and assist survivors of the event. The strong 
specific institutional response to this mass casualty event and resulting strong demonstrations of 
solidarity is supportive of hypothesis 4b.  
Other Effects Upon Demonstrations of Solidarity 
 
The final factor to consider when examining the response to the Pulse event is Orlando’s 
economy. Orlando is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world and has a higher 
gross domestic product per capita as compared to the rest of the state and nation. Prosperous 
economies have successful businesses who become involved in community causes, such as the 
response to a mass casualty event. For example, six of the OneOrlando Fund board members 
represented successful businesses in the Orlando area.  
Many tourists were probably unaware of Pulse before the incident; however, they had a 
positive association with the Orlando area due to tourism, entertainment or hospitality which 
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may have led to a positive association with the area. Once these people became aware of the 
Pulse shooting, they would demonstrate solidarity with the victims due to that positive 
association. However, concerns over the Pulse incident, along with the Zika virus and hurricanes, 
are cited as difficulties for the tourism industry in 2016 (Pedicini 2017). The successful economy 
in Orlando also made it easier for individuals to demonstrate their solidarity as people had more 
disposable income (Bracha and Vesterlund 2017).  
All these factors impacted the community response to the Pulse event in some way but 
the role the victim group and institutions had in positively affecting demonstrations of solidarity 
is undeniable. Though demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event can be strong 
without a vulnerable victim group, a vulnerable victim group can enhance demonstrations. A 
crucial aspect in examining this effect is whether or not a group is considered vulnerable. People 
that are considered traditionally vulnerable (ex. children, elderly etc), and socially 
disenfranchised or discriminated against groups are likely to be considered vulnerable by society, 
thus increasing demonstrations of solidarity if they represent the majority of victims of a mass 
casualty event. For strong demonstrations of solidarity to occur when a vulnerable victim group 
has been targeted there are two things that must take place. First, the media must characterize the 
victims and provide information on the victim group. Second, existing specific institutions must 
participate and organize demonstrations that are open to the general public, not just the 
vulnerable victim group. A mass casualty event that strikes an area with strong institutions would 
be likely to have high levels of demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, a strong government 
leadership response and specific institution response would lead to high levels of demonstrations. 
Strong institutions consistently solicit for demonstrations, have strong collaborations across the 
community and provide methods for anyone who wants to demonstrate solidarity. Findings 
130 
 
similar to these would be likely whenever a mass casualty event strikes a socially vulnerable 
victim group as the same causal factors would come into play. 
San Bernardino, California 
 
Around 8AM on December 2, 2015 approximately 80 employees from the San 
Bernardino County Environmental Health Department were meeting at the Inland Regional 
Center for a training seminar. An employee of the department, Syed Rizwan Farook, was present 
for the majority of the training until around 10:30AM when he got up and left. Coworkers noted 
that Farook had left his bag on the table so they thought he would be back to retrieve it. Just 
before 11AM the group took an unscheduled break due to technical issues. Without notice a door 
opened and an individual dressed in black tactical gear and a mask covering his face stepped 
inside and opened fire. Workers sprinted for an exit door while others attempted to take cover 
under tables. A second shooter, also dressed in black tactical gear, entered behind the first and 
began shooting as well. Between two and three minutes after they first entered, they fled to a 
black SUV they had waiting outside.   
 During the initial investigation, a San Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) officer was 
interviewing a county employee who advised that they seemed to recognize the shooter based on 
his body language and composition and provided the name Rizwan Farook to authorities. 
Farook’s name and the tag of a suspicious rental black SUV was provided to an SBPD narcotics 
team and analysts got to work. An analyst found an address in nearby Redlands that the narcotics 
team went to. As they did, they saw the SUV leaving back towards San Bernardino and they 
began surveillance in unmarked police vehicles. As Redlands officers converged on the area the 
occupants of the vehicle began shooting at the officers. Soon after, the vehicle came to a full stop 
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and both occupants began shooting at the officers with AR-15 style rifles. Farook was killed after 
being shot multiple times as he tried to flank officers. The other occupant of the vehicle, later 
identified as his wife, Tafsheen Malik, was killed after a barrage of gunfire struck her and the 
vehicle.  
 14 people were dead and 26 more were wounded. 13 of those killed were employees of 
San Bernardino County. At the time, this shooting was the highest casualty terrorist attack in the 
United States since September 11. Though many of the victims shared an occupation, they came 
from a diverse range of backgrounds and they ranged in age from 26 to 60 (Karimi 2015).  
Area Descriptors 
 
 The Inland Regional Center is located in the southern portion of the city of San 
Bernardino in San Bernardino County, California. In 2015, the city of San Bernardino had 
approximately 216,000 people and San Bernardino County had an additional 2 million people.  
Economically, San Bernardino had been through tumultuous times. The San Bernardino 
economy is tied to transportation; the economic agency devoted to San Bernardino county boasts 
of connectivity to the rest of the Southern California markets via three railroads, three airports 
and three major interstates (San Bernardino County Economic Development Agency 2019). 
Economic growth in the area is also sensitive to the wider technology markets. The three most 
common industries in the county are retail/trade, healthcare/social and 
manufacturing/transportation (San Bernardino County Economic Development Agency 2019).  
Amazon and General Electric have a limited presence in the area. In June 2009, the city’s 
economic development agency undertook plans to revitalize the downtown areas into a hub of 
culture and art.  
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Poverty rates and unemployment were higher in San Bernardino than the state and nation. 
GDP per capita and median household income in San Bernardino are significantly lower than the 
rest of the state and nation (U.S. Census Bureau). Table 13 shows how both San Bernardino 
County and California are much more racially diverse than the rest of the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau). Educational attainment is significantly lower than the rest of the state and 
nation and crime rates are significantly higher.  
In 2012, the city filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy after it was facing a $45 million-dollar 
budget shortfall (Esquivel 2017). After the bankruptcy filing, the city outsourced many of its 
services and cut staff. Violent crime increased in the city within that time which was attributed to 
an understaffed police department (Esquivel 2017). Poverty also rose to nearly 33% in this time, 
again attributed to a lack of public services. This case became the second largest city bankruptcy 
case ever. In June of 2017, a plan was approved for San Bernardino to emerge from bankruptcy. 
 
Table 11: Case #2 Descriptors 
 
 
 
 
2015 San Bernardino County California U.S.
Population 2,128,133 39,144,818 321,418,821
White Only 62.2% 61.8% 73.6%
Poverty 19.0% 15.3% 14.7%
Unemployment 6.4% 6.2% 5.3%
Educational Attainment 19.0% 31.4% 29.8%
Gross Domestic Product per Capita $35,108 $53,855 $48,538
Median Household Income $53,803 $64,500 $55,775
Violent Crime (per 100,000) 920.0 426.3 372.6
Property Crime (per 100,000) 5,527.0 2,618.0 2,487.0
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Casualties 
 
The majority of violent mass casualty events result in a lesser amount dead than 14.83 At 
the time, 14 dead as a result of a violent mass casualty event was the highest since the September 
11th attacks. The average number of casualties for a violent mass casualty event between 2000 
and this event is 11.4. Therefore, this event’s casualty number is coded as high because it is 
higher than the average.  
Violence Against Non-Vulnerable Victims 
 
Thirteen of the fourteen victims were county employees and ten of those were 
environmental health specialists (Karimi 2015; OHS 2015). Most of the victims were known to 
Farook and worked closely with him.  
Certain occupations can be viewed as vulnerable or sympathetic. County government 
employees such as these are not coded as vulnerable. Occupations are not listed in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as a protected class alongside traditionally accepted vulnerable groups such 
as race, color, religion, sex or national origin (Civil Rights Act of 1964). Occupation is also not a 
protected class in other definitions of discrimination that cover ethnicity, handicaps, sexual 
orientation or identity. Public services jobs, such as police and fire, do carry increased penalties 
for crimes committed upon them in the performance of their duties. While inclusion in 
definitions does not definitively decide whether a group is vulnerable or not, it is a good example 
of how vulnerable groups are perceived and protected within the United States.  
 
83  Of the 129 mass casualty events that occurred prior to this one, the mean number of casualties is 52.03. 
Excluding the outliers of the 9/11 terrorist attack and Hurricane Katrina, the mean number of casualties drops to 
19.89. There were 49 violent events within the database prior to this event with a mean number of 11.4 casualties. 
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County government employees were not perceived as vulnerable in this case for two 
reasons. First, it became known quickly that Farook worked with the victims so it did not appear 
that they were specifically targeted because they were government employees. While most of the 
victims of this attack were county government employees, the victims do not appear to have been 
selected as part of a political statement about the county government, but out of convenience as 
the perpetrators of this attack knew there would be a large group of people in an easily attackable 
place. As part of the FBI’s investigation, evidence was uncovered showing that both suspects 
discussed elements of radical Islam which included jihad and martyrdom (Mozingo 2016). After 
the attack was over, the Islamic State and Levant (ISIL) claimed that both suspects were 
“soldiers of the caliphate” (Callimachi 2015). As both attackers were inspired by Islamic 
extremism, it appears indiscriminate mass murder was the objective regardless of who the 
victims were. 
Second, county government employees were not perceived as vulnerable because they do 
not have a documented history of marginalization and victimization seen in other socially 
vulnerable groups. Without that documented history of injustices against the victim group, 
sympathy with the victims was not high. In order to clarify on the vulnerability (or not) of 
government employees it is important to understand under what circumstances they are 
specifically targeted and what the usual reactions are when a mass casualty event strikes a group 
of government employees. The targeting of government employees adds a political dimension to 
an act of violence, often leading it to be classified as an act of terrorism. For example, the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City in 1995 which killed 168 people 
was designed to kill federal employees. The perpetrators, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols 
both expressed that their motive was perceived federal government overreach, which resulted in 
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them targeting that building, the home of fourteen federal agencies (Lewis 2000). McVeigh even 
went so far as to try and minimize non-governmental casualties (Michel and Herbeck 2001). 
Demonstrations of solidarity occurred after the Oklahoma City Bombing, however, the 
aforementioned theory suggests that they were mainly the result of the high casualty count and 
the fact that it was due to terrorism, as the victim group was not seen as especially vulnerable.  
 The main difference between the Oklahoma City Bombing victims and this incident is the 
fact that the majority of the victims in Oklahoma City were purposefully selected to be Federal 
government employees. From 2002 to 2011 almost 96% of violence against government 
employees was against state, municipal or county employees (Harrell 2013). Excluding law 
enforcement and security related professions, government employees still face violence at a 
higher rate than private sector employees (8.7 per 1000 vs. 4.7 per 1000) (Harrell 2013). 
However, government employees were less likely than private sector employees to face a serious 
violent crime and were less likely to face someone with a weapon during a violent act (Harrell 
2013). The victimization of government employees (and media coverage) does not reach levels 
to induce a sympathetic reflex amongst common citizens.  
In conclusion, it is apparent that the victim group of the San Bernardino terrorist attack is 
not perceived to be vulnerable. As is the case with many local government offices, the 
employees of the San Bernardino County Environmental Health Department were a diverse 
group. Though government employees do appear to be targeted more than others, they are not 
viewed as a vulnerable group as they do not have a history of persecution or marginalization as 
seen in other groups based on age, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc. While any loss of life is 
tragic, the demonstrations of solidarity that would follow an incident where a non-vulnerable 
group is targeted, such as this one, would not be as strong as when a vulnerable group is targeted. 
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Institutions  
 
The City of San Bernardino uses a council-manager type government. The mayor is a 
ceremonial position and bureaucratic influence is spread amongst a city council. R. Carey Davis 
was the mayor of San Bernardino in 2015. He is a certified public accountant by trade and was 
elected in the wake of the city filing for bankruptcy. His statement in response to the shooting 
was mainly symbolic and did not mention demonstrations of solidarity of any kind (Davis 2015). 
Responses from leaders of government institutions in the San Bernardino area are sparse 
following the attack. Prominent institutions in the area include California State University San 
Bernardino and numerous non-profit institutions like the Feeding America Food Bank. 
Additionally, the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians and the Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians operate casinos in the area and are active in the community. Religious institutions 
include the Ecclesia Christian Fellowship and several prominent mosques and Muslim 
institutions. Businesses like Altura Credit Union are active in the community and Amazon and 
General Electric have a limited presence in the area. LifeStream provides blood products for 
much of the Inland Empire area. Other nationwide non-profit institutions responded to the 
incident such as the Salvation Army, who responded quickly and began providing relief services 
in the family reunification area (Fowler 2015).  
The victims in this case were members of workers unions that represented them. In 2015, 
union membership in California was the fourth highest in the U.S. (BLS 2015). Institutionalism 
is high within unionized workers and groups like the AFL-CIO and Teamsters were heavily 
involved with the victims of this event. These groups provide actual representation and services 
to their members. The victims in this event were both local government workers and members of 
137 
 
the San Bernardino community. As such, they received the benefits of a wide institutional 
response. 
Media Coverage 
 
 On December 3, 2015 President Obama released a statement offering sympathies with the 
victims while also conveying a message of uncertainty regarding whether the event was 
terrorism or not (Obama 2015). President Obama’s messages regarding the event consistently 
emphasized that the investigation was ongoing but he did ask Congress to prevent people on “no 
fly lists” from purchasing firearms (Obama 2015). The president’s message did not include that 
the victims were employees of the local government.  
 The local San Bernardino newspaper The Sun had posted its first story regarding the 
shooting on its website by 2:31PM on December 2nd (The Sun 2015). The first story included that 
a training session for county employees was ongoing at the Inland Regional Center at the time of 
the attack. The article also cited an anonymous San Bernardino County official who stated that 
the Department of Public Health was using the facility. Subsequent news coverage of the San 
Bernardino attack was highly focused on the terrorism aspect, casualty count and the identities of 
the suspects. The fact that victims were primarily local government employees is included in 
most of the media regarding this attack. New York Times coverage of the attack includes the 
casualty number and terrorism aspect of the event (Nagourney, Lovett and Perez-Pena 2015). 
The fact that the majority of the victims were county government employees is only sparingly 
mentioned within the New York Times coverage of the event. The Wall Street Journal coverage 
includes the casualty number and terrorism aspect. However, Wall Street Journal coverage 
includes that the victims were county government employees much more frequently than the 
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New York Times (Audi, Barrett and Carlton 2015; Carlton, Barrett and Bustillo 2015; Elinson 
and Frosch 2015). 
The coverage of this attack has been criticized as “hysterical” and “frantic” by observers. 
The media quickly labelled the event as terrorism related and released several pieces of incorrect 
information before the last shootout (Carr 2015). Media outlets then gained access to the 
shooter’s private residence and many broadcasted from inside the townhouse, raising concerns 
over crime scene contamination and releases of private information (Al-Jazeera 2015). 
 Two notable developments took place that kept the San Bernardino shooting in the 
media. The first is the successful prosecution of one of the attacker’s neighbors, Enrique 
Marquez Jr. He pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and making 
false statements to obtain firearms as he purchased and provided both rifles used by the attackers 
in addition to initially planning the attacks with Farook (Rokos 2017). The second was the legal 
battle over gaining access to Farook’s county issued Iphone. The FBI believed more information 
regarding the attack within the phone but were initially unable to gain access to it. The federal 
courts became involved and ordered Apple to provide access, which they refused. The FBI later 
gained access to it independently from Apple (Tanfani 2018). 
Dependent Variable: San Bernardino Strong 
 
 San Bernardino emergency services initially staged victims and witnesses at the San 
Bernardino Golf Course.84 The more than 400 witnesses were then moved to the Rock Church 
and World Outreach Center so they could be interviewed (Braziel et al. 2015). They were then 
 
84 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. The emergency 
operations setup utilized was through the California Office of Emergency Services. 
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transported to the Ruby C. Hernandez Community Center where they could be reunited with 
families (Braziel etl a. 2015). The San Bernardino County Coroner set up a family assistance 
center at a nearby hotel for the families of the deceased where they could receive information 
and behavioral health assistance (Braziel et al. 2015). Local religious organizations self-deployed 
to the Rock Church and the Hernandez Community Center to try and help victims (Braziel et al. 
2015). 
The developing nature of the incident caused San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 
Department and San Bernardino Police Department’s public affairs units to work together 
(Braziel et al. 2015). At 11:51AM the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office Twitter account 
warned of an active shooter in the area of Orange Show Road and Waterman Avenue and asked 
people to avoid the area (sbcountysheriff 2015). San Bernardino Police Department Chief Jarrod 
Burguan also utilized his personal twitter account to post updates on what was occurring 
throughout the day (Burguan 2015). Chief Burguan’s frequent tweeting throughout the day is 
credited for diffusing several rumors regarding the shooting (Braziel et al. 2015).   
 Local elected officials also converged on the command post.85 Many were looking for 
information to share with their constituents while others expected to be included in operational 
plans (Braziel et al. 2015). The SBCSD employs a legislative liaison in order to work with 
elected officials and this employee was able to provide information to these officials while also 
informing them of the necessity of confidentiality regarding operational plans. These elected 
officials also asked if the media would like to interview them but the liaison suggested they stay 
off camera (Braziel et al. 2015). Soon after the event began unfolding SBCSD set up a telephone 
 
85 I attempted to interview several members of both the county and city but did not receive a response to my 
inquiries. 
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hotline for people to call looking for information about the victims but the department did not 
man the phones until later due to the speed at which the event was unfolding (Braziel et al. 
2015).  
The Inland Regional Center was in very close proximity to many other county level 
agencies and many of them were on lockdown when the event began to unfold, which slowed 
their responses.86 As the majority of the victims were county employees, many of them were 
known throughout the local government which amplified the initial trauma.87 The county CEO, 
Greg Devereaux, talked to county department heads twice a day for a month after the attack in 
order to try and accommodate the trauma of both the community and the government.88 The San 
Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department proactively responded to the area even though 
their main location was on lockdown due to the attack.89 Approximately 300 clinicians were 
deployed by the Behavioral Health Department within the first 48 hours. They mainly assisted 
witnesses but also responded throughout the county in order to minimalize the shock and any re-
traumatization that would happen. The CEO requested that the fallen government employees 
were treated similarly to whenever another public service member were killed in that a personal 
liaison was designated for each family of the deceased.90 The San Bernardino Behavioral Health 
Department provided crisis intervention services related to this event for approximately 2.5 years 
after the event. The department stayed with survivors through multiple re-enactments the FBI put 
 
86 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. 
87 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. That official claimed that 
the shock of knowing many of the victims made the initial response that much more difficult.  
88 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. 
89 Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21, 
2019. 
90 Author’s interview with an official from San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21, 2019. 
These liaisons assisted family members with numerous issues such as planning funerals, and occupational issues. 
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them through.91 In response to the incident, local government institutions have undertaken more 
efforts to instill resiliency within the community through education and training.92 
Due to the fact that an overwhelming number of victims were health inspectors with San 
Bernardino County, California Governor Jerry Brown declared a limited state of emergency 
(Reuters 2015). In that state of emergency Governor Brown claimed that the attack left the 
county with too few of health inspectors in order to carry out “critical” work so his declaration 
allows for the state to send in health inspectors as replacements until the county is able to meet 
normal staffing. (Reuters 2015). The county later approved a $1.5 million-dollar agreement with 
the California Association of Environmental Health Administrators to provide almost thirty 
temporary employees due to the burden put on the county public health and environmental health 
divisions (Molina 2016). The city of San Bernardino incurred approximately $1 million dollars 
in expenses related to the shooting, mainly through added police officer presence and fire 
department deployment following the attack (Esquivel and Winton 2015).  
Vigils and Gatherings of Solidarity 
 
The day after the attack, approximately 2,000 residents gathered at the San Manuel 
Stadium in downtown San Bernardino and heard Mayor R. Carey Davis speak, praising first 
responders and claiming that the attack had “forever impacted our community” (Hecht 2015). On 
December 7th there were two vigils that took place, the first was attended by several hundred 
people and marked when county employees returned to work (Johnson 2015). The second was 
 
91 Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21, 
2019. That official emphasized that they expected the FBI to provide clinicians and trauma experts but they failed 
to do so. 
92 Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21, 
2019. 
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when more than a thousand people gathered at nearby California State University San 
Bernardino in order to honor the victims, five of whom were alumni of the school (Johnson 
2015; Goldstein 2015). Another vigil was held on January 6th, which nearly five thousand people 
attended including a local pastor and former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani who spoke on 
resiliency following a terrorist attack (Healy and Kandel 2016; Robinson and Wall 2016). It does 
not appear that any international reactions to the shooting warranted media coverage except for 
the Pakistani government offering legal assistance to investigators (Phillip et al. 2015). The San 
Bernardino Behavioral Health Department deployed clinicians to vigils and gatherings as they 
feared re-traumatization of survivors.93 Multiple vigils and gatherings occurred following this 
event, however, many were small in size. Therefore, vigils and gatherings are coded as low for 
this event. 
Fundraising Efforts 
 
Soon after the shooting happened, San Bernardino Mayor Carey Davis set up a 
GoFundMe page dedicated to the victims with a goal of raising $100,000 (Lopez 2016).94 After 
42 months of being open $137,123 was raised from 1,232 different donors. GoFundMe and the 
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community each donated $10,000 (Lopez 2016). GoFundMe also agreed to 
waive their service fees for the fund (Shultz 2015). Mayor David claimed these funds would be 
distributed to victims and their families but the exact distribution remains unclear (Lopez 2016). 
On December 4, 2015 the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors and the 
Arrowhead United Way established the San Bernardino United Relief Fund in order to provide 
 
93 Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21, 
2019. 
94 I attempted to interview a representative from the mayor’s office but a response was never received to my 
inquiry.  
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an avenue to accept donations that would go to a fund to be given to victims and survivors of the 
event.95 Arrowhead United Way leaders were initially cautious about partnering with the local 
government due to the bureaucratic nature of government business.96 This fund is composed of 
members of the community including the non-profit sector, law enforcement, faith-based, 
business, county and labor sectors (Arrowhead United Way 2015). Table 13 below shows San 
Bernardino United Relief Fund board members (Arrowhead United Way 2015). 
Table 12: San Bernardino United Relief Fund Board 
 
Within several weeks following the shooting, Ken Feinberg was contacted by San 
Bernardino officials. He never personally responded to San Bernardino but advised them on how 
they should respond.97 One of the main suggestions of Mr. Feinberg was to get money out 
quickly to the victims and to conduct townhall meetings in order for the community to feel as 
 
95 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. This official also stated 
that other donated items, such as children’s toys, were sent to the county and were delineated through the relief 
fund to the appropriate areas. 
96 Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official credited that 
partnership for streamlining many processes and giving the fund some credibility.  
97 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official stated 
that Mr. Feinberg engaged in two to three telephone consultations but he did not feel the need to personally 
respond due to the delay and because donations were not as prolific as in other cases. 
Name Position Company
Kara Adams VP of Marketing Altura Credit Union
Bill Carnegie President & CEO Feeding America Food Bank Riverside/San Bernardino
Ray King Captain San Bernardino Police Department
Keith Lee Boardmember Arrowhead United Way
Vici Nagel President & CEO Academy, Go
Laurie Stalnaker Secretary/Treasurer AFL-CIO Central Labor Council
Deidre Rodriguez General Manager Teamsters Local 1932
CaSonya Thomas Director Behavioral Health, San Bernardino County
Dr. Joshua Beckley Senior Pastor Ecclesia Christian Fellowship
Taif Kaissi, MD VP & Executive Director MiNDS
Steve Kovensky Deputy Chief San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
Patrick Morris Former Mayor, Judge City of San Bernardino
Dena Smith Chief Operating Officer San Bernardino County  
Ken Ramirez Tribal Secretary San Manuel Band of Mission Indians
James Siva Tribal Council Member Morongo Band of Mission Indians
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involved as possible.98 Initially, The San Bernardino United Relief Fund’s goal was to raise 
$700,000. However, by the time the fund closed one year later they raised approximately 
$2,461,000 dollars for distribution amongst the 75 claimants (Gazzar 2015; Final Protocol 2016). 
Donations came in from all 50 states and numerous other countries and the fund credited the 
generosity of “businesses, labor unions, foundations, faith communities, tribal councils and 
individuals” for the raising of the money (Final Protocol 2016).99 A local Native American tribe, 
the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians donated $350,000 and the Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians donated $250,000 to the fund (Yarbrough 2015).100 101 More than 1,000 mostly Muslim 
donors donated approximately $200,000 through “Your Cause”, an Islam driven method of 
raising money for different causes. (Gazzar 2015).102 Another $100,000 was raised through 
another mostly Muslim campaign MiNDS, initiated by a local medical doctor (Gazzar 2015). 
Other significant donations came from Wells Fargo ($50,000), the Union Pacific Foundation 
($25,000), and Arrowhead Credit Union ($25,000).103  
  Leaders from the Arrowhead United Way were initially cautious of partnering with local 
businesses as they believed it could compromise their tax-exempt status.104 The San Bernardino 
 
98 Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official stated that 
they conducted townhall meetings and were generally met with support from the community, however, that 
official noted that there were hecklers at the events who believed the United Way would keep any money raised. 
99 Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official was certain 
that donations had been received from all 50 states but was unsure on exactly which countries donated.  
100 Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. Both groups operate 
successful casinos in the area. That official stated that both groups are very charitable and often donate to the Red 
Cross after natural disasters. 
101 I attempted to interview both the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians and the Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians but never received a response from my inquiries. 
102   Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official was unsure 
as to the exact amount but believed it to be near $200,000. 
103  Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. 
104  Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official credits local 
Congressman Peter Aguilar for providing assistance in dealing with the IRS and maintaining their tax-exempt 
status.  
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United Relief Fund received assistance from the United Way across the nation along with the 
leaders from other areas afflicted by violent mass casualty events.105 The United Way had 
previously established relief funds in 2003 and 2007 when fires ravaged the Southern California 
area. While the expected amount of money to be raised was surpassed, the unorganized methods 
and lesser amount per victim leads to a coding of low. 
Blood Supply Reaction 
 
The vast majority of the casualties were transported to Lomalinda Medical Center and 
Arrowhead Regional Hospital for emergency medical care.106 The main supplier of blood and 
blood products to these medical facilities is LifeStream.107 Once it became apparent that a mass 
casualty event had occurred within the community, LifeStream attempted to be proactive in 
moving products to the correct locations.108 The Inland Regional Center is less than a mile away 
from Life Stream’s main business location so employees were simultaneously trying to ensure 
their own safety as the location was locked down due to security concerns (Goldberg 2015). 109 
After 9/11, LifeStream evaluated their emergency response plans and consistently revisit logistic 
issues such as communication and travel after every major event.110 Immediately following the 
attack there was a surge of donors with some waiting almost three hours to donate blood.111 In 
 
105 Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official specifically 
noted Newton, Connecticut and Aurora, Colorado as communities they consulted with regarding organizing and 
distributing funds to victims and survivors.  
106 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019.  
107 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. LifeStream covers over 90 hospitals in 6 
Southern California counties.  
108 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. 
109 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. That official stated that a “shelter in 
place" order was issued to employees at that main facility. 
110 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. That official stated that they did not 
believe tabletop exercises were practical for disaster response and did not believe they have the resources 
available to train specifically for disasters. 
111 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. 
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the month following the attack, between ten and eleven thousand units of blood were collected 
and distributed, a significant increase.112 Demonstrations of solidarity via blood donation 
increased following the attack, leading to a coding of high. 
Union Response 
 
The most common feature of the victims was that they were local government employees. 
The event occurred while they were working which allowed for local unions to be involved. 
Additionally, local AFL-CIO113 and Teamsters representatives were on the San Bernardino 
United Relief Fund. The Teamsters represent 11,000 public service workers in the San 
Bernardino area including many of the victims (Deniz 2015). $250,000 was raised by Teamsters 
across the nation and donated to the victims of the attack through an independent fund (Robb 
2015).114 Survivors of the attack were forced to go through workman’s compensation procedures 
by the San Bernardino county government. This caused a significant amount of stress for 
survivors as many claims got denied.115 The Southern California Public Service Workers-Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU 721) was newly formed at the time of the shooting and 
did not represent any survivors, though they did become more involved in later 
demonstrations.116 Local unions had a good working relationship with the county when the 
incident occurred, however, the surge of claims and the bureaucratic nature of the county 
 
112 Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. That official stated that there was a 
significant increase in donations following the shooting. 
113 I attempted to interview a representative from the AFL-CIO but did not receive a response to my inquiry.  
114 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. Teamsters nationwide raise 
money in response to many disasters across the nation.  
115 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. Many denials stemmed from 
a change to workman’s comp laws in 2005 that made “stress” claims harder to prove.  
116 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. I attempted to interview a 
representative from SEIU 721 but did not receive a response to my inquiry.  
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governments response strained relations.117 Free counseling and other services were offered to 
the county for the survivors but those offers were denied in favor of workman’s compensation 
options.118 Medications and surgeries were not approved by the counties workman’s comp, likely 
out of fear of costs.119 Amanda Gaspard was shot twice during the incident but a year later her 
surgery and other treatments were denied as they were too expensive and they would not be 
approved under California’s worker’s compensation guidelines (Ross, Christie and Blake 2016). 
The Teamsters provided an example of the Sandy Hook shooting where a school was targeted as 
an appropriate response by a local government in dealing with a mass casualty event that 
occurred in a workplace.120  
Memorialization 
 
A makeshift memorial was set up on the corner of Orange Show Road and Waterman 
Avenue near where the shooting took place. People left numerous flowers and other personal 
memorialization’s of the victims at this site (Luna 2015). Initially SEIU 721 planned to construct 
a permanent memorial to the victims outside of the union office in Riverside that was slated to 
being construction in June of 2016 (Molina 2016). However, the nearly $2200,000 was raised for 
the memorial was distributed to victims and the plans were scrapped due to ballooning costs 
(Shultz 2018). The memorial committee met frequently in 2016 but meetings began to dwindle. 
Discontent grew with the simple plaque memorial in the Government Center and it was seen as 
 
117 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. That official noted that the 
meetings the county held were very bureaucratic and not very helpful. 
118 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. 
119 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. That official claimed that the 
shooting was considered a single incident and anything over $1 million dollars the county would have had to pay 
out of pocket as insurance only covered up until that point.  
120 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019 
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not enough to honor those who died (Nelson 2017).  According to county Supervisor Josie 
Gonzales, a memorial to the attack is planned for downtown San Bernardino (Nelson 2017).121 
Upland’s Incredible Edible Community Garden has unveiled six memorial groves dedicated to 
the victims and has plans for eight more to represent each of the victims (Whitehead 2018). 
By January of 2016 the Inland Regional Center had reopened for business (De Atley 
2016). At the first anniversary of the event, a moment of silence was held at the Inland Regional 
Center for the victims (Dobuzinskis 2016). A commemoration event drew approximately 2,000 
people to an arena in San Bernardino while the survivors and other victims held a private 
ceremony to mark the occasion (Dobuzinskis 2016). A large gathering occurred at California 
State University San Bernardino where a memorial and peace garden was dedicated to the 
memory of the victims (Yarbrough and Hagen 2016). By 2017, the room where the shooting 
occurred reopened after a brief ceremony (Emerson 2018). Within the Inland Regional Center 
there are two murals commemorating the event (Emerson 2018). Multiple memorialization’s of 
the event occurred throughout San Bernardino. However, the lack of a large memorialization 
supported by the survivors and local institutions is glaring and leads to a minimal 
memorialization coding.  
Analysis 
 
In conclusion the data collected through this case study indicates that fewer 
demonstrations of solidarity occurred following the San Bernardino shooting as a result of the 
lack of perceived vulnerabilities of the victim group and weak institutional presence in the area. 
 
121 I attempted to interview a representative from Supervisor Gonzales’ office but I did not receive a response to 
my inquiry.  
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These results are supportive of hypothesis 3, hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b. The casualty numbers also 
impacted demonstrations, but to a lesser extent. Figure 14 shows how the facts of the San 
Bernardino case did not transfer to high demonstrations of solidarity. While a specific group of 
people were targeted, it was a target of convenience for the attackers and his (government) 
coworkers were not considered a vulnerable group by the general public. Additionally, the 
institutions in the area failed to respond strongly which limited the ability for the area to 
demonstrate solidarity. 
 
Figure 14: Case #2 Mechanism 
 
The Effect of the Casualty Number 
 
Demonstrations of solidarity seem to have been driven by the number of victims and the 
type of event as these traits of the event were traumatic enough to attract the media’s attention 
and shock the community into responding. At the time this shooting was the highest loss of life 
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in a terrorist attack in the U.S. since 9/11, which brought increased media coverage on its own.122 
Direct influence of the effects of casualty numbers is evident in increased media coverage which 
meticulously documented the event and its aftermath. Additional event related narratives, such as 
gun control, political response and related prosecutions, attracted the media and kept this event in 
the media cycle. This led to more people learning about the event themselves which would 
increase demonstrations of solidarity. The media was drawn to this event, like many other mass 
casualty events, due to the violent way in which a significant amount of people lost their lives. 
As the number of injured and property damage was relatively low, it appears that neither of these 
factors affected demonstrations of solidarity and neither were mentioned prominently when 
looking through archival sources or through interviews with community organization leaders. 
The Effect of the Victim Group 
 
While San Bernardino and the Inland Empire responded very admirably in the immediate 
aftermath of the attack, the demonstrations of solidarity seem to have been hampered by several 
different factors, one being the type of victim group. The lack of a vulnerable victim group led 
demonstrations of solidarity to take place through general institutions and government 
bureaucracy. The unions did not organize demonstrations as they provided actual representation 
to many of the victims. Without a vulnerable victim group, media narratives were driven by 
terrorism, casualty numbers, gun control discussions and political responses to the shooting. The 
media narratives that did include victim type were not framed in a way that convinced onlookers 
that the victim group was vulnerable. For example, these narratives did not include any 
 
122 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official credits 
how violent an act is and the loss of life as the crucial factors when determining charitable giving following a mass 
casualty event. 
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discussion on the targeting of government workers or history of marginalization for workers that 
might convince people that they were vulnerable.  
Figure 15 below shows Google search trends for 2015 San Bernardino Attack, San 
Bernardino Shooting Victims, San Bernardino County Environmental Health and San 
Bernardino Charities. There are obvious peaks for the first three on the date of the attack, 
however, there is only a minimal increase for charities. Searches related to charities shows only a 
minimal increase and there are many moments over this five-year span that has higher number of 
searches related to San Bernardino charities. There is an increase in the first two searches when 
the Orlando shooting occurred in June of 2016. Only a minimal increase is registered at the first 
anniversary of the event and no anniversary of the event after the first registers in these results. 
These results seem to indicate that there was a rush of interest in the event once it occurred, as is 
expected. However, it appears that interest wore off fast and did not transfer over onto searching 
or donating to charities. Other searches concerning the victim type (ex. union, specific charities) 
did not have enough information to register an increase as shown through these visualizations.  
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Figure 15: Case #2 Related Search Results 
Source: Google Trends 
https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US 
 
The Effect of the Institutions 
 
The institutional response to this event was hampered from very early on. The county fire 
chief leads emergency response in the region, however, it is believed that someone from law 
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enforcement would have been more effective.123 Government institutions handled the active 
shooting aspect appropriately and the incident commander stated that the “first thought was to 
get dignity back to the victims” (Braziel et al. 2015). However, due to the sheer number of 
witnesses, it took an extended amount of time for everyone to be interviewed. Once they were 
taken back to the reunification center, they were forced to walk through a gauntlet of media that 
had gathered (Braziel et al. 2015). Though counselors were available at both facilities, victims 
stated that they had difficulty identifying counselors or clergy so no significant services were 
provided to the victims (Braziel et al. 2015).  
Many survivors have complained that the county has failed to provide appropriate 
services to a survivor of such a traumatic incident (Ross, Christie and Blake 2016; Purper 2018). 
Government leaders had a very limited response. Mayor Davis spoke on several occasions 
regarding the incident and personally started the initial GoFundMe effort that raised just over 
137 thousand dollars. Local leaders took an appropriate step in contacting Ken Feinberg 
regarding how they should respond but only seemed to selectively follow his guidance. For 
example, townhalls were conducted and money was distributed quickly, however, multiple funds 
existed and the local government only had custody over one.124 Union officials working with 
county officials claimed that those officials often seemed preoccupied and the bureaucratic 
nature of the government did not assist in dealing with survivors and their needs or 
 
123 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. County fire chief leads 
emergency response because of how common wildfires are. That official credited the fire departments response 
but believed a fire chief in an active violent situation such as this was not as effective as someone from law 
enforcement would have been. 
124 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. Mr. Feinberg strongly 
recommends consolidation of funds into one effort that the local government has direct custody over. 
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demonstrations of solidarity.125 Five members of the San Bernardino United Relief fund 
represented local government bureaucracies. 
Non-profit institutions played a part as well. Blood donations were strong following the 
event and other general community level institutions responded and provided opportunities for 
the public to demonstrate. Due to the lack of successful businesses in the area, few business-
related institutions responded. For example, only one board member on the San Bernardino 
United Relief Board was from a local business.  
Though not considered especially vulnerable, it is important to note that specific 
institutions relevant to the victim group did respond. For example, the union response would 
likely not have been as strong without the victims being government, union covered workers. 
Unions were handicapped in responding to this mass casualty event for three reasons. The first is 
that union organizations have existed for many years and were created to protect workers and, 
though they have a nationwide reach, they did not seem to have as strong of an identity evident 
in traditionally vulnerable victim groups. The second is that unions traditionally negotiate with 
different bureaucracies and they may not have the organizational structure to allow for 
demonstrations of solidarity as seen by specific institutions related to a vulnerable victim group. 
The final reason is that unions covering the targeted victims were busy providing services to 
those survivors and the victims’ families and organizing and participating in demonstrations of 
solidarity following a mass casualty event may not have been one of their priorities. In 
conclusion, the poor institutional response including poor government and specific institutional 
response is supportive of hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b. 
 
125 Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. 
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Other Effects Upon Demonstrations of Solidarity 
  
The economy of San Bernardino could have had an impact upon demonstrations of 
solidarity that followed this event. In 2015 the city was in the midst of bankruptcy and one could 
logically argue that the poor state of the city hampered government led demonstrations. In 2015, 
California had the highest rate of poverty of any state in the nation. San Bernardino county had a 
near20% poverty rate that likely contributed significantly to the lower demonstrations of 
solidarity as people would have had less disposable income (Sepulvado 2016). The economy in 
the area is driven by low paying jobs like retail, manufacturing and transportation jobs and the 
lower gross domestic product per capita compared to the rest of the state and nation reflect 
that.126 There are few prominent businesses in the area and only one local business was 
represented on the San Bernardino United Relief Fund. Simply put, demonstrations of solidarity 
often cost money, either directly or from having to take time off work. This would also explain 
why a costless demonstration, such as donating blood, continued to be high in the area. It is 
important to recognize that each community is economically very different and these traits affect 
each community differently. For example, these economic factors can also be seen as a reason 
the area could be more resilient as coping skills are more common.127 Therefore, the incident 
itself could be perceived as less traumatic, causing fewer demonstrations of solidarity.  
There were some reactions to this event that are unique to this case or only exist rarely. 
For example, two groups contributed to demonstrations of solidarity in the area because they are 
 
126 Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official strongly 
believed that the economic state of San Bernardino and surrounding areas kept demonstrations of solidarity from 
being more prevalent. 
127 Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. This official believes the 
recent hardship within the area toughened the people of the area to trauma.  
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ingrained in society there. First was the San Manuel and Morongo Band of Mission Indians who 
operate successful casinos in the area. Second was the Little League baseball association as San 
Bernardino is home to the Western Region offices.128 Another seemingly rare phenomena that 
occurred after this event was the seemingly strong demonstrations of solidarity by the identity 
group of the attackers. It is unknown why the Muslim community responded so strongly after 
this attack and no empirical results exist to explain donation behaviors by the suspects identity 
group. The final noteworthy occurrence following this event is that a new institution was created 
due to this event after the government failed to respond appropriately in assisting survivors with 
care. The survivors have banded together, and with legal assistance, have created social 
networks, such as San Bernardino Survivors Speak Out. This Facebook group is dedicated to the 
survivors and highlighting the issues they have faced in dealing with the county and their 
workman’s compensation (San Bernardino Survivors Speak Out 2019).  
 These factors affected how the San Bernardino community responded to the event and it 
appears that a lack of vulnerable victim group and low institutional response both seem to have 
affected the lower numbers of demonstrations of solidarity that occurred. A takeaway from this 
case study should be that a targeted victim does not necessarily equate to a vulnerable victim 
group. Without the increased media coverage and strong social networks that vulnerable groups 
bring, the demonstrations of solidarity that followed seemed to be hampered. Weaker institutions 
do not solicit for demonstrations, have active collaborations across the community or readily 
provide methods for people to demonstrate solidarity. Findings similar to these are likely 
 
128 Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. 
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whenever a mass casualty event strikes either a non-vulnerable or random group of victims or 
areas with low institutionalization. 
Conclusion 
 
Results from these case studies are supportive of hypothesis 3 that states when a 
vulnerable victim group is targeted, higher demonstrations of solidarity will follow. Additionally, 
results are supportive of hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b which state that higher institutionalization, 
strong government institutional leadership or a strong specific institution response will lead to 
more demonstrations of solidarity. These findings are consistent with previous studies that 
indicate that local level capacity and institutions often play important roles in community 
recovery following a traumatic event. The presence of the vulnerable victim group and the high 
levels of institutionalization in the Pulse case study clearly amplified demonstrations of solidarity 
that followed while demonstrations of solidarity that followed the San Bernardino shooting did 
not have those benefits. Data regarding the effects of casualty numbers was obtained, however, 
casualty numbers do not seem to have the same influences on a community as they do 
individuals. With the variety of other factors influencing demonstrations of solidarity, a true 
most similar case design would be practically impossible to have.  
Throughout these case studies it became apparent that one of the biggest differences in 
community response to each of these violent mass casualty events is the presence of specific 
LGBT institutions in Orlando that greatly assisted in demonstrating solidarity there. Without a 
vulnerable victim group, those LGBT groups likely would not have responded nearly as strong 
as if a non-vulnerable group were targeted. LGBT people are a historically and recently 
marginalized group so these groups were still very active, ingrained within the community and 
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had the means to demonstrate solidarity with the victims on short notice after the Pulse attack 
occurred. Within San Bernardino, the closest comparison with these specific LGBT groups 
would be the unions. The biggest difference here, and what may explain some of the differences 
in response, is that the unions were actively representing the victims in San Bernardino while 
LGBT groups did not have a direct responsibility to the Pulse victims. These results are strongly 
supportive of hypothesis 4b which states that a strong specific institutional response will lead to 
high demonstrations of solidarity.  
The level of institutionalization in each case was very different. Orlando had the benefit 
of not only specific LGBT related institutional response but also a strong general and 
government institution response. The institutionalization in Orlando was not only high but also 
very organized which allowed for many demonstrations of solidarity to take place. Mayor Dyer 
and local government leaders were actively involved in soliciting for demonstrations of solidarity 
or directly involved in them. San Bernardino’s government reacted to the event and set up a fund 
for victims but their reaction seemed stymied from the beginning. The strong response from 
Orlando area government institution leaders and the poor response from the San Bernardino 
leadership is supportive of hypothesis 4a.  
The state of the economy in each area could also have influenced demonstrations of 
solidarity (See Table 8 & Table 11 for statistics). For example, Orlando/Orange County 2016 has 
an unemployment rate that is lower than the rest of the state and nation while San Bernardino 
2015 has an unemployment rate that is higher than rest of California and more than a percentage 
point higher than the rest of the nation. Poverty in San Bernardino is higher than that in 
Orlando/Orange County. Gross domestic product per capita is significantly lower in San 
Bernardino than the rest of California and the nation while gross domestic per capita is 
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significantly higher in Orlando/Orange County than the rest of Florida and nation. Higher 
income has been found to directly affect amount and frequency of giving behaviors and a 
comparison of these cases seems to be supportive of those findings (Bracha and Vesterlund 
2013). Median household income is only slightly higher in Orlando/Orange County than Florida 
but less than the nationwide median household income. In San Bernardino median household 
income is significantly less than rest of California but still higher than the rest of the nation. The 
economy in Orlando/Orange County is rooted in tourism and hospitality which brings a 
significant amount of money into the area and a tax revenue that is used to heighten the quality 
of life within the area. Additionally, those large companies that operate in Orlando are active 
members of the community and many demonstrated solidarity with the victims. Though the 
economy of San Bernardino seems to be improving, it is rooted in manufacturing and 
transportation which makes economic growth more difficult. The area has a lack of large 
businesses as seen in Orlando which contributed to the lack of demonstrations in San 
Bernardino. 
Another significant difference is that educational attainment (defined as percentage with 
a bachelor’s degree or higher) is significantly higher in Orlando/Orange County than in San 
Bernardino. This is consistent with findings that indicate that those with higher education will be 
more altruistic and donate more (Yen 2002; Andreoni et al. 2003; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). 
The role of trauma fatigue (aka compassion fatigue), defined as the gradual lessening of 
compassion over time due to consistent exposure to traumatic events, is something that was 
mentioned when researching these cases.129 Again, an important aspect of trauma fatigue is the 
 
129 Trauma fatigue was mentioned by several people I interviewed in both cases. 
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role the media plays. A higher number of casualties (either dead or injured) will attract the 
media’s attention and that consistent coverage can both advise people of an events occurrence 
while simultaneously exhausting and desensitizing them to violence. In 2015, there were 335 
“mass shootings” defined as when four or more people were shot or injured (Gun Violence 
Archive 2015). Based on this definition, there was another mass shooting in San Bernardino in 
March of 2015 and 27 other mass shootings throughout California (Gun Violence Archive 2015). 
In 2016 there were 382 mass shootings, 29 of which occurred in Florida. In Orlando there were 
two mass shootings in February and another in April (Gun Violence Archive 2016). This data 
does not seem to indicate that mass shootings articulated in this way cause any kind of trauma 
fatigue. The number of injured alone has been previously found to not be an influencing factor in 
donations when compared to fatalities (Evangelidis and Van de Bergh 2013). Two events 
occurred that could have caused trauma fatigue for San Bernardino. The first was a mass 
shooting/terrorist event in October of 2015 that resulted in the deaths of ten students in 
Roseburg, Oregon (Vanderhart, Johnson and Turkewitz 2015). The second was another violent 
mass casualty event in Isla Vista, California in May 2014 that resulted in the deaths of 6 people 
(Lovett and Nagourney 2014). Frequency of shootings do not seem to cause trauma fatigue, but 
the recency of another violent mass casualty event could cause trauma fatigue. 
The Google search data used in both case studies indicates the existence of a triggering 
effect when a mass casualty event occurs. For example, there are visible increases in Orlando 
related searches when the Las Vegas shooting occurred and visible increases in San Bernardino 
related searches when the Orlando shooting occurred. While trauma fatigue may have played a 
role in demonstrations of solidarity, it is important to recognize that demonstrations may have 
increased for each case as well based on previous mass casualty events potential demonstrators 
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may have been exposed too. Once a new mass casualty event occurred (Orlando and San 
Bernardino in this case), these individuals could have been emotionally triggered by the new 
violence they saw and demonstrated solidarity for the new event. 
The San Bernardino community responded resiliently and within their means. However, 
demonstrations of solidarity were less due to the lack of a vulnerable victim group and a lack of 
effective institutions. Casualty numbers do however attract media coverage, as it did in both 
cases, which is a definite predictor of demonstrations of solidarity (Eisensee and Stromberg 
2007; Brown and Minty 2008; Oosterhof, Heuvelman and Peters 2009). While casualty number 
seems to have an impact on demonstrations of solidarity, that variable is much more suited to be 
examined at the individual level. In conclusion, the biggest difference in explaining the different 
levels of demonstrations of solidarity between these two cases is that one area had a much higher 
capacity to deal with a traumatic event. Included in this capacity was the presence of specific 
institutions that were able to respond when a vulnerable group was targeted. Current emergency 
management policy stresses the importance of local government capacity in dealing with 
disasters and these results support those findings, along with hypothesis 3, hypothesis 4, 4a and 
4b (Birkland 2009).  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
  
This dissertation sought to achieve several goals. The first was to apply current social 
behavior theories and concepts like social capital, community resilience and altruism to explain 
the behaviors of people following a mass casualty event. Furthermore, it was suggested that these 
theories and concepts could be used to explain a community’s behavior following a mass 
casualty event, regardless of the source of the event. In operationalizing mass casualty events, a 
unique typology was provided that divided mass casualty events into four different categories; 
terrorism and criminal (violent) and weather and accidental (non-violent). 
The second goal was to test three related hypotheses through the use of a survey 
experiment in Chapter 4 while the first, third and fourth hypotheses are also tested using a case 
study method in Chapter 5:  
• Hypothesis 1: Higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
• Hypothesis 2: Violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than 
nonviolent events.  
o Hypothesis 2a: Terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of 
solidarity than other event types.  
• Hypothesis 3: Events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will 
generate more demonstrations of solidarity.  
• Hypothesis 4:  Victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization 
will have more demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event.  
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o Hypothesis 4a: A strong response from government institution leaders will 
lead to more demonstrations of solidarity  
o Hypothesis 4b: A strong specific institutional response will lead to more 
demonstrations of solidarity. 
Experimental results loosely suggest that casualty numbers influence demonstrations of 
solidarity while there was a minimal relationship between violent event types and 
demonstrations. Additionally, results suggest that victim type influences demonstrations much 
more. Altruistic behavior was found to be highly correlative with most of the demonstrations of 
solidarity tested while group membership was only found to be selectively correlative and often 
in a direction contrary to the proposed theory.  
Results from the case studies support hypothesis 3 as the vulnerable victim group of the 
Pulse incident played a crucial role in the high demonstrations of solidarity that followed. These 
in-depth case studies revealed the vulnerability pathways in which vulnerable victim groups 
affect demonstrations of solidarity. Furthermore, these case studies revealed the two crucial 
factors that explain the manner in which vulnerable victim groups affect demonstrations of 
solidarity. First is the role the media plays in covering such events. A media narrative that is 
inclusive of the victim type is likely to greatly affect following demonstrations of solidarity, 
supporting the “identifiable victim effect” previously established. Second is the role specific 
institutions play when a vulnerable victim group is targeted. The mobilization of these identity 
groups aligned with the victim typology is crucial for an amplified response whenever a 
vulnerable victim group is targeted. These groups often have an existing base of donors and 
volunteers that is conducive to demonstrating solidarity in a timely manner and they provide an 
avenue for common citizens uninvolved with the vulnerable victim group to demonstrate.  
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Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b is supported through the case studies as well. Institutions played 
an important role in the demonstrations of solidarity that followed the Pulse attack in Orlando 
and institutional support was lacking following the San Bernardino shooting. Government 
institutional leadership is important because they have a traditional authority in the community 
and they can solicit for demonstrations of solidarity. Specific institutions are important because 
they often represent the diverse nature of many communities. Additionally, prominent businesses 
and non-profit organizations within a community have the capital and ability to organize and 
participate in large scale demonstrations of solidarity. While some of these results are more 
supportive than others, there are both theoretical and policy contributions that can be drawn from 
them. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 
Though the sample utilized in the survey experiment was restricted to students, the results 
suggest that the structure of the experiments are correct and more experiments testing similar 
hypotheses is needed. In testing an argument reliant on the amount of loss of life in mass 
casualty events, it would be appropriate to provide respondents with more selections covering a 
much larger range of loss. Results from this experiment in testing hypothesis one suggests that 
higher casualty numbers do have a positive effect on demonstrations of solidarity but it failed to 
reach significant levels in these experiments. Would a more serious event (ex. if 50, 100, 200 
people killed) signal to the community that more help was needed, causing higher 
demonstrations of solidarity? Also, when testing theories related to event type, it appears that 
event type is significant under specific circumstances. However, results suggest that weather 
events will lead to more demonstrations of solidarity, not violent events. In order to account for 
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these changes then different event types need to be examined much more closely. For example, 
how common are certain events and do other factors affect demonstrations, such as state of 
emergency declarations? Measuring the effects of a mass casualty event through the use of a 
survey experiment are inherently difficult as the role of emotion plays an important part in 
dictating an individual’s response, and causing an emotional response through the use of a 
survey experiment (as opposed to experiencing an event firsthand) is extremely difficult. A 
larger and more representative sample (including those who have experienced an event) and 
implementing these other changes would likely lead to results more supportive of the hypotheses.   
 While results for Hypothesis 3 are very supportive it would still be advisable for future 
empirical testing with several modifications. Vulnerable groups seem to receive higher 
demonstrations of solidarity, however further examination between traditional and socially 
vulnerable groups is needed. Different processes seem to be taking place when traditional and 
socially vulnerable groups are targeted. The wording of the hypothesis might want to change 
from vulnerable to sympathetic as groups may not need to be especially vulnerable in order to 
have higher demonstrations of solidarity. For example, arguing that specific groups such as law 
enforcement or soldiers are vulnerable in the same manner than traditionally or socially 
vulnerable groups is difficult to do. However, these groups are indeed sympathetic and higher 
demonstrations of solidarity are likely to follow a mass casualty event where they have been 
targeted. The same mechanisms we saw in the case studies would be evident; an increased and 
inclusive media coverage and existing networks of social groups based on the identity of the 
victim groups.  
Throughout the experiments conducted, demonstrations of solidarity were measured in 
five different ways; social media response, volunteer time, blood donation, monetary donation 
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and event participation. Measurement of demonstrations throughout the case studies were also 
similarly aligned but not as restricted. While these demonstrations cover a wide range of 
different types of post mass casualty event behaviors, results suggest it would be beneficial to 
future researchers to examine each one more closely, particularly psychological motivators 
behind each one. What factors motivate someone to donate blood as opposed to donating time or 
money? Findings from the case studies indicate that factors such as availability of demonstration 
methods and cost are all likely to influence demonstrations. This is most evident in blood 
donation behavior. Both Orlando and San Bernardino had strong blood donation reactions and 
representative from both organizations interviewed believe it is because of the availability and 
low-cost aspect of blood donation. 
 Experimental results can provide valuable insight into the individual level of decision 
making regarding demonstrating solidarity following a mass casualty event and qualitative 
results can provide valuable insight into how a community may demonstrate solidarity following 
a mass casualty event. A possible future empirical direction in studying this phenomenon is 
through the use of a large N quantitative study. The nature of quantitative work is strong in terms 
of validity and the larger samples utilized lead to more generalizable results. The main issue with 
using a quantitative method to test these theories and concepts is the issue of data availability. 
The growing reliance on online donations could potentially lead to an abundance of data in time. 
Community level groups that do the majority of demonstrating solidarity often record 
inconsistent data regarding those demonstrations. The use of indexes that may not be as closely 
related to concepts or events measured also often leads to measurement error (King, Keohane 
and Verba 1994). If data issues could be overcome, a systematic analysis of mass casualty events 
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using quantitative methods would be able to provide interesting results that would go much 
further in providing evidence for the theories offered here. 
 Another interesting next step in related research would be to examine general community 
behavior as opposed to the strict demonstrations of solidarity as examined here. For example, 
crime rates were only briefly mentioned in the qualitative chapter of this dissertation. Crime is 
something that is existent within every community, but does the insertion of a mass casualty 
event affect those crime rates? Previous research has found a positive relationship between social 
capital and violent crime (Rosenfeld et al. 2001). Lemieux (2014) found a decline in property 
crime following a weather event in Canada. He further theorized that donations increased and 
crime decreased closer to the event epicenter. Is a traumatic, shocking event like a mass casualty 
event strong enough to affect crime rates within the community they occur in? Theoretically, 
lower crime rates should indicate a more stable and resilient community so we would expect a 
community with lower crime rates to respond with higher demonstrations of solidarity. 
Examining crime and other general community behaviors would help explain if a community 
responds resiliently or non-resiliently following a mass casualty event.  
Policy Contributions 
 
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) of 1992 was often criticized for its lack of engagement 
of state and local governments (Harrald 2012; Kapucu 2009). Historical emergency management 
policies did not include the utilization of demonstrations of solidarity that often arise following a 
mass casualty event. However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, emergency 
management throughout the United States has evolved. As policy changed after Hurricane 
Katrina and other major events, emergency management has begun to recognize the importance 
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of local capacity. The “government-centric approach” has been criticized for not properly 
engaging local communities in disaster recovery (FEMA 2011). Newer policies emphasize the 
need for collaboration not only across government agencies but also between government 
agencies and other community institutions. Local governments have been found to play a key 
role in emergency management and they often collaborate with other local institutions to prepare 
for and respond to disasters (Kapucu 2012; Waugh 1994). Current emergency management 
policy seems to be realizing the importance of local capacity and the findings from this 
dissertation further those ideas. However, these policies do not consider the unique factors of 
each mass casualty event to tap into the demonstrations of solidarity that could follow. This is 
likely due to the fact that these types of events are complex and the major motivators to 
demonstrate solidarity are relatively unknown. If these demonstrations were properly utilized, a 
great deal of resources could be gathered and put towards the recovery of the community. 
Finally, as with any empirical work there is a “why” question. This dissertation and 
related research provide several important insights into explaining community response to mass 
casualty events that are applicable to policymakers and the real world. First, better understanding 
the psychological and organizational behaviors behind demonstrations of solidarity would make 
it easier to predict the levels in which demonstrations would occur following an event. Second, if 
a community’s response could be predicted then the appropriate resources could be managed 
accordingly and a smoother transition back into normalization could take place. 
 There are several ways in which more supportive and thorough empirical results 
regarding demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event could influence policy. 
For example, the resilience of small governed areas (like counties or cities) could be measured 
preemptively based on different factors. When a mass casualty event impacted that area then 
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there would be an idea of how that community would demonstrate solidarity. If it was an area 
with low resilience (expected to respond with low demonstrations of solidarity) then more 
support could be brought in to help the area become more resilient and demonstrations would 
increase. Government institutions could preemptively arrange different agreements and 
relationships with other institutions to provide assistance to the community.  
Demonstrations of solidarity are an important step in the healing process a community 
undergoes following a traumatic event. If assistance could be given to communities to maximize 
their demonstrating potential then those communities should return to normalization quicker and 
those bonds of solidarity within that community could be strengthened. While these results are 
preliminary, they provide important insight into how the facts of a mass casualty event and 
community institutionalization could influence demonstrations of solidarity. 
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A.1- Database: Accident & Terrorism 
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A.2- Database: Crime & Weather 
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County State Month Day Year Type Method Casualty Population Poverty UnEmpl Education MHI #White SoE SoE Prior SoE Total VicVul Specifc Victims? NAIC 813 per Cap Source
Saint Bernard  LA 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 35           64,951          17.3      . 10.9          27,367    . 1     -          66            1         poor/black 32            2,029.7 https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2014/08/hurricane_katrina_st_bernard_n.html
Harris  TX 09 23 2005 Weather Hurricane 35           3,732,000    17.9      5.7        27.3          30,750    . 1     -          23            -     . 2,387      1,563.5 https://www.weather.gov/hgx/climate_reviews_pshhgx_Rita05
Walker  TX 09 23 2005 Weather Hurricane 5             64,330          22.6      5.6        . . . 1     -          23            -     . 46            1,398.5 https://www.myplainview.com/news/article/Number-of-deaths-related-to-Rita-difficult-to-8524114.php
Hancock  MS 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 50           46,097          15.5      10.8      . . . 1     -          44            -     . 34            1,355.8 https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2014/08/hurricane_katrina_st_bernard_n.html
Dallas  TX 09 23 2005 Weather Hurricane 23           2,317,000    34.9      5.7        27.1          30,293    . 1     -          23            -     . 1,964      1,179.7 https://www.google.com/search?q=hurricane+rita+dallas+texas&oq=hurricane+rita+dallas+texas&aqs=chrome..69i57.5002j1j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Galveston  TX 09 23 2005 Weather Hurricane 36           274,494       13.3      5.7        26.1          33,944    . 1     -          23            -     . 243         1,129.6 http://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/research/txhur.pdf
Jackson  MS 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 12           134,474       15.4      9.9        17.1          28,339    . 1     -          44            -     . 130         1,034.4 https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf
Harrisson  MS 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 126        195,843       16.1      10.8      19.4          26,563    . 1     -          44            -     . 194         1,009.5 https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf
Orleans  LA 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 1,464     455,188       25.5      . 31.3          26,926    . 1     -          66            1         poor/black 458         993.9     https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf
Pearl River  MS 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 17           51,764          22.5      9.2        . . . 1     -          44            -     . 53            976.7     https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf
Jefferson  TX 09 23 2005 Weather Hurricane 6             246,063       19.7      7.8        19.6          26,328    . 1     -          23            -     . 307         801.5     http://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/research/txhur.pdf
Forrest  MS 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 7             75,726          27.7      6.2        24.1          21,011    . 1     -          44            -     . 102         742.4     https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf
Vanderburgh  IN 11 6 2005 Weather Tornado 25           173,521       13.4      5.2        21.4          29,680    . - -          . -     . 267         649.9     https://www.weather.gov/media/pah/Top10Events/2005/evansvilletornado.pdf
Jones  MS 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 12           65,915          25.0      5.7        12.6          24,253    . 1     -          44            -     . 108         610.3     https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf
Macon  TN 02 6 2008 Weather Tornado 13           22,007          20.3      8.3        7.4            22,910    . - -          . -     . 11            2,000.6 https://www.newschannel5.com/Global/story.asp?S=8048774
Harris  TX 09 7 2008 Weather Hurricane 9             3,981,000    15.3      4.7        27.6          33,893    . 1     -          16            -     . 2,411      1,651.2 https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5838a3.htm
Sumner  TN 02 6 2008 Weather Tornado 22           155,704       8.7        6.0        22.6          34,194    . - -          . -     . 136         1,144.9 https://www.spc.noaa.gov/climo/reports/080205_rpts.html
Galveston  TX 09 7 2008 Weather Hurricane 8             288,489       11.9      5.6        26.4          38,573    . 1     -          16            -     . 268         1,076.5 https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092008_Ike.pdf
Pike  AR 06 10 2010 Weather Flood 16           11,236          21.2      9.1        12.4          25,079    9,961          - -          . 1         children 11            1,021.5 https://web.archive.org/web/20100617081151/https://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gTJioKmEcYR7qOaIAsX9CmwOy0VgD9G9V5UG0
Davidson  TN 05 2 2010 Weather Flood 10           628,131       17.3      8.2        34.5          32,223    358,845     - -          . -     . 992         633.2     http://www.tnema.org/news/tema/?p=423
Hale  AL 04 27 2011 Weather Tornado 6             15,364          28.5      13.8      10.0          23,564    6,337          1     -          35            -     . 8              1,920.5 https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_04272011sawyerville
Catoosa  GA 04 29 2011 Weather Tornado 8             64,873          14.4      8.2        18.2          31,377    58,828       - -          . -     . 59            1,099.5 http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2011/apr/29/officials-identify-eight-tornado-fatalities-ringgo/48562/
Faulkner  AR 04 25 2011 Weather Tornado 5             116,308       14.7      7.2        24.8          35,295    91,882       - -          . -     . 106         1,097.2 https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/deadly-tornado-outbreak/tornado-hits-vilonia-arkansas-2nd-time-just-three-years-n91176
Dekalb  AL 04 27 2011 Weather Tornado 31           71,387          20.3      11.8      9.9            25,927    58,091       1     -          35            -     . 67            1,065.5 http://whnt.com/2016/04/23/dekalb-county-remembers-2011-tornado-in-rainsville-memorial-saturday/
Newton  MO 05 22 2011 Weather Tornado 158        58,823          16.1      8.0        18.1          27,955    50,935       - -          . -     . 59            997.0     https://www.weather.gov/sgf/news_events_2011may22
Jasper  MO 05 22 2011 Weather Tornado 158        117,853       16.8      7.6        21.4          27,401    100,546     - -          . -     . 153         770.3     https://www.weather.gov/sgf/news_events_2011may22
Monroe  MS 04 27 2011 Weather Tornado 16           36,544          19.3      12.0      12.6          27,461    25,012       - -          . -     . 48            761.3     https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_04272011shottsville
Tuscaloosa  AL 04 27 2011 Weather Tornado 44           91,568          20.2      8.3        26.7          33,401    124,560     1     -          35            -     . 235         389.7     https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_04272011tuscbirm
Bertie  NC 04 18 2011 Weather Tornado 11           20,971          25.1      12.1      10.8          23,697    7,381          - -          . -     . 56            374.5     https://pilotonline.com/news/local/weather/article_7195ba2a-d804-5c7c-91d1-f65a5e641705.html
Marion  AL 04 27 2011 Weather Tornado 7             3,685            25.6      11.2      8.2            24,581    28,497       1     -          35            -     . 31            118.9     https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_04272011shottsville
Yavapai  AZ 06 30 2013 Weather Wildfire 19           215,271       16.4      7.7        24.3          26,797    173,253     - -          . 1         firefighters 213         1,010.7 https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/30/fire-in-arizona-prompts-evacuation-of-120-homes/2477469/
Clear Creek/Summit  CO 04 20 2013 Weather Avalanche 5             18,932          9.2        5.5        43.8          38,683    15,613       - -          . -     . 27            701.2     https://www.denverpost.com/2013/04/21/colorado-avalanche-victims-were-part-of-snowboard-gathering-turned-tragic/
Canadian  OK 05 31 2013 Weather Tornado 8             6,679            7.3        4.1        24.5          38,046    94,959       - -          . -     . 17            392.9     https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/10/131024-tornado-el-reno-oklahoma-samaras-enhanced-fujita-scale/
Cleveland  OK 05 21 2013 Weather Tornado 24           3,230            12.7      4.3        29.8          36,505    195,743     - -          . -     . 196         16.5       https://www.nbcnews.com/news/all/satellite-picture-reveals-scar-left-behind-moore-tornado-flna6C10219235?franchiseSlug=sciencemain
Snohomish  WA 03 22 2014 Weather Mudslide 49           759,417       9.9        5.7        29.1          43,272    537,410     1     -          24            -     . 565         1,344.1 https://snohomishcountywa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/3913
Jefferson  LA 08 31 2005 Weather Hurricane 30           451,652       15.5      . 23.0          30,605    . 1     -          66            1         poor/black 321         1,407.0 https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2014/08/hurricane_katrina_st_bernard_n.html
Coffee  TN 10 3 2001 Crime Knife 7             48,544          12.4      4.4        . . . - -          . -     . 66            735.5     https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/04/us/6-killed-in-greyhound-crash-in-tennessee-after-passenger-slits-driver-s-throat.html
Montgomery  MD 10 3 2002 Crime Shooting 5             906,145       4.3        3.5        . . . - -          . -     . 960         943.9     http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/South/10/03/maryland.shootings/
Washburn  WI 11 21 2004 Crime Shooting 6             16,458          11.4      6.3        . . . - -          . -     . 22            748.1     https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/chai-vang-moved-iowa-prison/
Waukesha  WI 03 12 2005 Crime Shooting 7             374,989       3.8        3.8        37.2          41,542    . - -          . -     . 373         1,005.3 http://www.thejournal.org/issues/issue99/autopsy.html
Beltrami  MN 03 21 2005 Crime Shooting 10           42,653          19.4      5.3        . . . - -          . 1         high school students 50            853.1     http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/03/25_helmsm_prozacfolo/
King  WA 03 25 2006 Crime Shooting 7             1,832,000    9.6        3.7        44.6          42,579    . - -          . -     . 2,132      859.3     https://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Ravers-flock-to-Web-for-news-1199446.php
Lancaster  PA 10 2 2006 Crime Shooting 5             55,169          9.1        3.5        22.9          32,556    . - -          . 1         Amish/Female Schoolchildren 661         83.5       https://web.archive.org/web/20061002205912/http://cbs3.com/topstories/local_story_275115123.html
Forest  WI 10 7 2007 Crime Shooting 7             9,751            16.5      7.1        . . . - -          . 1         Students 4              2,437.8 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/us/08cnd-shoot.html?hp&mtrref=en.wikipedia.org&gwh=386B58FAEBCF0ED81D961106B8564D8F&gwt=pay
Salt Lake  UT 02 13 2007 Crime Shooting 5             1,002,000    9.0        2.5        29.3          332,372 . - -          . -     . 523         1,915.9 https://web.archive.org/web/20141006080559/http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/site297/2008/0129/20080129_023518_trolleyreport.pdf
King  WA 12 24 2007 Crime Shooting 6             1,832,000    9.9        3.2        44.0          40,509    . - -          . -     . 1,027      1,783.8 https://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Man-admits-to-Carnation-killings-in-bid-to-dodge-5129224.php
Douglas  NE 12 5 2007 Crime Shooting 8             497,292       12.0      3.4        35.6          33,744    . - -          . -     . 577         861.9     https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shooting-nebraska/mall-shooter-hid-assault-rifle-in-sweatshirt-idUSN0564256720071206
Montgomery  VA 04 16 2007 Crime Shooting 33           89,284          19.9      3.2        42.4          31,996    . - -          . -     . 109         819.1     https://web.archive.org/web/20131015095917/http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf
Los Angeles  CA 12 24 2008 Crime Arson/Shooting 9             9,779,000    15.3      7.6        28.1          33,229    . - -          . -     . 5,863      1,667.9 https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/us/27shooting.html?ref=us
Dekalb  IL 02 14 2008 Crime Shooting 6             106,503       15.6      5.8        8.0            35,749    . - -          . 1         College Students 94            1,133.0 https://web.archive.org/web/20080704030041/http://www.northernstar.info/article/2350/
St. Louis  MO 02 7 2008 Crime Shooting 8             992,331       9.0        6.0        38.7          38,918    . - -          . 1         Government Employees 1,012      980.6     https://web.archive.org/web/20080208212628/http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/stlouiscitycounty/story/DF9F175C2F225844862573E9001BDB9A?OpenDocument
Skagit  WA 09 2 2008 Crime Shooting 6             118,373       11.4      6.1        24.4          32,740    . - -          . -     . 142         833.6     https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/skagit-county-shooting-spree-leaves-6-dead-including-sheriffs-deputy-2-injured/
Henderson  KY 06 25 2008 Crime Shooting 5             45,466          11.8      6.1        16.2          30,207    . - -          . -     . 55            826.7     https://web.archive.org/web/20080628081721/http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hCQpscfc_M8JtSecCWwa2c9zp7mQD91H5ONG0
Pierce  WA 11 29 2009 Crime Shooting 5             796,836       12.3      9.7        23.7          37,652    572,853     - -          . 1         cops 634         1,256.8 https://web.archive.org/web/20091202064239/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010382767_webfourdead29m.html
Broome  NY 04 3 2009 Crime Shooting 14           194,630       16.3      8.2        26.5          31,195    171,538     - -          . -     . 223         872.8     https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=7249853&page=1
Moore  NC 03 23 2009 Crime Shooting 8             87,158          13.3      10.1      32.5          27,943    66,740       - -          . 1         Elderly 110         792.3     https://www.wral.com/news/local/story/4837676/
Coffee  AL 03 10 2009 Crime Shooting 6             48,365          15.7      8.5        22.3          31,484    35,268       - -          . -     . 67            721.9     https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/us/12alabama.html?hp
Geneva  AL 03 10 2009 Crime Shooting 5             4,445            19.4      15.3      9.7            22,436    22,036       - -          . -     . 25            177.8     http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/03/10/shooting.alabama/
Hartford  CT 08 3 2010 Crime Shooting 8             895,303       11.3      9.5        34.1          42,267    598,255     - -          . -     . 975         918.3     http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/08/03/connecticut.business.shootings/index.html
Orange  CA 10 12 2011 Crime Shooting 8             3,056,000    13.0      9.1        36.7          41,734    1,339,135 - -          . -     . 1,733      1,763.4 http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/10/vigil-seal-beach-salon-shooting.html
Carson City  NV 09 6 2011 Crime Shooting 5             54,756          14.8      13.2      . 52,199    . - -          . 1         Troops 45            1,216.8 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shooting-nevada/four-dead-in-shooting-at-nevada-restaurant-idUSTRE78550M20110906
Summit  OH 08 7 2011 Crime Shooting 8             541,281       16.5      9.1        28.1          34,803    433,086     - -          . -     . 610         887.3     http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/08/shooter_described_as_eccentric.html
Kent  MI 07 7 2011 Crime Shooting 7             608,111       14.7      8.2        31.5          33,385    458,610     - -          . -     . 747         814.1     https://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2011/07/gun_used_by_rodrick_dantzler_i.html
Pima  AZ 01 8 2011 Crime Shooting 6             2,382            20.4      8.5        29.1          31,684    542,627     - -          . 1         Government Employees 646         3.7          http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/01/08/20110108arizona-giffords-brk.html
Arapahoe  CO 07 20 2012 Crime Shooting 12           596,383       10.4      7.7        38.3          41,840    364,766     - -          . -     . 282         2,114.8 https://www.bellenews.com/2012/07/23/world/us-news/james-holmes-appears-in-court-being-accused-of-killing-12-people-in-aurora-cinema-shooting/
Fairfield  CT 12 14 2012 Crime Shooting 28           935,238       8.9        7.8        46.3          47,110    605,569     - -          . 1         school children 935         1,000.3 http://www.theoaklandpress.com/general-news/20121215/sandy-hook-elementary-newtown-connecticut-shooting-timeline
Alameda  CA 04 2 2012 Crime Shooting 7             1,157,000    13.1      8.7        42.4          45,385    516,893     - -          . 1         students 1,219      949.1     http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/04/death-toll-7-in-oakland-religious-school-shooting.html
King  WA 05 30 2012 Crime Shooting 6             2,009,000    11.9      7.3        45.9          45,186    1,277,867 - -          . -     . 2,210      909.0     https://abcnews.go.com/US/ian-stawicki-seattle-cafe-racer-shooter-kills-shoots-citywide/story?id=16463885
Hennepin  MN 09 27 2012 Crime Shooting 7             1,185,000    13.1      5.2        46.8          41,669    840,845     - -          . -     . 1,385      855.6     http://www.startribune.com/shooter-business-owner-ups-driver-among-those-killed/171609251/
Los Angeles  CA 06 7 2013 Crime Shooting 6             10,005,000 19.0      9.8        30.1          33,247    2,721,187 - -          . -     . 6,000      1,667.5 http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831196-five-dead-including-gunman-in-shooting-rampage-near-los-angeles?lite
Miami-Dade  FL 07 26 2013 Crime Shooting 7             2,642,000    21.0      7.4        26.8          28,398    396,762     - -          . -     . 1,763      1,498.6 https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/florida-shooting
D.C.  WA 09 16 2013 Crime Shooting 13           649,165       18.8      8.5        55.1          53,660    217,331     - -          . -     . 3,169      204.8     https://nypost.com/2013/09/16/dc-cops-fbi-probe-shooting-at-washington-navy-yard/
Snohomish  WA 10 24 2014 Crime Shooting 5             759,417       9.9        5.7        29.1          43,272    537,410     - -          . 1         high school students 565         1,344.1 https://web.archive.org/web/20141108071403/http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/marysville-shooting/2014/11/08/marysville-shooting-victim-andrew-fryberg/18681377/
Texas  MO 02 26 2015 Crime Shooting 8             25,690          23.3      6.6        13.0          23,702    23,503       - -          . 9         . 32            802.8     https://www.houstonherald.com/news/sheriff-nine-killed-in-tyrone-murders-shooter-is-dead/article_b59bf6b8-be73-11e4-9f6a-c79579d79c5b.html
Douglas  OR 10 1 2015 Crime Shooting 9             107,685       19.5      7.5        14.9          27,547    95,193       - -          . 1         College Students 4,484      24.0       https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/10/01/officials-active-shooter-oregon-college/73153610/
Skagit  WA 09 23 2016 Crime Shooting 5             116,901       14.9      7.7        24.4          35,450    90,922       - -          . -     . 145         806.2     https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/23/us/washington-mall-shooting/index.html
Santa Barbara  CA 05 23 2014 Crime Shooting 6             91,169          17.4      6.1        32.0          34,637    201,923     - -          . 1         women 440         207.2     https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/26/justice/california-elliot-rodger-timeline/
Kalamazoo  MI 02 20 2016 Crime Shooting 6             75,984          16.6      4.1        37.9          35,291    202,746     - -          . -     . 272         279.4     https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2016/03/police_believe_jason_dalton_us.html
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APPENDIX B: VIGNETTES & EXPERIMENTAL DOCUMENTS 
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B.1- Vignette 1  
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Version 1 
 
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather 
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 2 dead and 
many others injured. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene 
to assist and relief efforts are underway.  
 
Version 2 
 
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather 
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 6 dead and 
many others injured. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene 
to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 3 
 
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather 
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 23 dead 
and many others injured. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on 
scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 4 
 
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community killing 2 people and leaving many 
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is 
currently being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of terrorism. The community is 
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
 
Version 5 
 
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community killing 6 people and leaving many 
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is 
currently being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of terrorism. The community is 
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
 
Version 6 
 
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community killing 23 people and leaving many 
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is 
currently being investigated by Federal authorities an act of terrorism. The community is 
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.  
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B.2- Distractor Question 1 
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Question 1: On the next screen you will be asked to rank the first four U.S. presidents in 
chronological order 
Rank the first four U.S. presidents in chronological order 
______ Thomas Jefferson (1) 
______ John Adams (2) 
______ James Madison (3) 
______ George Washington (4) 
Question 2: On the next screen you will be asked to rank the last four U.S. presidents with the 
most recent first 
Rank the last four U.S. presidents with the most recent scored the lowest.  
______ William J. Clinton (1) 
______ Donald J. Trump (2) 
______ George W. Bush (3) 
______ Barack H. Obama (4) 
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B.3- Vignette 2  
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Version 1 
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather 
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area. The area is 
devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the number dead. The 
community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts 
are underway. 
Version 2 
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community. The responsible party was  
apprehended leaving the area and the incident is being investigated by Federal authorities as an 
act of terrorism. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event 
due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on 
scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 3 
Imagine that a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed 
within your community. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass 
casualty event due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many 
organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 4 
Imagine that a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several 
people during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible 
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the attempted 
robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused. The area is devastated and the 
incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the number dead. The community is 
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
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B.4- Distractor Question 2 
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Question 1: On the next screen you will be asked to complete the numerical sequence 
What comes next in the numerical sequence: 
1 4 9 16 25 __ 
29  (1)  
33  (2)  
36  (3)  
39  (4)  
 
Question 2: On the next screen you will be asked to complete the numerical sequence 
What comes next in the numerical sequence:  
-2 5 -4 3 -2 __ 
0  (1)  
1  (2)  
2  (3)  
3  (4)  
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B.5- Vignette 3  
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Version 1 
Imagine that a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several 
people during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible 
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the attempted 
robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused, mostly school children who 
were at the bank for a field trip. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass 
casualty event due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many 
organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 2 
Imagine that a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several 
people during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible 
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the attempted 
robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused, seemingly random bystanders. 
The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the 
number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist 
and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 3 
Imagine that a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed 
within your community. Victims are mainly school age children who were on several different 
school buses. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event 
due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on 
scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
Version 4 
Imagine that a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed 
within your community. Victims were seemingly random commuters. The area is devastated and 
the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the number dead. The community is 
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway. 
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B.6- Response Questions 
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Question 1: In the week following the event, would any of your social media activity (Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram etc.) be in response to the event? (ex. Posts/hashtags related to event, marking 
yourself as “safe,” changing pictures etc.) 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
Not involved with social media  (3)  
Question 2: If you had two hours of free time in the week following the event, how much of that 
time would you devote to relief efforts? (Out of 120 minutes) 
 _______ Total Time Spent (1) 
Question 3: Would you donate blood in the week following the event? 
No  (1)  
Yes  (2)  
Question 4: If you had $100 in the week following the event that you were not using for anything 
else, how much (if any) would you donate to a charitable or relief effort related to the event? 
(Out of 100 dollars) 
 _______ Total Money Spent (1) 
Question 5: Would you attend a large group event immediately following the event meant to 
show solidarity with the victims and community? (Ex. candlelight vigil) 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
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B.7- Demographic/Introductory Questions 
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How old are you? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is your sex? 
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
No Sex  (3)  
Prefer not to answer  (4)  
 
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? 
Less than High School  (1)  
High school graduate or equivalent (ex. GED)  (2)  
Some college  (3)  
Associates (2 year degree)  (4)  
Bachelors (4 year degree)  (5)  
Master's Degree  (6)  
Doctorate  (7)  
Professional Degree (MD, JD etc.)  (8)  
 
Describe your income (before taxes) 
less than $30,000  (1)  
$30,000-$39,999  (2)  
$40,000-$49,999  (3)  
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$50,000-$59,999  (4)  
$60,000-$69,999  (5)  
$70,000-$79,999  (6)  
$80,000 or more  (7)  
 
On the scale below indicate your political leanings 
 
 
How often do you attend religious services weekly? 
None  (1)  
1  (2)  
2-3  (3)  
More than 3  (4)  
 
How many social, civic or organizational groups are you a member of? (ex. Alumni associations, 
charitable/neighborhood groups, fraternities/sororities etc.) 
None  (1)  
1  (2)  
2-3  (3)  
More than 3  (4)  
Would you go out of your way to do something nice for a stranger? 
Very Often  (1)  
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Often  (2)  
Occasionally  (3)  
Not Often  (4)  
Never  (5)  
 
Have you ever experienced an event where a large number of people were killed in a single 
incident? (including military service) 
No  (1)  
Experienced firsthand  (2)  
Knew someone who was a victim and survived  (3)  
Knew someone who was killed during an event  (4)  
People often respond to an event or occurrence (such as disasters, assassinations, attacks, strikes, 
injustices etc.) in ways that reflect support for the afflicted community. Examples include 
something as simple as social media support to participating in charitable events to devoting time 
and effort to aid the victims and community. 
You will now face the first of three different imaginary scenarios. You will then face a series of 
questions regarding your response to the events that take place within your scenario. Some of 
your scenarios may seem to be closely related so read carefully and answer truthfully. You are 
free to quit at any time. 
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B.8- Explanation for Exempt Research 
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B.9- Experiment IRB Approval Letter 
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B.10- Pearson’s Correlation Table of Descriptive Variables 
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Age Sex Education Income Politics Religion Altruism PriorMCE
Age 1.00
Sex 0.0715 1.00
Education 0.4963 -0.1222 1.00
Income 0.5626 -0.0044 0.3375 1.00
Politics 0.0621 -0.1357 0.1273 0.1201 1.00
Religion 0.0562 0.0348 0.0788 0.1495 0.1804 1.00
Altruism 0.0226 0.1018 -0.0704 -0.0676 -0.1241 0.0929 1.00
Prior MCE 0.2051 -0.0632 0.0088 0.1326 -0.0017 -0.0053 0.0859 1.00
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B.11- Factor Analysis Matrices 
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Experiment 1 
 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 1.69 0.55 0.33 0.33
Factor2 1.13 0.30 0.23 0.56
Factor3 0.83 0.13 0.16 0.73
Factor4 0.69 0.04 0.14 0.87
Factor5 0.65 - 0.13 1.00
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 61.01 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
Social Media -0.513 0.63 0.33
Time 0.6 0.31 0.53
Blood 0.42 0.57 0.49
Money 0.69 0.28 0.44
Event -0.63 0.47 0.37
ROTATE
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 1.45 0.08 0.29 0.29
Factor2 1.36 - 0.27 0.56
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 61.01 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
SocialMedia 0.02 0.81 0.33
Time 0.66 -0.15 0.54
Blood 0.69 0.15 0.49
Money 0.71 -0.23 0.44
Event -0.17 0.77 0.37
Factor1 Factor2
Factor1 0.75 -0.65
Factor2 0.65 0.75
PREDICT
Variable Factor1 Factor2
SocialMedia 0.13 0.62
Time 0.45 -0.02
Blood 0.52 0.22
Money 0.47 -0.75
Event -0.01 0.56
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Experiment 2 
     
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.15 1.24 0.43 0.43
Factor2 0.90 0.12 0.18 0.61
Factor3 0.78 0.15 0.15 0.76
Factor4 0.62 0.10 0.12 0.89
Factor5 0.52 - 0.10 1.00
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
Social Media -0.60 0.63
Time 0.75 0.42
Blood 0.50 0.75
Money 0.71 0.49
Event -0.69 0.52
ROTATE
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.15 - 0.43 0.43
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
SocialMedia -0.60 0.63
Time 0.75 0.43
Blood 0.50 0.75
Money 0.71 0.49
Event -0.69 0.52
Factor1
Factor1 1.00
PREDICT
Variable Factor1
SocialMedia -0.28
Time 0.34
Blood 0.23
Money 0.32
Event -0.32
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 126.36 Prob>chi2=0.00
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 126.36 Prob>chi2=0.00
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Experiment 3 
   
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.38 1.56 0.47 0.47
Factor2 0.83 0.06 0.16 0.64
Factor3 0.77 0.20 0.15 0.80
Factor4 0.56 0.11 0.11 0.91
Factor5 0.45 - 0.09 1.00
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
Social Media -0.64 0.58
Time 0.76 0.42
Blood 0.53 0.72
Money 0.76 0.42
Event -0.73 0.46
ROTATE
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.38 - 0.47 0.47
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
SocialMedia -0.64 0.58
Time 0.76 0.42
Blood 0.53 0.72
Money 0.76 0.42
Event -0.73 0.46
Factor1
Factor1 1.00
PREDICT
Variable Factor1
SocialMedia -0.27
Time 0.32
Blood 0.22
Money 0.32
Event -0.30
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 179.37 Prob>chi2=0.00
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 179.37 Prob>chi2=0.00
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APPENDIX C: QUALITATIVE  
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C.1- Explanation of Exempt Research 
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C.2- Qualitative IRB Approval Letter 
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C.3- Interview Instrument 
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions Examples: 
1. What is your name, job title, job description? 
a. What was your job title at the time of the incident? 
2. What does your organization do? 
a. How does your organization work with existing partners within the community? 
3. What was your organizations role in the community before the incident? 
a. If organization did not exist then question is omitted. 
b. How did your organization form? 
c. Did existing members of the community assist in forming the organization? 
4. How did the incident change your organizations role in the community? 
5. What did your organization do regarding the incident? 
6. Whose idea was it to respond in that way? 
7. Was your organization prepared in responding to such an event? 
a. How did the community as a whole react to the event? 
b. What role did the media have in the event? 
c. Was your organization asked to assist following the event or did you do so on your 
own? 
8. What are some of the lessons your organization learned regarding how to respond to such 
an event? 
a. If another mass casualty event where to take place within your community, how 
do you think your organization would react differently? 
9. How do you feel the community responded overall? 
10. What do you think impacts community response to such events? 
a. Other experience with disasters/MCE’s 
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